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	 3 
Introduction 
 
No single commodity has been so important in delineating the frontiers 
American national security as oil. Concerns about the future availability (and price) of 
fossil fuels have factored heavily in the U.S. foreign policy-making process for the last 
several decades, shaping the country’s objectives, political alliances, and overall 
engagement with the world. The notion of energy security is usually considered to have 
become central in the American political debate in the 1970s, when a series of 
tumultuous events shook the Middle East and restructured the functioning of the 
industry, while the emergence of Washington’s real strategic interest towards oil is 
usually dated back to the WWII years. Yet the survival of the state and the access to 
petroleum had been interlinked well before. A compelling narrative about a vital and 
incoming “global struggle for oil” developed already at the beginning of the century, 
prompting a shift in the administration’s attitude toward petroleum and the 
identification of foreign sources of supply as direct U.S. interest. The dissertation 
investigates the origins of Washington’s interest in petroleum and the elements that 
originally shaped the country’s foreign oil policy in the early twentieth century. The 
chapters center on the analysis of the American political debate and give special 
consideration to the international race to secure oil concessions in the Middle East that 
began before WWI and that culminated in the early 1920s. The study follows the 
establishment of a new, more assertive stance towards the securing of sources of supply 
in U.S. politics, and looks at the parallel evolution of concept of national interest. In 
examining the process of actual policy-formation, the research looks into the discussion 
between the various branches and departments of the administration, as well as between 
the federal government and the other private actors involved in petroleum exploration 
and production. The aim is to reconstruct the arguments that were used to support 
Washington’s drive toward the acquisition of petroleum supply, in order to understand 
how the access to oil resources – both at home and abroad – was presented, justified, 
and pursued before the American public. 
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1.1 The Industry: The Spindletop Effect 
 
1.1.1 The Shiny Well Upon a Hill  
A twentieth century of oil-fuelled energy and dreams of endless growth started 
with a small delay on the Gregorian schedule, on January 10, 1901. Captain Anthony 
Lucas was the man that unwittingly inaugurated the new era when he struck oil at 1,200 
foot deep, under a small hill south of Beaumont, Texas, about twenty miles from the 
coast of the Gulf of Mexico. The well came in around 10:30 in the morning. The first 
violent spurt of mud sent tons of 4-inch drill pipe shooting high over the derrick, 
carrying its heavy crown block into the sky before falling back ruinously to the ground. 
The three-man crew working on the hillock had barely the time to scamper away. Soon 
after, what they thought was a cannon shot anticipated a second powerful eruption. 
Following the rapid expulsion of high-pressure gas, an impressive 6-inch thick column 
of oil rose high above the top of the damaged derrick. The greenish, straight stream of 
oil went more than one hundred feet above the wooden structure1. The pressure at the 
head of the well was so high that petroleum flowed – and flew – uncontrolled for nine 
days before the drillers were able to cap it. The steady and continuous jet inundated the 
adjacent lands and fathered out in the sky, creating a heavy and oily mist that smeared 
the town. Lucas and his men tried to recapture at least part of the oil, hastily building 
earthen levees on the hill. The flood, however, seemed impossible to dam. Petroleum 
spilled over the barriers and run wild, starting to pool in ditches and pits. Sand was 
finally amassed to confine the oil within a close perimeter. When the flow was stopped, 
the final black lagoon was four to six feet deep and covered an area of almost one 
hundred acres2. There was no doubt: the Spindletop well was a “gusher” – one of 
gigantic proportions, too.  
                                                
1 There are countless accounts about the Spindletop discovery, but (almost) all of them differ on this 
2 The events that took place at Beaumont on January 10, 1901, are taken and condensed here from several 
different accounts. Besides the works mentioned above, the story of those days at Spindletop is found also 
in Paul N. Spellman, Spindletop Boom Days (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M Press, 2001); Jo Ann 
Stiles, Judith Linsley, and Ellen Rienstra, Giant Under the Hill: A History of the Spindletop Oil Discovery 
at Beaumont, Texas, in 1901, (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 2002), pp. 89-184; John S. 
Spratt, The Road to Spindletop; Economic Change in Texas, 1875-1901, (Dallas: Southern Methodist 
University Press, 1955), pp. 273-285; Ruth Sheldon Knowles, The Greatest Gamblers; the Epic of 
American Oil Exploration (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2nd edition, 1978) pp. 21-45; Boyce 
House, Spindletop, The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Jul. 1946) pp. 36-43; History 
of the Southwestern Fields, North American Oil & Gas – A supplement to The Oil and Gas Journal, Vol. 
18, May 1919, pp. 140-151.  
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Spontaneous gushes of petroleum occurred every time drillers perforated 
reservoirs whose overlaying strata had allowed the accumulation of gas in a compressed 
state – as in the case of the salt dome structure hidden below the hillock. These 
“fountains” or “spouters”, as they were known at the time, were actually not rare. In 
Russia, the first gusher was recorded in 1866 in the North Caucasus region; it was the 
area around Baku, however, that in the late nineteenth-century became famous for its 
frequent black geysers. In the United States too, oil fountains – although considerably 
smaller than their Russian peers – became part of the petroleum culture since the very 
beginning. The first gusher was drilled in Pennsylvania in 1861, just two years later the 
Drake well, which is traditionally considered the start of the American oil industry3. 
Lucas’s well, however, was different and, in many respect, unprecedented. As is often 
the case in an oil business obsessed with quantity, the numbers associated with the 
Spindletop field help to convey the scale and importance of the discovery. In 1900, in 
the United States produced around 64,000,000 barrels of oil, brought about by a total of 
about 65,000 active wells4. Those scattered in the Appalachian region, which included 
New York, Pennsylvania (the oldest oil state and the major producer until 1895), the 
eastern edge of Ohio, West Virginia, part of Kentucky and Tennessee, were about 
36,000 and accounted for slightly less than half of the nation’s output, or about 
36,300,000 barrels. Ohio, whose output peaked that year, accounted for 22,000,000 
barrels. California, where the petroleum industry had developed intensely in the 
previous ten years, contributed with another 4,000,000 barrels. The only active field in 
Texas was in Corsicana, where about 800,000 barrels were extracted in 1900. Louisiana 
had no commercial production. The first well in the Corsicana field, about 230 miles 
northwest of Beaumont, was completed in 1885 and yielded two and a half barrels per 
                                                
3 Edwin Drake drilled his (and America’s) first commercial oil well in 1859 in northwestern 
Pennsylvania.  
4 Data in this section: for the number of the wells, see The Petroleum Resources of the United States 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1909), pp. 30-51. For the regional and national 
production, see: United States Geological Survey (USGS), Department of Interior, Mineral Resources of 
the United States, Calendar Year 1901 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1902) pp. 525-
584; Ralph Arnold and William J. Kemnitzer, Petroleum in the United States and possessions – A 
Presentation and Interpretation of the Salient Data of Geology, Technology, and Economics of Petroleum 
in Each State and Possession Treated According to the Conventional Major Field Divisions (New York, 
Harper & Brothers, 1931); Department of Energy (DOE), Energy Information Administration (EIA), 
Petroleum Navigator: Crude Oil Production, electronic database, at http://goo.gl/qzcOSL. For the world 
production, see: Valentin R. Garfias, Petroleum Resources of the World (New York, John Wiley & sons: 
1923) pp. 224-225; Charles E. Bowles, The Petroleum Industry (Kansas City, Missouri: Schooley 
Stationary & Printing, 1921). 
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day. Considering the entire United States, the average daily production per well was just 
above five barrels. By these standards, an extraordinary well would have provided 
around 5,000 barrels per day – the level at which people in Beaumont believed the 
Lucas well was producing. The first educated guesses at Spindletop, however, indicated 
that oil was gushing freely at a rate of 30,000-35,000 each 24 hours. The amount was 
eventually revised and moved up to 75,000-100,000 barrels per day, bringing the 
estimated total production for the first nine days in which the well remained uncapped 
around a staggering 800,000 barrels. Looking at the production rate, this meant that 
Lucas gusher during that period had matched every day all the 36,000 eastern wells 
combined, or delivered at least twice as much oil as Pennsylvania, or seven times as 
much as California. To put it differently, the Spindletop well was able to produce every 
24 hours about half the amount of oil that all the country’s wells combined provided in 
the same period of time5.  
Even without using math, it did not take long to realize the value of the well. The 
morning after, The Houston Daily Post was already writing that on the hillock there was 
«an oil well the equal of which cannot be seen elsewhere in the United States and 
probably in the world»6. In the following days, the stunning news was confirmed to the 
skeptics and reached the east coast. On January 13, the New York Times reported on the 
new Texan well. A small article published on the front page stated that the well was 
«said to be the greatest oil strike in the history of that industry»7. Few days later, on 
January 17, the newspaper corroborated the previous account, writing that according to 
Col. L. J. Polk, General Manager of the Gulf Colorado and Santa Fe Railway, the 
gusher was «unquestionably a world-beater»8. The excitement for the unprecedented 
discovery brought thousands of oil drillers and entrepreneurs to Beaumont. In 1901 
alone, more than 600 new oil companies were capitalized in Texas and around 140 
wells were drilled just in the Beaumont area9. The population of the city more than 
doubled, going from about 9,500 to 20,000. As a consequence, land and housing prices 
                                                
5 The comparison appears, although with slightly different figures, in James A. Clark and Michel T. 
Halbouty, Spindeltop, p. 79. The values indicated here are personal elaborations based on oil production 
statistics. 
6 Oil Struck Near Beaumont, The Houston Daily Post, January 11, 1901 
7 Big Oil Strike in Texas, The New York Times, January 13, 1901. 
8 The Texas Oil Discovery, The New York Times, January 17, 1901 
9 United States Geological Survey (USGS), Department of Interior, Mineral Resources of the United 
States, Calendar Year 1901, pp. 529, 567.  
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skyrocketed. The town experienced a devastating speculative boom that earned 
Spindletop the new name of “Swindletop”. The usual increase in violence, gambling, 
and prostitution associated with petroleum discoveries transformed the community, 
turning it from a placid lumber manufacturing center into a hunting ground for the 
«usual swarm of boom-town vultures»10. In 1902, Texas Annual book confirmed that 
“The United States Geological Survey has a record of about 138,000 wells drilled in the 
eastern field since oil was discovered, and in that entire number, representing over forty 
years' work of an army of drillers, there never has been a well that produced, except for 
a few days, more than one-tenth as much as the Lucas gusher»11. These suggestive 
figures, widely reported and celebrated in historical accounts about those days, offer a 
vivid representation of the magnitude of the field. One of the most common statistical 
facts about Spindletop, which is repeated in every related story in the exact same 
formulation (and with actually little numerical backing), affirms that, as soon as five 
new wells – all gushers – were completed on the hillock, the daily production of the 
field rose to surpass that of all the other fields in the world put together12. Despite the 
lack of precise data, it is not difficult to see how it would have been possible, given that 
the world output in 1900 was just above 148,000,000 barrels, which meant average of 
about 400,000 barrels daily – just four or five times (depending on the estimate) the 
quantity of oil that the first gusher alone was producing every day during the first 
week13.  
The specification about the production rates being daily values, recorded at the 
beginning of the life of the well, is important. The “mother of all gushers”, and its soon-
to-follow children at Spindletop did not sustain such stupendous rates of production for 
a long period of time – and it would have been impossible to do so. The furious assault 
at the hillock led by hundreds of oilmen resulted in countless punctures in the 
                                                
10 Ruth Sheldon Knowles, The Greatest Gamblers: The Epic of American Oil Exploration (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), p. 76 
11 C. W. Raines, Year Book for Texas – Public Officials and Departments under the Republic and State, 
Institutions, Important Events, Obituaries of Distinguished Dead, Industrial Development, Statistics, 
Biographical Sketches, and History Never Before Published (Austin, Texas: Gammel Book Company, 
1902), p. 294.  
12 For example, the story appears (without any production data for the other five gushers) in: James A. 
Clark and Michel T. Halbouty, Spindeltop, p. 79; Jo Ann Stiles, Judith Linsley, and Ellen Rienstra, Giant 
Under the Hill: A History of the Spindletop Oil Discovery at Beaumont, Texas, in 1901, (Austin: Texas 
State Historical Association, 2002), p. 3; Houston Faust Mount II, Oilfield Revolutionary: The Career of 
Everette Lee DeGolyer (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2014), p. 3. 
13 Department of Interior, Mineral Resources of the United States, Calendar Year 1901, p. 611. 
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reservoirs, which rapidly lost gas and pressure. As Lucas reportedly said, «the cow was 
milked too hard»14. Part of the problem – a major part of it, actually – was the so-called 
“rule of capture”, which defined American oil exploration since its inception. In its 
basic formulation, the rule stated that the owner of a tract of land automatically acquired 
property rights over the oil extracted from it even if such oil was coming from a 
reservoir located under someone else’s acreage. Since underground oil pools did not 
follow surface artificial divisions, and their extension was difficult to prove anyway, 
nineteenth-century courts had used both the common law ferae naturae analogy and the 
percolating ground waters analogy to solve the problem of oil ownership15. Oil, like 
wild animals (or water), was known to move freely. Like hunters capturing their preys, 
therefore, the drillers who “captured” oil could enjoy total control over their prize. This 
legal context evidently encouraged a quick exploitation of the reservoir, since no oilman 
could hope to keep the underground oil he had just discovered exclusively for himself. 
The rule of capture basically permitted competing drillers to siphon oil off from each 
other’s pools by simply setting up a well on an adjacent land. It therefore forced oil 
operators to extract as much petroleum as they can before somebody else could use up 
the pool. The result was a rapid drainage of the reservoir and its transformation in a 
“flush field” – like Spindletop, where a quick spike in total output was followed by an 
equally fast decline in production16.  
Just few months after the discovery there was indeed a sharp decrease in oil 
extracted from the many of the new wells on the hill. Yet, the transformative power of 
the field was real. In 1902, Spindletop produced alone 17,420,949 barrels of crude oil, 
which accounted for more than 20% of the country’s total output17. The success at 
Beaumont also stimulated an impressive wave of drilling along the coast and within the 
state borders, marking the beginning of the Texas oil industry. When Spindletop 
production dropped by 50% the following year, oil companies were indeed already 
extracting enough petroleum from elsewhere to make up for the losses and maintain the 
                                                
14 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1991), p. 74. 
15 Bruce Kramer, The Rule of Capture, An Oil and Gas Perspective, Environmental Law, Vol. 35, No. 4 
(Fall 2005), p. 899. 
16 C. Menezes, R. L. Andreano, H. F. Williamson, The American Petroleum Industry (chapter) in Output, 
Employment, and Productivity in the United States after 1800, U.S. National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Economic History Association (1966), p. 360  
17 Diana Davids Olien and Roger M. Olien, Oil in Texas, The Gusher Age, 1895-1945, p. 41. 
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same state output. In 1904, Texas went on record as the second oil producer in the 
nation, behind only California, after having poured more than 22,000,000 barrels in the 
market in just twelve months. The following year, the Gulf region (which included both 
Texas and Louisiana) became for the first time the major producing area in the United 
States and temporarily moved south the industry’s center of gravity. The production in 
the area peaked in that same year at more than 37,000,000 barrels of oil – an astonishing 
4,520% increase in output since 1900.  
The fortunes of both states would have swung considerably in the following 
years. First new important discoveries in Oklahoma and California and then the boom 
of the Mexican oil industry would have reduced again role of Texas and Louisiana as 
national producers. What did not vanish, however, was the “Spindletop effect”, which 
during the first decade of the century was felt well beyond the borders of those states. 
The tremendous overflow of cheap crude oil significantly changed the balance of forces 
within the American oil industry, altering the power relationships between domestic 
operators and ultimately leading to a restructuring of the whole industry. 
 
 
1.1.2 Confounding the Giant at Home 
At the end of the nineteenth century there was little distinction between the 
Rockefeller’s Company and the American oil industry as a whole. The overlapping, 
both at the economic and cultural level, was almost complete. Actually, still in 1909, a 
Midwestern oilman complained that American Congressmen had «no notion that oil 
meant anything else but Standard oil from the time it came out of the mouth of the well 
until it reached the consumers' hands»18. Despite growing competition, which eroded 
some of the early advantages of the company, John D. Rockefeller’s control over the 
American petroleum industry was firm and widespread. The domineering position of 
                                                
18 The author of the comment was Olean Franchot (member of the Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Producers' 
Association of Oklahoma and Kansas) during the Conference of the Independent Oil Producers and 
Independent Oil Refiners held in Washington in mid-1909. Small independents were trying to convince 
Congress to introduce a duty on Mexican oil, since imports were driving down oil prices and threatened 
to send them out of business. Paradoxically, the political opposition to the measure was based on the 
belief that a duty on oil would have helped the Standard Oil. In fact, Rockefeller’s company was much 
better equipped than its smaller competitors to survive a period of low prices. A greater gift to Standard, 
as the independents were claiming, would have indeed been to leave their smaller companies exposed to a 
flood of cheap oil from abroad. Report of the Conference of Conference of the Independent Oil Producers 
and Independent Oil Refiners Favoring a Duty on Petroleum and its Products, Senate Document No. 88, 
61st Congress, 1st Session, June 12, 1909, p. 4.  
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the Standard Oil group was the result of almost forty years of ingenious and aggressive 
business strategy. From Cleveland, Ohio, where he entered the petroleum-refining 
sector in the early 1860s, Rockefeller had managed to bulldoze his commercial 
competitors, first in the Appalachian region, then in the rest of country, and build a 
gigantic oil combination with international reach. It took actually just two years to the 
original Standard Oil Company, incorporated in 1870, to complete the acquisition of the 
first thirty-four rival refiners in the Mid-West19. A continuous and successful cycle of 
capital accumulation and expansion drove the company’s horizontal integration. By the 
early 1880s, Rockefeller’s associated companies controlled already more than 80% of 
the national refinery capacity20.  
The story of Standard’s consolidation became a tale about the fast-paced growth 
of an unbeatable and unscrupulous company – a perfect representation of the 
tumultuous development of the oil business and, perhaps even more so, of the 
unchecked industrial transformation occurring in the United States. The vast scope of 
Rockefeller’s operations, and the necessity to establish a stronger and more efficient 
managerial and communication system between parent companies, led to a profound – 
and innovative – administrative reorganization few years later. In 1882, the Standard 
Oil officially became a trust. The purpose, as Chandler noted, «was not to obtain 
control over the industry's output» (in practice, the Company already dominated the oil 
market) but «to provide a legal instrument to rationalize the industry and exploit 
economies of scale more fully»21. The trust provided the «essential legal means to 
create a central or corporate office» that could both reorganize and streamline the 
company’s process of production and coordinate the petroleum’s flow from the well up 
to the consumers – with a great reduction in cost per unit22. The move inaugurated an 
era of vertical integration, marked by the Trust’s expansion in the producing, 
transportation and marketing sectors23. As a result, by the end of the decade, the 
                                                
19 Roger M. Olien and Diana Davids Olien, Oil and Ideology, The Cultural Creation of the American 
Petroleum Industry (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), p. 40. 
20 Melvin G. de Chazeau and Alfred E. Khan, Integration and Competition in the Petroleum Industry 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 75. 
21 Alfred D. Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamic Of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 24-25 
22 Ibid.  
23 Henrietta M. Larson, The Rise of Big Business in the Oil Industry, in Oil’s First Century – Papers given 
at the Centennial Seminar on the History of the Petroleum Industry, Harvard Business School, November 
13-14, 1959, Published by the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration (1960). 
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Standard Oil interests not only controlled over 90 per cent of the total refining 
investments in the United States, but had also achieved a virtual monopoly over the 
transport and handling of crude thanks to the construction of the first large network of 
pipelines and to the profitable and extremely contested association with railroad 
companies24.  
Both Rockefeller’s commercial competitors, whose opposition became fierce in 
the 1890s, and the Ohio Supreme Court, which ordered the dissolution of the trust in 
1892, tried to stop Standard’s commercial advances. These attacks strained Rockefeller, 
who began to delegate more and more responsibilities to his associates, but fell short of 
taming the oil giant. In 1899, after few years of official administrative separation, all the 
affiliated entities were incorporated as parts of a new holding company registered under 
the accommodating New Jersey’s law: the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. The 
establishment of the new business organization did not alter the pattern of the industry. 
Standard maintained a controlling power in both American downstream and upstream 
operations at the end of the century. In the refining sector, where Rockefeller’s original 
interest laid, Standard’s hold was undisputable, with the group’s refineries processing 
about 80% of all the oil produced in the country every year. A similar situation could be 
found in the marketing segment of the oil industry, where the Company maintained an 
average share of 82.3% of the total sales of all petroleum products in home trade in the 
late 1890s25. As for oil production, the Standard Oil directly extracted respectively the 
88% and 85% of the crude oil supply coming from the two most important producing 
areas: the Appalachian and the Lima-Indiana regions26.  
Then Spindletop oil began to flow. The opening of the Gulf region represented an 
unprecedented occasion for Standard’s longstanding competitors and for new entrants, 
as the presence of high-yield wells effectively lowered barriers to entry, enabling 
smaller or newly created companies to obtain enough oil to cover operating costs and 
                                                
24 Rockefeller used the large volumes of (oil) shipments that Standard could guarantee to railroads’ 
operators as leverage, asking (and obtaining) from them exclusive rebates for his companies. The cheaper 
transportation costs made Standard’s margin of profit even higher and expanded the gap between the 
Trust and its competitors. The other oil companies strongly criticized Standard’s association with the 
railroad’s operators, denouncing it a proof of Rockefeller’s collusive and monopolistic behavior.  
25 R. W. Hidy and M. E. Hidy, History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey): Pioneering in big 
business, 1882-1911 (New York: Harper, 1955) 
26 Harold F: Williamson and Ralph L. Andreano, Competitive Structure of the American Petroleum 
Industry, 1880-1911, in Oil’s First Century – Papers given at the Centennial Seminar on the History of 
the Petroleum Industry, Harvard Business School, November 13-14, 1959, Published by the Harvard 
Graduate School of Business Administration (1960), p. 76 
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earn profits. More important, the discovery of new wells was so rapid, and the surge in 
production so strong, that not even Rockefeller’s oil-thirsty apparatus could keep up. In 
a matter of months after Spindletop discovery there was just too much crude for 
Standard, or anyone else, to control. Actually, Standard did not enter at all the new 
Texan field, leaving the extraction of millions and millions of barrels to old and new 
competitors. The company's participation remained limited also once the petroleum was 
brought out of the ground, with purchases totaling just one-tenth of the Gulf crude oil 
output27. With competitors and outsiders like Sun Oil Company, Gulf Oil Company, and 
Texas Company gulping down the remaining 90%, American operators’ relative weight 
in the domestic market started to change significantly. Rockefeller’s grip over the 
industry inevitably loosened. The tendency continued and actually accentuated during 
the second part of the decade, when dynamics similar to those first observed at 
Beaumont were replicated after the discovery of new flush fields like the Humble Oil 
Field, in Texas, and the Glenn Pool Field, in Oklahoma (both inaugurated in 1905). The 
quasi-monopolistic rule enjoyed for about four decades therefore faced regional 
disruption and a wider, more resourceful opposition at the national level. By 1911, the 
year the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the Company’s breakup, the percentage of 
petroleum distilled by Standard refineries had dropped to 64% of the country’s total28. 
An even more serious decline was registered in the share of national production, which 
for Standard fell by more than half to stop at 13.8%29. It is noteworthy that the Jersey 
Standard experienced this commercial downturn despite continuous efforts in expanding 
its activities. In the first decade the Company volume of production increased by almost 
70%, yet the combination «failed utterly» in responding to the new challenges: «The 
geographical spread of producing fields was too great, profits were too attractive, and 
competition was too strong for even such a powerful combination as Jersey Standard to 
keep pace with the expansion of the industry»30. 
The decision, back in 1911, not to participate the production in the Gulf was the 
result of a combination of structural factors and strategic considerations. The Texas 
legal climate, with strict antitrust provisions that had already been leveled in the past 
                                                
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid.  
29 R. W. Hidy and M. E. Hidy, History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey): Pioneering in big 
business, 1882-1911, pp. 407-408 
30 Ibid.  
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against Standard affiliates, was one of the elements taken into account. The almost 
complete lack of oil-related infrastructure in the South, and the belief that investments 
in other states (like California) would have eventually yielded higher returns, also 
influenced the company’s slow, and ultimately underachieving, reaction to the 
American oil industry expansion in the area31. One of the most important 
considerations, however, had to do with the quality of the crude oil being extracted at 
Beaumont, which was sourer and heavier than the petroleum usually found in the Mid-
Continent. The distinction between sweet and sour petroleum was made very early on, 
when drillers used to actually taste their oil to determine its quality, and depends (still 
today) on the sulfur content of its chemical mixture: the higher its concentration, the 
sourer the oil is. Sulfur, however, does not simply give oil a bitter flavor and a 
characteristic smell of rotten eggs, but it also makes crude more corrosive and 
hazardous to process32. The liquid’s gravity, which is its density in relation to water, is 
instead what is used to categorize oil as heavy or light.33 Although sweet oils are 
generally lighter, there is no strict correlation between these two quality characteristics, 
which are measured with two completely different methods. Technical aspect aside, the 
differentiation is important because as the quality of petroleum changes, so does the 
yield rate of the various products extracted from it. The reason is that, despite immense 
improvements in oil processing over the last one hundred and sixty years, refining 
operations still revolve around the basic principle of distillation. All crude oil’s 
components have indeed different boiling temperatures, so it is sufficient to use heat in 
order to be able to progressively separate them by evaporation. The component with the 
lowest boiling point (the lightest) is, of course, the first to vaporize. The gas then is 
channeled into a pipe, stored, and cooled down into its liquid state. This process, which 
in the nineteenth-century relied mostly on experience and saw the use of very 
rudimentary equipment, continues until all petroleum’s components, from the lightest to 
the heaviest, are isolated. These oil’s fractions, or “cuts”, correspond, once purified, to 
the various refined products commonly marketed by companies. At the turn of the 
twentieth century, those ranged from the distillates extracted from petroleum’s lighter 
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fractions, like naphtha and kerosene, to gas-oil, which derived from a medium-
temperature boiling cut, to the last, heavier (“bottom of the barrel”) products as paraffin 
wax, lubricants and fuel oil. The remaining residue was used to obtain tar, asphalt, coke, 
etc. The different composition of light/sweet and heavy/sour crude oil therefore explains 
the variation in the yields of oil-refined products. In the first case, the presence of more 
volatile hydrocarbons – the lighter cuts – facilitates the extraction of greater quantities 
of their corresponding distillates, or products. The opposite, instead, happens when 
heavier molecules are prevalent. The proportion of petroleum’s higher sections 
diminishes, and so does the available amount of distillates extracted from them, while 
the recovery of products from its lower fractions increases. These refining constrictions 
have a specific commercial and technological relevance in a market where not all 
petroleum’s products have the same value. Indeed, the birth and development of the 
American oil industry in the second half of the nineteenth-century revolved around the 
practical importance of just one of them: kerosene, which was used as illuminating oil 
in lamps and lanterns34. Oil had indeed begun its commercial career as nothing but a 
cheaper alternative to whale oil, largely considered the best source of illumination until 
the first half of the nineteenth-century35. When, before the American civil war, a decline 
in the whale population increased the costs in the fishing industry and prompted the 
search for a replacement, a series of potential substitutes – coal oil (considered the 
‘original’ kerosene), lard oil, and camphene from turpentine – entered the market. 
Petroleum-distilled kerosene, which began to be marketed in the 1860s, was therefore a 
latecomer in the sector of private lightening and it was not until the end of the war that 
it began to effectively compete with the other products. In the last thirty years of the 
century, however, while the market for illuminating oil expanded exponentially, 
kerosene emerged as its indisputable leader thanks to its greater energy efficiency, 
better handling, and, above all, lower price thanks to its large availability36.  
                                                
34 For the description of late nineteenth, early twentieth century refining procedures and products’ 
composition, see: P. H. Giddens, The Birth of the Oil Industry (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
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Press, 2000), pp. 13-36 
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The Spindletop oil was instead so «thoroughly impregnated with sulfur» that at 
first the experts at Beaumont had doubts that it could be of any use even as fuel, let 
alone as kerosene37. Even when skepticism dissipated, oilmen realized that, upon having 
purified and refined it, Spindletop oil produced just «30% of export illuminating-oil»; 
the rest was basically «a residuum of good fuel oil»38. Actually, the yield rate of 
illuminating oil was so small that some companies found more convenient to not 
distillate the oil’s higher fractions at all; they preferred to make those light cuts 
evaporate under the sun before simply treating the oil as a fuel. The (supposed) low 
quality of Spindletop oil was exactly one of the main reasons why Standard Oil decided 
not to enter the field, despite the fact that it was the company that had by far with the 
largest expertise in the purifying, refining, and marketing of sour oils39. At the end of 
the century, the Trust – like the rest of the American oil industry at the turn of the 
century – was still mainly focused on the production and distribution of illuminating oil 
and lubricants. The prospect of having to market a large, additional quantity of fuel oil, 
which was one of the least marketable petroleum’s products, was problematic and 
eventually considered unattractive – an aspect that hints both at the magnitude of the 
change that was about to come and at Standard’s strategic limits. As one of the most 
renowned oil business historians wrote, the company’s manufacturing «system was 
occupied with its traditional product lines. Standard was suffering from the fate that has 
normally overtaken pioneers in industrial development, that of being tied by earlier 
investments and operations»40. 
 
1.1.3 Driving the Change 
                                                
37 Robert T. Hill, The Beaumont Oil Field, with Notes on Other Oil Fields of the Texas Region; Mining 
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38 Ibid. p. 232. 
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Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955).  
40 Henrietta M. Larson, The Rise of Big Business in the Oil Industry, in Oil’s First Century – Papers given 
at the Centennial Seminar on the History of the Petroleum Industry, Harvard Business School, November 
13-14, 1959, Published by the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration (1960). 
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The idea of kerosene as oil’s most valued derivate raised the question, since the 
very beginning of the industry, of what to do with all the other inevitable by-products of 
petroleum refining operations. Even with the lightest quality of petroleum available at 
the time in the United States, the Pennsylvania crude, the yield rate of kerosene did not 
surpass the 70%41. This meant that, for every single barrel refined, at least 30% of the 
oil remained in the hands of the producers in the form of other distillates – or waste. 
Petroleum-derived lubricants, waxes, and fuels, were all completely new products for 
American merchants and consumers. Oilmen’s path to prosperity and profits, therefore, 
had to be paved not only with beaten competitors but also with innovative solutions, 
registered patents, and technological advancement. Oil companies, in order to be 
successful, needed to create new market outlets, convincing people to adopt the recently 
developed products and often to embrace different, unfamiliar habits altogether. The 
task, of course, turned out to be easier for some petroleum’s derivatives than for others. 
The usefulness and effectiveness of oil lubricants, for example, became quickly clear, so 
much so that they achieved in few years a global reach. As a product used almost 
everywhere in the industrialized, and recently mechanized, world, it became integrated 
in large distribution networks side to side with kerosene. By 1899, almost 40% of the 
entire American output in lubricating oils was sold abroad42. Naphtha (used also as 
anesthetic) and paraffin wax (key element in candles manufacturing) had instead a more 
limited appeal and for decades they remained essentially regional goods, traded locally 
without the support of a large supply chain. Gasoline, the distillate of petroleum’s most 
volatile fraction, had a similar fate until the turn of the century. Today’s most important 
petroleum by-product was initially used in air-gas machines for lightening, then sold as 
solvent or as fuel for household stoves. In 1899, it accounted for no more than 13% of 
the total of refined products and it was mainly sold within the country43.  
Heavier fractions like fuel oil – the petroleum’s distillate that today is broken up 
in a variety of diesel fuels – had an even more difficult path to industrial recognition. 
Indeed, it took time for the idea that petroleum could be a valid alternative to coal (and 
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wood) as energy source to take roots. Early attempts to burn fuel oil in ad-hoc modified 
boilers failed soon, as the distillate was considered both dangerous (extremely 
flammable) and expensive. The fact that the first oil region, in Pennsylvania, was also a 
coal mining area did not help. The accessibility to cheap coal diminished the incentive 
for finding alternative energy sources and the possibility of develop profitable 
economies of scale, differently from what was happening with other oil derivatives. The 
industry was so focused on kerosene that little effort was made to create an outlet for 
fuel oil, which was considered a residue of the refining process more than anything else. 
Until 1880s, its commercial production remained insignificant and it was either re-used 
by the oil company itself for internal consumption or «run to waste, form[ing] lakes of 
liquid petroleum, which were often set on fire to get rid of them, or carried off by pipes 
into the sea»44. The situation improved only after 1885, when a quality of heavy, black 
and highly sulfurous oil was struck at Lima, in Ohio. Given its characteristics, it was 
clear since the beginning that there was no chance to distill large quantity of 
illuminating oil from its higher fractions. In fact, the Lima oil was so sour that it was 
impossible to process with traditional methods. The Standard Oil, which soon came to 
control the main part of new field, therefore faced two equally challenging tasks. With 
thousands of barrels waiting to be marketed, it needed not only to find a way to purify 
sourer petroleum, but also to create an outlet for its refined products, which – given the 
oil’s composition – would have been composed mainly of low fractions’ distillates like 
fuel oil. In the following fifteen years, the Trust invested significantly in the 
development of new refining methods for sulfurous, heavy oils and pushed for the 
adoption of fuel oil as alternative source of energy to coal. The wonders of fuel oil were 
presented also to the visitors of the World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893, 
where a boiler house of unprecedented dimension was built to power the majestic 
exposition’s Machinery Hall. Standard’s fuel, coming from the near field of Whiting, 
Indiana, burned with a pace of 12,000 gallons per hour without emitting «the smell, dirt, 
or smoke» usually experienced when using coal45. The innovations introduced by 
Standard opened the path to further improvements in refining technology for sour oils 
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and introduced the American people to the qualities of fuel oil as energy source in 
transportation and industrial manufacturing. Indeed, the continuous growth of American 
infrastructures and the spectacular increase in the national production capacity, which in 
the 1890s finally surpassed Great Britain’s, created the perfect avenues for the 
dissemination of new energy solutions46. In this respect, the spread of Thomas Edison’s 
electric bulb represented a different but converging, and equally important, force toward 
the modification of industrial and consumers’ preferences. Invented in 1879, the device 
had rapidly entered the market of private and public lightening, putting pressure on the 
oil industry’s main product: illuminating oil. A transition was therefore already visible 
by 1899, when the percentage of illuminating oil in the total of refined products went 
down from 80% registered in the mid-1880s to almost 60%, while the share of fuel oil 
and residuum, which just over ten years before was close to zero, rose to almost 15%47.  
These changes did not completely convince American oilmen. By the end of the 
century few of them had in fact «grasped the implications of the development of the 
internal combustion engine as an outlet for the lighter fractions, nor had they fully 
recognized the potentials of extending the use of petroleum fuels to ships, locomotives, 
and even home furnaces»48. However, as Ralph and Muriel Hidy noted, at that point all 
the country really needed for «a spectacular expansion in the adoption of petroleum as 
fuel was the inexpensive production, in large quantities, of a suitable type of crude oil 
which would be so located as to be capable of transport at low cost to big consuming 
centers»49. The gigantic Spindletop field, just 20 miles from Port Arthur, overflowing 
with one of the heaviest oil ever seen soon ready to be sold at a price so low as 10 cents 
per barrel, nicely met, and even overcame, these expectations. In the years following the 
discovery in Beaumont, fuel oil’s use skyrocketed. In 1909, fuel oil accounted for 
almost 40% of all refined products. Five years later, in 1914, seventy percent of all the 
petroleum extracted in the United States was sold as fuel oil and, more important, only 
around one-twentieth of it left the country, while the rest was used to (literally) fuel 
American industrial and economic growth in the decade that preceded the beginning of 
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the war50. Brick, pottery, and cement manufacturing; steel and iron production; heating 
in houses, schools, stores, offices, hotels; railroad and marine transportations: the uses 
of fuel oil multiplied as its availability increased. With a growing and seemingly endless 
supply available, the only limit to its diffusion was the relative price of coal, which 
remained a formidable opponent (and the indisputable leader) as energy source. The 
penetration of fuel oil was therefore slower in some northwestern regions, while took 
place rapidly both in the coal-poor/oil-rich California and, of course, in the Southwest51. 
In fact, the country’s energy transition to oil remained relatively limited at the 
beginning of the twentieth century – still in 1914, petroleum accounted for only less 
than 10% of American total energy supply, with coal taking care of more than 80% of 
the remaining needs – and it would have actually taken decades to be completed52. More 
important that the rapidity of the conversion, however, were the particular dynamics that 
the new industrial mindset set in motion. The adoption of the internal combustion 
engine as power generator in factories and, more important, in private and public 
transportation – a choice intimately connected with the idea of using oil like energy 
source – led indeed to some of most transformative developments in the twentieth 
century history. The Diesel engine, which ran (and still runs) on fuel oil, was the first to 
experience an increase in popularity thanks to the early twentieth century petroleum 
boom. Invented by the German Rudolph Diesel in 1895, however, the new engine 
remained primarily confined to factories, where it was used as static power unit, due to 
its weight. Even more significant would have been instead the parallel evolution of the 
Otto engine, which ran on gasoline, and the decision to mount it on wheeled vehicles. 
Engineers had soon realized that petroleum’s lightest distillate, although more 
expensive, made a better fuel than heavier fractions thanks to its higher volatility and 
energy yield. It was not until 1893 that Henry Ford assembled its first prototype and 
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tested it in its kitchen sink53. The first car prototypes were completed in the late 1890s. 
Yet the challenges in building a properly functioning gasoline-fuelled automobile could 
be finally surpassed only well into the first decade of the following century. The 
appearance of safer and more efficient models on American roads accounted for a 
revolution. Their success was immediate; so much so that in 1909 there were already 
more than 120,000 cars in the United States54. In the following years, American 
growing demand of gasoline as fuel would have been met mainly through 
improvements in refining techniques, proving once again the reactivity and flexibility of 
the petroleum industry. In order to overcome gasoline low yield, especially from heavy 
oils, refiners began to “crack” their crude, i.e. to break down the long, heavier chains of 
hydrocarbons that composed petroleum’s bottom fractions into simpler, lighter 
molecules such as those of gasoline (or kerosene). The chemical reaction, which is the 
result of the application intense heat or pressure, was actually known since the 
nineteenth century. At that time, however, operators did not really command the 
process, which was often the unintended result of petroleum’s overheating. The method, 
called indeed “cracking”, was perfected only in 1910s when refiners started to 
systematically use it to convert heavier, less valuable fractions into premium products, 
therefore improving the latter recovery rates. The diffusion of motorized vehicles that 
begun in the early twentieth century would have led to a further transformation in the 
petroleum industry and to the creation of an all-new country with a faster, more 
mechanized and more oil-depended society. The real impact of cars would have not 
been fully felt, or understood, before the end of the war. Already in 1909, however, the 
overall value of gasoline sales matched, and actually slightly surpassed, that of fuel oil, 
kerosene, and lubricating oils, with each product accounting for about 25% of the 
total55. 
 
1.1.4 Going Abroad 
The Spindletop discovery, and the boom in production it stimulated, had 
repercussion not only within the country but also at international level. The biggest oil 
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producer in the world at the end of the nineteenth-century was not the United States but 
Russia, whose output in 1900 accounted for more than half of the world’s total. The 
Russian oil industry had reached global prominence after a very unpromising start. Oil 
extractions and refining activities began roughly at the same time in the United States 
and in the tsarist empire. The two national oil industries, however, followed two very 
different trajectories. American oil operators showed since the very beginning a high 
degree of dynamism and organization. Helped by the presence of skillful entrepreneurs 
and the growth of a more stable financial system, oil companies worked rapidly to 
expand through an increasingly connected country. The birth of the Russian oil 
industry, instead, was plagued by a series of structural problems that limited its 
development until at least the 1880s. One of the most important was the remoteness of 
the Baku region and the total lack of any transportation and distribution network. Oil 
had to travel hundreds of miles, often in inadequate containers and on even more 
inadequate roads, just to reach Moscow or Saint Petersburg. European countries’ 
markets, of course, were even more difficult to reach. Even worse, the Czarist 
administration ran the «minuscule» and «primitive» petroleum industry as a state 
monopoly, effectively denying the possibility to private investors56. As a result, the 
Baku oil region remained isolated for decades, not only geographically but also in terms 
of trade, posing no threat to American exports. There was also another important factor 
limiting the reach of Russian products. Contrary to the Pennsylvanian crude, the 
petroleum from the Baku region was heavy and sour and consequently less suited for 
the distillation of kerosene – let alone lighter fractions. Russian operators therefore 
focused on fuel oils (and lubricants) since the very beginning, leaving the production of 
other distillates as secondary. The abundance of fuel oil did prompt an early energy 
transition in industries and in railroad transportation57.  
The situation improved in the latter part of the nineteenth-century thanks to the 
opening of the field to private enterprises and the arrival of two brothers, Ludwig and 
Robert Nobel, who settled in Baku in the late 1870s with the intention to enter the oil 
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business. In a relatively limited number of years, they managed to build one of the 
biggest companies in the world – Branobel – and turn the region’s structural limits into 
Russian oil industry’s strong points. The lack of infrastructures indeed worked as an 
incentive for the Noble brothers to improve transportation methods, while the necessity 
to process heavy oils led them to devise significant innovations in refining techniques. 
The only aspect that probably did not change was the environmental one. The Baku 
region, whose population in the nineteenth-century climbed more rapidly than many 
European and American cities as a consequence of the oil boom, was renown for its 
abysmal living conditions. Many historical accounts described its oil-blackened 
landscape and the contaminated lives of the inhabitants of the “Black City”, as the Baku 
oil district was called58.  
Workers’ terrible condition did not slow down the Russian production. On the 
contrary, once the original, structural constraints on the industry were lifted, Russian 
companies’ operations grew quickly, sustained by the immense size and strength of 
Baku petroleum reservoirs. Thanks also to the large financial investments made in the 
development of Russian fields by the Rothschild family, the country’s oil business 
expanded to become competitive also in Europe during the late 1880s and the 1890s, 
when kerosene, fuel oil, and lubricants from Baku began battling with Standard’s 
products in large markets like Great Britain and France. By the end of the century, 
Russian production had largely surpassed American output. In 1900, on the eve of the 
Beaumont discovery, operators in Russia extracted almost 76 million barrels of oil, 
while the American production stopped short of 64 million barrels. Lucas gusher 
however quickly reversed the trend, handing back to the United States the title of major 
oil producer in the world already in 1902. In the following years, the flush fields in the 
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Gulf Region and the oil rush in California inflated American production. In 1905, the 
United States climbed to an impressive total of 134 million barrels, which translated 
into a 110% growth since 190059. The rate of production increase was of course 
unprecedented. This tremendous surge of American oil was not, however, the only 
explanation for the widening gap in total output between the two most important oil 
countries. In fact, internal political unrests led to an actual decrease of Russian 
production after 1901. As a consequence, by the end of the first decade of the twentieth 
century, the oil extracted every year in the United States accounted for more than 60% 
of the world’s total.  
The expansion in production effected American exports, too. After 1900, the 
domestic abundance of heavy oils impacted not the compositions of American 
shipments directed abroad, but also their destination. Kerosene, once the dominant 
product, remained the most exported item but became less and less significant. Its share 
among the total of distillates sold abroad dropped throughout the first part of the 
century, going from about 75% in 1899 to about 45% in 1914. Similarly to what 
happened within the United States, the contraction had to do also with the spread of 
electricity and natural gas for public and private lightening in major European cities. As 
the sales of illuminating oil winded down, those of lubricants and fuel oil rose to offset 
them. Between 1899 and 1914, the latter share among the total of the petroleum 
products sold abroad boosted from 2% to over 30%. Most important, the exports of fuel 
oil gained to American operators new markets. As European economies evolved 
towards a more diversified use of petroleum, products like fuel oil became highly 
attractive for less industrialized countries, whose late mechanization could be now 
powered directly by oil, skipping (or in any case reducing) the coal-phase. An 
increasing portion of those exports was as a consequence directed to Central and South 
American countries during the first part of the century, strengthening the United States 
continental marketing operations. The slow transition from coal to oil in marine 
transportation, too, significantly helped American companies to expand their activities 
and find new outlets abroad, as they started refueling bunkering stations around the 
world. The increasing availability of fuel oil and the gradual energy switch in merchant 
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ships became two mutually reinforcing developments, destined to profoundly alter the 
commercial and political outlooks in the United States as well as in Europe. The shift in 
exports’ composition and distribution could be considered complete as soon as the new 
uses for gasoline began to take roots also overseas. Similarly to what happened in the 
United States, the spread of automobiles and gas-burning vehicles in Europe was indeed 
changing the landscape and the working dynamics of any major city, and drove up the 
demand of the highly volatile distillate.  
 
The changes in the use of petroleum’s products were the result of the evolving 
interaction between available oil supply, technology and society. As the first forty years 
of oil industry demonstrated, petroleum’s role as major power and energy source was 
not predetermined. Rather, it took a combination of individual resolve and scientific 
advances to turn oil into something more valuable than the blackish, smearing and 
uninviting substance it had been for centuries. Buried thousands of feet under the 
ground, petroleum had to be actively sought, deeply transformed, and aggressively 
promoted before even being considered as a tradable good. Petroleum market, 
especially in its first phase, was indeed largely driven by supply, as no demand was 
present for distillates whose usefulness, or even existence, people was not aware of. 
Since the very beginning of the industry, oil pioneers and entrepreneurs had to work 
tirelessly to build and expand the needs for petroleum products, in the United States and 
elsewhere. The process of oil commodification had different stages, but they were all 
associated with, and facilitated by, oil’s increasing availability60. More oil meant 
basically more accessible, and cheaper, oil, which translated into a further incentive to 
expand its uses and industrial application.  
Discoveries like the one at Spindletop, with the surge in production and the 
enthusiasm they generated, marked therefore the transition to the “Age of Energy” The 
technological progress that marked the tempo of the industry’s evolution should 
however not be considered as an exogenous element in assessing oil’s political, 
economical and cultural dimension. When not actively sought by the companies 
themselves, technical improvements represented the efforts of an increasingly connected 
and integrated community of engineers and inventors, whose work produced an 
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extremely powerful synergy of communication and transportation systems. The results 
was the emergence of a different society, based on the combination of «scientific 
advances, technical innovation, aggressive commercialization, and intensifying, and 
increasingly efficient, conversions of energy»61 
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1.2 The Country: The Rooseveltian Era 
1.2.1 Trust-busting and Soul-Searching 
President Theodore Roosevelt delivered his first annual message to Congress on 
December 3, 1901, less than two months after his inauguration62. More than a simple 
statement of purpose, the twenty thousand words speech addressed to the legislative was 
instead an already fairly detailed programmatic document and presented the president’s 
positions on a number of sensitive issues. The status of government-industry relations – 
or, better, the legitimacy of large corporations and the extent of federal authority in 
regulating them – was among the subjects addressed and also one of the most pressing 
concerns in American contemporary society. The three previous decades of rapid and 
unchecked industrial growth had indeed not only generated an exceptional commercial 
expansion and an equally impressive technological progress, but also facilitated the 
spread of corruption and economic inequality. The popular backlash against the 
accumulation of corporate wealth and the emergence of monopolistic tendencies in the 
domestic market had eventually prompted the creation of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC; 1887), specifically designed to regulate railroads operators, and the 
passage of the Sherman Act (1890), which prohibited the adoption of anticompetitive 
practices by U.S. corporations, but both measures had proved unsatisfactory during the 
last decade of the century. The Commission had soon realized that it did not have the 
means – or, according to revisionist historians like Gabriel Kolko, the intention – to 
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really discipline railroads’ operators63. As for the anti-trust law, since the very 
beginning the Supreme Court had interpreted it in such a permissive way as to still 
allow not only industrial agglomeration but also the de facto existence of cartels and 
collusive agreements in the market. At the turn of the century, industrial and financial 
influence in politics, especially at the local and state level, remained widespread and 
instances of what would have later been called “regulatory capture” were common64. 
The U.S. lawmakers – and the country at large – faced the choice between allowing the 
expansion of an unbridled and disordered form of capitalism and pushing for 
government intervention. Roosevelt, who had fought to stop corruption and reform local 
politics for years, tackled the issue directly65. He acknowledged that the «captains of 
industry who have driven the railway systems across this continent, who have built up 
our commerce, who have developed our manufactures, have on the whole done great 
good to our people», but also stated that there were «real and grave evils, one of the 
chief being over-capitalization because of its many baleful consequences; and a 
resolute and practical effort must be made to correct these evils»66. The speech was 
actually a balancing act between the defense of free enterprise and the support for 
government regulations, as he admitted that the «mechanism of modern business» was 
so delicate that «extreme care» must have been taken in order «not to interfere with it in 
a spirit of rashness or ignorance»67. Cautiousness aside, there was however little doubt 
in Roosevelt’s mind about who should have gotten the upper hand in the relationship 
between private business and public administration. He strongly advocated further 
regulatory powers for the federal government and in particular the «the right to inspect 
and examine the workings of the great corporations». As a matter of fact, the «old laws, 
and the old customs» were «no longer sufficient» to interact with the evolved world of 
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industrial and economic forces68. To restrain industrial speculation and place the policy-
making process out of the reach of private and corporate interests, there was therefore 
only one solution: the authority over business needed to be transferred from the states’ 
legislatures to Washington D.C. and, more specifically, to the executive branch and its 
centralized administrative agencies69. To enforce his vision, Roosevelt called for the 
immediate establishment of a new department and secretary of Commerce and 
Industries, tasked with the authority to investigate and regulate American corporation. 
The Congress initial unresponsiveness on the matter, however, prompted the president 
to work directly through the Justice Department. In early 1902, Roosevelt instructed the 
U.S. Attorney General Philander Knox to file an antitrust suit against the Northern 
Securities Company, a gigantic holding company created by financial titans James J. 
Hill, E. H. Harriman, J. P. Morgan, and John D. Rockefeller in order to control a large 
share of American rail transportation.  
In 1904, the Supreme Court ruled to dissolve the Company under the Sherman 
Act of 1890, partially reversing its previous, more accommodating position on the 
legality of corporate organizations. The Court had in fact sanctioned price fixing for the 
first time at the end of the nineteenth century (Trans-Missouri in 1897; Joint Traffic in 
1898)70. After the Court decisions, however, companies had simply switched to a 
different strategy to try to corner the market: instead of colluding as separate entities, 
they merged to create single companies large enough to influence prices in their relative 
market sectors71. The shift, from cartel behavior to monopolistic regimes, made little 
difference for consumers and small manufacturers. The 1904 sentence, which 
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	 30 
interpreted the creation of the corporation as a clear attempt to control a specific 
business segment, basically implied that the sole existence of such an organizational 
structure could constitute a market violation. The case therefore resulted in the first real 
major anti-monopoly decision. It halted the great “merger movement” developing in 
American business and marked the beginning of an intense political and judiciary 
activity against American corporations. In the following four years, the Department of 
Justice initiated more than forty prosecutions – more than twice the number (18) of 
those initiated by the U.S. government in the ten years between the passage of the 
Sherman Act 1890 and the Roosevelt’s arrival at the White House in 190172.  
Among the litigations started by the new administration, there was also the one 
against the Standard Oil of New Jersey. Launched in 1906, the federal suit accused the 
company of engaging in price-cutting to eliminate local business rivals, of setting up 
shell companies to simulate competition among affiliates, and of threatening smaller 
industrial buyers into ordering their products. The legal proceeding was however more 
than the long-awaited investigation into American petroleum industry’s business 
practices. Rather, it represented the culmination of a protracted cultural and political 
battle against the American oil giant. Rockefeller’s company had been attracting public 
hostility since the 1870s and it had quickly became the favorite targeted not only of the 
other operators within the industry, which felt that they were being denied the 
possibility to compete fairly, but also of the American public at large, which believed 
that Trust had amassed too much power and influence. Indeed, the amount of criticism 
that Standard had to face at the beginning of the twentieth was comparable only to the 
extent of its business success. The allegations leveled in Court accusing the Jersey 
Standard of being a predatory and monopolistic corporation simply mirrored the critics 
outside the tribunal hall. In fact, in the street, as well as in books, newspapers, and 
popular publications, that Rockefeller’s Company had received even heaviest charges. 
Throughout its first forty years as leader of the oil market, The Standard Oil was 
repeatedly pointed to as the quintessential symbol of corruption and iniquity present in 
the United States and became the main focus of the diffuse, anti-big business sentiment 
that characterized American culture at the turn of the century.  
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There were at least two strands of thoughts that contributed to shape both the 
common representation of the Standard Oil in American society and the public 
discourse surrounding it. The first was a populist-religious thought, which took 
inspiration from the country’s traditional values and questioned the Company’s ethic; 
the second was based instead on an economicist perspective, which analyzed Standard’s 
market role and focused to its socio-economic consequences. These intellectual threads 
were deeply intertwined and developed symbiotically in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century. Then, as popular, widespread ideas, they coalesced during the 
Roosevelt’s presidency – and actually through Roosevelt’s political activity and 
rhetorical message – assuming a new shape, and weight, in the country’s public debate. 
By the beginning of the second decade of the century, as the progressive movement 
reached its maturity, these long-standing political and economical considerations and 
their “reformed” versions would have contributed to the dismantling of the 
Rockefeller’s company and the development of a new role for the federal state vis-à-vis 
the nation’s industry. 
 
The Standard Oil: The Octopus 
The first and very popular characterization of the Standard Oil identified the oil 
giant as «soulless corporation» with a despotic attitude73. Along this lines, Rockefeller, 
who remained the public face of the company despite having delegated most of the 
managing responsibility after the creation of the holding company, became the epitome 
of the greedy “robber baron”, ready to use any available mean to crush his opponents. 
This narrative developed on the works of journalists and commentators who began 
investigating on American emerging big businesses – railroads, steel, and oil industry – 
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in the attempt to expose their business practices. Their writings obtained tremendous 
success with the American public. Within a rapidly evolving society, which suffered 
from two heavy economic setbacks (in the early 1870s and 1890s) crushing the hopes 
and the savings of many rural and urban Americans, the corporate steady accumulation 
of fortunes became indeed suspicious, even unwarranted, and was quickly associated to 
bribery and political maneuvering. In 1881, a radical (later populist, later socialist) New 
York journalist Henry Demarest Lloyd vividly captured this kind of allegation – and 
disdain – against Standard when he wrote that the «Standard [had] done everything 
with the Pennsylvania legislature except refine it»74. The expression appeared in a long 
piece written for The Atlantic, where Lloyd criticized Standard’s «conspiracy with the 
railroads» that led the Rockefeller’s company to control the oil market75. The article, 
“Story of a Great Monopoly”, which became widely popular, represented the first 
“reportage” on Standard’s practices. Few years later, in 1889, Lloyd published Wealth 
Against Commonwealth. The book presented a vehement critique of Rockefeller’s 
company, whose behavior was seen as a distortion of the American life, and, more in 
general, of the whole category of American industrialists and the world they created:    
«Our bigness – cities, factories, monopolies, fortunes, 
which are our empires, are the obesities of an age gluttonous 
beyond its powers of digestion…Captains of Industry “do not 
know” whether the men in the ranks are dying from lack of food 
or shelter…  
If our civilization is destroyed…it will not be by his 
barbarians from below. Our barbarians come from above. Our 
great moneymakers have sprung in one generation into seats of 
power kings “do not know”…. Without restraints of culture, 
experience, the pride, or even the inherited caution of class or 
rank, these men, intoxicated, think they are the wave instead of 
the float, and that they have created the business that has 
created them. To them…government [is] but a fountain of 
franchises, the nations but customers in squads… They are 
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gluttons of luxury and power, rough, un-socialized, believing 
that mankind must be kept terrorized»76. 
 
Ida Minerva Tarbell, teacher, writer, and daughter of one of the Pennsylvania 
oilmen that Rockefeller coldly put out of business in the 1870s, read Lloyd’s book while 
in Paris and later recalled that it helped her “crystallize” a «clutter of recollections, 
impressions, indignations, perplexities» about the situation of the American oil industry. 
Few years later Tarbell wrote what is still today the most famous indictment of the oil 
giant: The History of the Standard Oil Company. Published first as a series of articles 
(between 1902 and 1904, in the McClure’s Magazine) and then as a book in 1904, 
Tarbell’s work perfectly represented this type of investigative journalism of the time, 
aimed at revealing political corruption and corporate malpractices. She was for this one 
of the first journalists to earn the title of “muckraker” coined by Roosevelt to indicate 
those reporters who dug deep into the dirt in order to prove their stories. Indeed, digging 
into the Company’s history is exactly what Tarbell did. She analyzed numerous 
corporate documents and spoke directly with Standard’s officials. The final picture of 
the Trust and his founder was a negative one77. Tarbell actually worked hard to prove 
that the Standard Oil was «determined, not to compete against, but to destroy, all 
competition and thereby monopolize a basic commodity and necessity of life at the well, 
at the refinery, and in the marketplace»78. Despite her sober tone in reporting, her 
disdain against the «unctuous logic of the Mother of Trusts» emerges from the text79. 
What vexed Tarbell the most was Standard Oil’s “unfairness” – the idea that, by using 
dishonest and deceitful schemes to ruthlessly suppress competition, Rockefeller had 
betrayed the original spirit of economic rivalry and the strong ethic standards that 
characterized American life. «As I saw it», Tarbell wrote after reading Lloyd’s book, «it 
was not capitalism but an open disregard of decent ethical business practices by 
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capitalists that lay at the bottom of the story»80. In targeting the Trust’s commercial 
strategy, therefore, what pundits and observers really came to contest were its business 
nature and its intentions in relation with the society on which it operated. To be 
condemned, more than Standard’s corporate strategy, was its morality – of the lack 
thereof. Rockefeller rising profits contrasted with the economic distress experienced by 
farmers, craftsmen, and small manufacturers during the cyclical economic downturns 
that characterized the era. Similarly, Standard’s continuous consolidation – through 
suspicious merges and acquisitions, whose goal was to shield the company from 
competition in an increasingly disordered and unregulated market – seemed to remove 
Rockefeller from the uncertainties of a society struggling to cope with the challenges 
brought by the country’s formidable industrialization, rapid urbanization, and rising 
immigration81. The Company’s insulation was indeed the mark of its perceived 
extraneousness to the real American community. At stake, then, according to the 
popular (and later populist) discourse, were not (only) the rejection of Standard’s 
industrial dominance, but (also) the preservation of the original values of the Republic. 
Indeed, the Trust’s new organizational structure – and the methods of accumulation of 
wealth associated with it, which included overcapitalization and the use of dependent 
work – shunned the traditional, frugal model of identity of Jeffersonian origin. The 
diminishing importance of self-employment in the newly established industrial system 
threatened the culturally constructed ideal of American “manhood”, built around the 
notions of freeholding and self-reliance82. If the epic of the first oil pioneers well 
epitomized the honest and masculine ethos of the American adventurer, the greedy, 
cheating, and ruthless conduct attributed to the soulless giant did not – at all. As Tichi 
noted, «“Manhood” and “fair play” are synonymous in this all-male story of 
Rooseveltian strenuous life»83. Rockefeller’s profit, as a consequence, came to be 
considered as disproportionate and morally inexcusable. Dishonestly built at somebody 
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else’s expenses, it also defied the common rules of thriftiness and moderation. As any 
other excess, in communities dominated by puritanism, self-discipline and restraint, 
extreme wealth was indeed linked to vice and moral degradation – a connection that in 
the case of the petroleum industry seemed particularly appropriate, given the disruption 
that befell any community that happened to strike oil. Reckless speculation, violence, 
pollution, and decadence were common experiences in the “oil towns” – over which the 
corporate giant profited nonetheless. More than with Cornelius Vanderbilt’s 
transportation empire, Andrew Carnegie’s and later J.P. Morgan’s gigantic steel 
enterprise, or Russell Sage and Jay Gould’s railroad interests, Rockefeller’s Standard 
Oil public standing suffered from a devastating moral judgment that described the 
Company, as embodied by its creator, as selfish, rapacious, and merciless.  
The dominant religious sentiment in the country (and the dramatic evolution it 
underwent at the turn of the century) was a crucial determinant of the value-loaded 
critique addressed to the Standard Oil. Traditional evangelical Protestantism, which 
tended to delineate «social problems in moral terms», turning «offenders into sinners, 
against the social, if not the divine, order», had infused early popular critics against the 
oil trust84. Then, by the end of the century, it combined with new theological disposition 
that asked for social reform and criticized the ethics of Rockefeller’s enterprise in an 
equally forceful way. The Social Gospel, as the new religious teaching was eventually 
called, preached that societal change was not only possible but also necessary to achieve 
individual salvation, basically reversing the notion that redemption was a personal 
affair. The uplift of the community, which was judged as a whole, was therefore a 
necessary step to save the souls of its members. The amelioration of living and working 
conditions, the achievement of widespread economic progress, and the elimination of 
social-disrupting behavior – or better: vices, like drunkenness, prostitution, gambling, 
etc. – were all crucial prerequisites for human fulfillment85. Part of the spiritual energy 
to the movement came from protestant postmillennialism – a Christian eschatology, 
according to which God’s return to heart would have taken place only after a long era (a 
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“millennium”, although not literally a thousand years) of devoted preparatory activities, 
consisting of missionary work, conversion efforts, and, of course, popular redemption86. 
Postmillennialists therefore promoted active change in the community, as both proof 
and precondition of Christ’s future coming. This desire for collective betterment is what 
indeed drove also Social Gospelers. The latters, however, maintained a worldlier – if 
not practical, materialistic – perspective, caring more about the daily transformation of 
the people’s lives than about the construction of the Kingdom of God on earth. This 
focus on tangible progress, and the attempt to emphasize ethics over religious dogmas, 
reflected the precepts of theological liberalism – another important theoretical 
constituent of the movement – that attempted to incorporate modern thinking and 
scientific development into the Christian faith87. During the 1890s the Social Gospel’s 
leading intellectual became the pastor Washington Gladden, whose «message skillfully 
fused the new liberal theology from the European continent with the evolutionary cult of 
progress rampant in the United States, joining both to the crusading mentality of mid-
century Protestantism»88. Gladden’s elaborate thought stressed how social 
improvements led to individual salvation. The crucial passage in the process was the 
possibility, through a communal effort, to develop a «sound personal character»89. He 
elaborated on the matter in his writings and explained what American individual 
character and moral virtue were based on, if not directly equated to: manliness. Indeed, 
only the acquisition of a «manly independence» could have helped man resist terrestrial 
temptations90. Manhood, with its close association to the notion of rectitude and 
respectability, persisted throughout the years as a fundamental tenet of American 
identity. As life-ordering concept, it remained at odds with the nature of dependent 
work and questioned the moral legitimacy of disproportionate and ostentatious wealth – 
both essential features of the new industrial system in general, and of the oil business in 
particular. The life in the American towns, especially in those organized according to 
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unrestrained (and consequently unfair and immoral) capitalism, was ultimately sinful 
and needed to be reformed. This conviction that a change in society was necessary in 
order for everyone to live up to his/her own potential led in turn to another, even more 
crucial understanding: «salvation…ultimately required the state», since «only the state 
could remedy the structural circumstances that led to the degradation of personal 
character. Only the state could create new conditions and better circumstances to get 
better men»91.  
 
The Standard Oil: The Monopoly 
The notion that the state needed to assume a new role in the society was a crucial 
contact point between the muckrakers’ popular critique of the Standard Oil, rooted in 
the American moral and spiritual tradition, and the new socio-economic theories that 
developed simultaneously at the end of the nineteenth century. The appeal for a more 
present and interventionist government put forward by the Social Gospel indeed was 
picked up, elaborated, and expanded by non-clerical thinkers in American society 
during those years. Among those, mostly university professors, who worked to 
substantiate the reformist case in economic and political terms, the most influential was 
Richard T. Ely – a German-educated American economist, close friend of Gladden, who 
became an advocate for social change and a leading social scientist at the University of 
Wisconsin. Through the American Economic Association (AEA), which he cofounded 
in 1885, Ely and his colleagues worked to promote a progressive theory of regulation 
and oppose the strict laissez-faire orientation dominant in American politics and 
economy92. The economist Henry Carter Adams, in particular, put forward an articulate 
revision of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian theories, questioning the 
notion that happiness and prosperity in American society could be reached simply 
through the individualistic search of personal benefit. The unbridled exercise of private 
rights could lead to abuse, and hence it could interfere with the collective welfare, 
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which was considered as indivisible. The Gilded Age capitalist and laissez-faire 
economy, where monopolies and large concentrations of powers were allowed to 
prosper and harm smaller and weaker market participants, came therefore under 
scrutiny. Following this line of reasoning, regulation and government intervention were 
required in order to prevent socially damaging economic developments like the 
imposition of higher prices to consumers, the suppression of competition, or the decline 
of industrial efficiency. In fact, Ely and Adams believed that the presence of a 
monopolistic equilibrium in the market was not always wrong, as they saw an important 
theoretical distinction between “natural” and “artificial” monopolies. In some 
circumstances, the presence of structural (natural) limits favored the development of 
large economies of scale for first comers, making very difficult for any other competitor 
to operate with profit (like, for example, according to Ely, in the railroads’ business, as 
well as with telegraphs, telephones, and canals)93. In these specific cases, the presence 
of multiple players could actually be considered inefficient from a market perspective, 
since the particular characteristics of the business would have made it impossible for all 
the participants to succeed. Even in these sectors of the economy, however, there was 
space (in fact, need) for an enhanced role of the state, since the (commercial) service 
provided by the “natural” monopolistic actor would have been then considered a “public 
utility” and therefore would have needed to be regulated as such. Artificial monopolies, 
instead, took place every time a dominant company was able to maintain its privileged 
position only by virtue of specific market restrictions and political arrangements. The 
Standard Oil, as Ely made clear already in 1890, was one of them, since the Trust could 
secure its monopolistic position only thanks to its unfair collaboration with the railroads 
and the exclusive rebates it enjoyed. «Standard’s competitors», noted Ely, had «never 
complained of the superior skill or superior business ability of the Standard men, but of 
the favoritism which has been shown them by the railroads»94. The introduction of 
stricter federal laws and regulatory reforms were therefore necessary not because 
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industrialists like Rockefeller were immoral and ruthless man, and their companies an 
example (and a force of) moral degeneration, but because of the market inefficiencies 
and economic distortions associated to the presence of profit-driven, self-interested 
monopolies like Standard’s and, more in general, to the corporate accumulation of 
wealth. Although Ely always maintained a same moral compass and inspiration of his 
contemporaneous Social Gospelers, his analysis remained primarily at the “scientific” 
and economic level – as was the critique to corporates’ riches that he put forth95.  
In regulating business activities, the state was simply fulfilling its social 
obligation since, as Ely specifically argued, the government was «created to promote 
the general welfare, and when it is used to advance special interests which are not at 
the same time general interests, it is perverted from its original purpose»96. This stance, 
which rhetorically was simply an echo of the traditional republican principles of 
government, actually entailed an important conceptual shift regarding the notion of 
liberty. The conventional, liberal, and “negative” idea of individual liberty as freedom 
from the state had been indeed first reworked and then reversed. The result was a new, 
“positive” interpretation that demanded an active protection of rights by the state and 
envisioned a larger redistributive role for the federal government. Economic justice 
(equality) became an important component to social justice. Following this reasoning, 
since the welfare of the society depended on the achievement of higher and “general”, 
collective goals, the common (i.e. public and national) good was not – and could not be 
– the simple sum of private, particular interests. Believing that American society needed 
to express and maintain certain ethical standards automatically invested the state of new 
responsibilities in the attempt to attain them.  
 
These ideas – and the arguments about the oil giant that directly derived from 
them – were central in the American public debate at the beginning of the century and 
remained very much so as the decade reached an end and the progressive rhetoric 
became more pronounced. Their spread, consolidation, and further development in U.S. 
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politics during that period was actually possible also, and specifically, thanks to 
Roosevelt’s activism and rhetoric while at the White House. Since the very beginning, 
as his first annual message demonstrates, the President voiced and combined popular 
and economic concerns about the Gilded Era’s corporate hypertrophy, advancing 
specific reform proposals grounded on both moral and market considerations. As 
Hawley noted, Roosevelt had indeed grew up «in the future heartland of the social 
gospel and had absorbed many of its basic premises» long before becoming President97. 
His connection with the late nineteenth-century protestant revival – and his rhetorical 
attachment to many of its topoi (the values of manhood, the importance of self-reliance, 
the existence of a superior common good) – went therefore well beyond partisan 
calculations and mere political opportunism to rest on a more personal level. 
«Gladden’s gospel», Hawley wrote, «meshed with Roosevelt’s conception of 
righteousness beautifully, the works-righteousness of action and deed and high ethical 
standards»98. Similarly, Roosevelt showed to be familiar with the new socio-economic 
thinking articulated by Ely and his colleagues. The President made clear since the 
beginning that not all trusts were created equal and expressed the willingness (and the 
political necessity) to differentiate between “good” and “bad” monopolies. His Bureau 
of Corporations, established within the new Department of Commerce and Labor in 
1903 and tasked with the responsibility to investigate corporate behavior, accepted and 
confirmed this distinction, therefore marking a difference, especially during Roosevelt’s 
second term (1904-1908), from the strictly legalistic anti-trust interpretation of the 
Sherman Act endorsed by the Court since 190499. The president indeed believed that the 
«Nation» deserved the «power of supervision and regulation over all corporations»100; 
yet, he never automatically contended that large industrial combinations were, by 
definition, illegitimate. Roosevelt held on this position until the very end of the decade, 
skillfully keeping tied together a strong popular/populist anti-business rhetoric – in 1907 
he accused the «malefactors of great wealth» for the first financial panic of the 
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century101, in 1908 he talked about the existence of an «irresponsible» business power 
that needed to be «controlled in the interest of the general public»102 – with a practical 
acknowledgment of the economic role of American corporations.  
In doing this, Roosevelt was helped in the second half of the decade by the work 
of a new array of progressive thinkers that in those years further articulated and 
developed these ideas. Herbert Croly’s reformist manifesto, The Promise of American 
Life, published in 1909, combined the classic accusations against «the corruption of 
American public life», the «glaring inequalities of condition and power», and the 
«excessive and corrupt influence» of big-businesses with a strong support for the 
federal “recognition” of American corporations. The impression was that the large 
combinations in U.S. industry, willingly or not, were there to stay. It therefore became 
important not to destroy or punish them, but to put them under federal jurisdiction (and, 
in a sense, protection) in order to make the best use of them within a greater framework 
of national growth and development.  
The progressive reassessment of the long-standing arguments about trusts and 
corporations significantly contributed to shape the role of the federal government in its 
relationship with private businesses in general, and with the oil industry in particular, as 
the country moved on into the second decade of the twentieth century. Making specific 
reference to the Standard’s example, Croly explained that American industrialists, too, 
had to realize that, given the public pressure on them, they would have been better off 
collaborating with the federal government: 
«Doubtless they have not exhausted the evasive and 
dilatory methods that have served them so well in the past; but 
little by little the managers of these corporations…are coming to 
realize that the only way in which their businesses can obtain a 
firm legal standing is by means of Federal recognition and 
exclusive Federal regulation. They would like doubtless to 
continue to escape any effective regulation at all; but without it 
they cannot obtain effective recognition, and in the existing 
ferment of public opinion recognition has become more 
important to them than regulation is dangerous»103. 
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Croly’s vision for a centralizing and overachieving federal government provided 
the intellectual base for Roosevelt’s “New Nationalism”, the full-fledged progressive 
agenda that he presented in 1910 and on which he would have run against both the 
incumbent Republican president William Howard Taft and the Democratic opponent 
Woodrow Wilson in 1912. The program condensed many of the (increasingly pressing) 
demands for social, economic, and political reforms that had already grouped under the 
large banner of progressivism. The coalition itself was actually as vast as loosely knit. It 
cut through class, gender, and party lines and included Social Gospelers, Christian 
social economists like Ely, but also more secularized elements in American politics, like 
trade unionists, women’s rights advocates, academics, muckrakers, political 
descendants of the late nineteenth-century populist movement, and, according to 
important historiographical interpretations, actually “middle class” Americans and small 
manufacturers who were simply trying to react to new possible extremisms104. Despite 
the regional, class, or party differences, however, all those who defined themselves 
progressive sought, in one variant or another, increased federal regulation to solve the 
mutually recognized problems, especially in business competition105.  
Roosevelt rode this reformist wave from his pulpit during his presidency and he 
would have done even more so after the end of his second term, with ruinous 
consequences for the Republicans. The rift that Roosevelt’s activism had opened in the 
Party, pitting the most reformist elements against the old guard leaders, would have 
grew only larger during the presidency of William Howard Taft. The new president’s 
half-hearted commitment to the policies and ideals of his predecessor would have 
indeed convinced Roosevelt to re-enter American public life in 1910 and to side openly 
with the progressives. In 1912, Roosevelt would have lead the newly established 
Progressive Party into the presidential election fighting against both the Republican 
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conservatism and the Democratic version of progressivism represented by Woodrow 
Wilson. By the time American people went to vote to decide which type of 
progressivism should have led the country forward, however, the Supreme Court had 
already taken its decision about the fate of the Standard Oil. The sentence, pronounced 
in 1911, well represented the contemporary progressive evolution of the original, late 
nineteenth century arguments about the oil Trust: it condemned Standard’s business 
practices while acknowledging the economic and industrial relevance of American 
corporations. The Court found the holding company responsible of having supported 
monopolistic practices in the national and international commerce of crude oil and 
refined products. As a sanction, Jersey Standard (its management) was prohibited from 
holding stocks in any of the other 33 affiliates found guilty under the Sherman Act. 
«The intent of the court», as Sweet and Knowlton noted, was not to punish the 
individual companies, but to break down the «unified control» of the combination – «to 
destroy the concert of command, casting the specified affiliates loose, not only from the 
parent company, but from each other as well»106. The sentence was definitely a victory 
for the original, popular and populist anti-big business sentiment, which had specifically 
targeted the oil industry since the late nineteenth century and eventually succeeded in 
taking down the most powerful symbol of the influence of private interests in public 
life: the Standard Oil of New Jersey. The moral crusaders did get the head of the oil 
giant after forty years of fight. With the 1911 sentence, however, they won the battle 
and lost the war. The Court’s decree dismantled the Standard at the corporate level (i.e. 
in its role of parent company) but neither damaged the various affiliated companies and 
their industrial assets nor diminished their role as economic actor. In a late vindication 
of Roosevelt’s original position, the ruling that brought down Rockefeller’s company 
served also to assert the “rule of reason” as guiding principle in judging the legality of 
corporate behavior: merges and monopolies (intended simply as possible market 
outcomes) were not to be considered illegal per se; in evaluating their rationality, even 
before the law, it was instead necessary to take into consideration the broader economic 
context in which they emerged and to measure them against the yardstick of economic 
efficiency. An even more effective victory was therefore that of those economists and 
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intellectuals who had complained about the Standard Oil but who regarded American 
corporations – if properly regulated – as an element of national strength and not as a sin.  
Roosevelt’s popular and populist vision of progressivism was eventually rejected 
at the ballot box in 1912 in favor of Wilson’s less antagonistic program of reform. 
Roosevelt and the strand of reformism he put forth failed in both eliminating corruption 
and economic imbalances, as well as in creating an absolute federal regulatory authority 
over businesses. His presidency nonetheless significantly contributed in shaping the 
future development of the relationship between the private businesses (including the oil 
industry) and the government. The statist discourse that emerged from a unique 
combination of spiritual, moral, and economic aspirations in the late nineteenth century, 
and consolidated during the Roosevelt’s years at the White House, did succeed in 
elevating American trade and market to a new, national dimension. From a state-
regulated activity, commerce – even oil commerce – became a national and federal 
concern. At the rhetorical level, both in politics and in the public debate, the notion of a 
public and national interest that needed to be safeguarded and promoted through the 
state became increasingly common and clearly defined. As Schlesinger wrote discussing 
Croly’s ideas and their impact, the goal was now to «transform the national attitude 
toward social development, to convert the old unconscious sense of national destiny into 
a conscious sense of national purpose, to replace drift by management»107.  
 
1.2.2 Conservation and Professionalization 
Big business, and how to thwart its influence, was not the only focus of 
Roosevelt’s first State of the Union Speech. The situation of American forests, too, was 
examined in his first address to Congress, in late 1901. The president went indeed to 
great lengths in explaining «the great part played by them in the creation and 
maintenance of the national wealth»108. The subject, which could seem unrelated the 
discussion about industrial regulation, was in fact strictly connected with the broader 
argument that Roosevelt and many progressives were trying to make concerning the 
powers of the federal government. The case for an expansion in the administration’s 
supervising and controlling responsibilities was based on a logic that went well beyond 
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the rejection of corruption in politics, or the protection of a fair economic competition. 
The idea that the central government deserved a new agency in American society came 
from the belief, put forward by Social Gospelers and early reformers, that a common 
good – a higher, overarching public interest – actually existed. The federal government 
– or in Rooseveltian terms: the presidency and so the executive – as sole true 
representative of the people’s will had inevitably a major role as interpreter and steward 
of such public and national interest. Interstate commerce represented one crucial area 
where Washington’s jurisdiction needed to be extended, but it was not the only one. In 
any other domain where there was an evident, collective benefit to be reaped, the 
government had to be given the necessary means to act. It was a moral duty – and, in 
fact, a right – of the federal government. The country’s forests, for example, were so 
important for mining, grazing, and irrigation that they needed to be properly preserved 
and administered. This could be achieved, in Roosevelt’s opinion, through 
centralization and the implementation of new managerial standards. In particular, the 
president planned to task a newly created agency within the Department of Agriculture, 
the Bureau of Forestry, with the control and supervision of national forests. The 
administrative reform would have transferred most of the powers from the Department 
of Interior, whose agencies were dealing with the mapping and protection of the 
country’s wood reserves, eliminating a «diffusion of responsibility» that the President 
considered «bad from every standpoint»109. The specifics are important because 
Roosevelt’s decision to empower the Department of Agriculture over the Department of 
Interior was not taken out of necessity or by chance. On the opposite, the selection 
represented an ideological and political endorsement to the man who had envisioned 
such transfer of power: Gifford Pinchot, the “father” of American conservationism. By 
the end of the decade, his ideas would have transformed ethos and practices of 
American bureaucracy and instilled a new sense of purpose in managing national 
resources – and, among them, oil. 
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U.S. Forestry between Agriculture and Interior: the rise of Scientific Administrators 
Pinchot was the head of the Division of Forestry in the agricultural department 
since 1898. Despite his origins (Pinchot was not a “son of the wilderness”110; he was 
born in Connecticut in 1865 from a wealthy northeastern family and grew up in New 
York), he made forestry first his passion and then his job, with incredible success. Since 
the late nineteenth-century, he «spearheaded a drive to convert public land policy from 
one that sought first and foremost to disperse public holdings to private interests to a 
policy that sought to retain, conserve, and manage the public land»111. For Pinchot, 
«marrying science with state power was the prerequisite for governing nature and 
assuring national greatness»112. To this end, he actively promoted an innovative, 
scientific management of natural resources and a new meaning to role of national 
foresters. He envisioned, and eventually run, a highly specialized cadre of professionals, 
trained to use empirical evidence to produce technical and impartial knowledge. These 
efforts perfectly exemplify the great transformation occurring in American culture. 
Pinchot recounted attending every day the revivalist sermons of Reverend J. Aitken as a 
child113. Like Roosevelt and countless other Americans, he had been directly exposed to 
the precepts of the social gospel. Furthermore, like Ely and several other emerging 
social scientists that were reforming American educational system, Pinchot had spent 
years of studying and training in Europe, accustoming himself to the rigorous method of 
scientific investigation extensively practiced overseas and in German institutions in 
particular114. He, like many other American intellectuals, scholars, and engineers, 
brought home his admiration for the European organizational and operational standards 
applied in both natural and social sciences115. These experiences significantly 
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contributed to shape their vision of development. The soundness and seemingly 
universal applicability of empirical research persuaded social engineers and 
administrators like Pinchot that a common, public good was not only recognizable but 
also, and more important, measurable through to the correct application of scientific 
criteria to the study of the country’s situation. The longstanding, liberal, and optimistic 
faith in progress, filtered through the new sense of social responsibility developing in 
the United States, became an all-powerful scientism that contributed to raise the 
nation’s ambitions and recast the country’s role in the late nineteenth-century. The 
introduction of stricter knowledge-based qualifications for expert positions in the public 
service, as well as in private businesses and in the academia, represented the first 
practical step in the attempt to fulfill a broader reformist and modernizing mission and 
ascertain the nation’s real potential. 
The movement towards professionalization represented the ideological 
counterpart to the ongoing technical revolution within the American industry, whose 
increasing mechanization promised to make every step of the productive process faster, 
more precise, and less costly – in a word: more efficient116. Pinchot was indeed one of 
the first and most fervid preachers of this “gospel of efficiency”117. He actively 
promoted the implementation of a businesslike approach, which focused on the 
elimination of waste and the rationalization of available resources, in the management 
of the U.S. natural patrimony. Pinchot’s conservationism considered natural resources 
as critical but limited assets, whose returns needed to be maximized over time to the 
continuous benefit of the national community. As Roosevelt explained already in 1901, 
«Wise forest protection does not mean the withdrawal of forest resources… The 
fundamental idea of forestry is the perpetuation of forests by use. Forest protection is 
not an end of itself; it is a means to increase and sustain the resources of our country 
and the industries that depend upon them. The preservation of our forests is an 
imperative business necessity»118. The focus, therefore, was on the sustainable use of 
the resource in order to make possible its long-term consumption, not on preservation 
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per se. Pinchot introduced an element of temporality in the management of natural 
resources that seemed completely absent in the minds of those Americans used to the 
continent’s plentitudes. As he himself reported, when he came back from Europe in 
1890, «not a single acre of Government, state, or private timberland was under 
systematic forest management anywhere on the most richly timbered of all continents.... 
When the Gay Nineties began, the common word for our forests was "inexhaustible." To 
waste timber was a virtue and not a crime. There would always be plenty of timber and 
everything else in American for everybody, world without end… And as for sustained 
yield, no such idea had ever entered their heads»119. The adoption of new professional 
standards, and therefore the use of technical expertise, would have instead helped to 
understand the optimal number of trees that could be cut (or needed to be replanted) 
every year to foster their economic use without endangering the nation’s timber reserve. 
«The job was not to stop the ax, but to regulate its use»120. This form of “utilitarian 
conservationism” advanced by Pinchot differed from the romantic, aesthetic 
preservationism – equally present in the United States – that advocated the federal 
withdrawal of lands in order to totally shield them from human intrusion121. Pinchot’s 
seemingly spurious environmentalism would have indeed attracted increasing criticism 
from later twentieth century naturalists. Historians, however, have repeatedly tried to 
downplay the negative and simplistic characterization of his pragmatic conservationist 
ideas, stressing how they evolved during the course his long and complex career, but 
also noting an inescapable truth: Pinchot was a man of his time. Relevant to his vision 
was his «certainty that social justice was partly secured through economic expansion, 
and that this was keyed to the nation’s ability to protect and to use in a sustainable 
fashion Earth’s bounty»122.  
Pinchot had focused on revolutionizing the personnel, the administrative 
objectives, and the operational methods of the USDA Division of Forestry since his 
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arrival, in 1898. Thanks also to the work of Pinchot’s friend Clinton Hart Merriam, who 
shared the same reformist ideals and had been the head of the USDA Biological Survey 
since 1889, by the turn of the century their Department was already «an organization 
center (perhaps the center) of American environmentalism» with a vast expertise in 
forestry123. In 1901, Roosevelt’s request to delegate additional responsibilities to the 
USDA represented therefore the president’s approval and support of their reformist and 
conservationist strategy124. The president had known the two men for years, so his 
commitment to the bureaucratic restructuring was neither superficial nor incidental. The 
relationship between Pinchot and Roosevelt would have indeed only grown stronger 
after 1901, with the former unofficially serving as one of the president’s closest 
advisors for the rest of the decade.  
Pinchot’s political leverage, his accomplishments in forestry management, and his 
ability to publicize them, brought him further administrative victories. In 1905, the 
Congress finally granted Roosevelt’s (and so Pinchot’s) requests, approving the 
complete transferring of authority over American forests from the Department of 
Interior to the USDA. At that point, «Department of Agriculture was the most modern, 
well-developed bureaucracy within the national government. It maintained a highly 
professional staff with a clear policy agenda. The Interior Department, on the other 
hand, possessed no such rigorous organization; its field offices were particularly 
unprofessional, lacking skilled employees and even necessary office equipment»125. The 
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Department of Interior’s bureaucratic failures were sentenced and publicly exposed 
during the second part of the decade by the Keep Commission. Official named 
Committee to Investigate the Executive Business of the Government, it was commonly 
known after its chairman, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Charles Keep. Roosevelt 
established the committee in 1905, tasking it with the administrative review of the 
executive branch. Until 1909, the year Roosevelt left the White House and the 
commission was disbanded, it worked to report widespread malpractice and inefficiency 
in many different government units. Its first report, presented in 1907, specifically 
targeted the Department of Interior for its outmoded practices – especially in the 
management of public lands through the Land General Office, considered inattentive 
and wasteful. One of the five members appointed by Roosevelt to the Commission was, 
of course, Gifford Pinchot, who had actually inspired the whole idea of an internal 
investigation. With him there was the fellow conservationist James R. Garfield, who 
had been a member of the U.S. Civil Service Commission (one of the first governmental 
unit to implement merit-based hiring and promotion criteria) and who in 1905 was 
serving as Commissioner at the Bureau of Corporation – the agency of the Department 
of Commerce created during Roosevelt’s first term to investigate U.S. corporations. 
Garfield’s credentials and reformist ethos (he, as Pinchot, had been pushing for an 
administrative review for years) made him in Roosevelt’s eyes the right man for what 
seemed a very challenging task of remodeling the management of the Interior 
Department along professional, scientific, and conservationist lines. Garfield was hence 
appointed Secretary of the Interior soon after the Committee presented its first remarks 
and recommendations for reform.  
 
Improving the Nation, Surveying Oil 
In the last two years of the Roosevelt’s administration, both Pinchot and Garfield 
worked hard to turn the personalistic, scarcely organized, and locally-oriented federal 
system overseeing trees, water, and public lands into the «resource management state» 
they envisioned126. The change was at the practical and organizational level as much as 
at the cultural one. The new administrative regime rested on the belief that a close 
relationship (if not actual overlapping) between conservation and efficiency existed: to 
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save resources meant to use them better, reducing their wastage and increasing their 
relative productivity. Even more important, both concepts assumed a new and exclusive 
national dimension. A more efficient use of resources did not mean higher and faster 
profits for private owners, but just the opposite: conservation was meant to serve the 
long-term benefit of the community as opposed to the short-term gain of specific 
individuals. Pinchot explained it clearly in 1910: «Conservation means the greatest 
good to the greatest number for the longest time…it demands the complete and orderly 
development of all our resources for the benefit of all the people, instead of the partial 
exploitation of them for the benefit of a few»127. The practical application of 
conservational criteria through the adoption of new organizational and administrative 
standards was therefore closely associated with what was considered the real public and 
national interest. These considerations ensured that the implementation of 
conservationist measures was invoked not only in the attempt to preserve the trees, 
rivers, and soil. As the past mode of exploitation appeared more and more mindless and 
wasteful, especially when compared with the growing industrial needs of the country, 
the specific category of “national resource” – which called for the state’s interest, if not 
intervention – came naturally to include not only lumber, waterways, and soil, but also 
metals, like iron or gold, as well as minerals, coal, oil, and natural gas. The situation of 
minerals and metals was particularly problematic from a conservationist perspective. 
The law regulating prospecting and mining rights was the Mining Law of 1872 
(officially known as the General Mining Act), passed after gold was discovered in 
California and designed to encourage the development of western territories. The 
legislation allowed U.S. citizens to explore for minerals (excluding coal) on federal 
public lands without need for authorization. Prospectors could then file a mining claim 
as soon as a deposit was located and patent the land, therefore gaining title to both 
subsurface and surface resources128. In order to obtain and retain the government deed, 
the claimants simply had to prove that there was enough material to be profitably 
marketed and pay a registration fee. At that point, miners (individuals but also private 
companies or corporations) could enjoy their economic rights regardless of any possible 
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alternative use or value of the land. The legislation regarding coal (Coal Land Acts of 
1864 and 1873) was not much better, as it simply required federal coal-bearing lands to 
be sold at public auction129. This legislative regime clearly favored a private, and 
completely discretional, use of public land and its resources and assigned the 
government almost no regulatory or controlling authority. In this respect, oil’s specific 
situation was even worse since the permissive criteria of Mining Law coupled with the 
effects of the “rule of capture”. The result was a context in which the rapid exploitation 
was not only encouraged but also the only actual way to guarantee profit from oil 
drilling. This outcome was of course the complete opposite of what conservationists 
were preaching. Roosevelt recognized this already in 1907, claiming that: «the nation 
should retain its title to its fuel resources, and its right to supervise their development in 
the interest of the public as a whole»130.  
From forests, lands, and waterways to minerals and livestock, in those years the 
use of conservationist rhetoric «became ubiquitous» in the United States, spreading 
rapidly among the variegated group of social scientists, reformists, experts and 
politicians that populated the progressive era131. The conservation claims fit indeed 
perfectly with the progressive discourse of collective improvement and reform. As 
society was given a new temporal, economic, and moral horizon to reach, efficiency 
became a national issue – a public, shared goal, with significant implications also at the 
personal and (even) physiological level. By the end of the decade, increasing the 
“national efficiency” through conservation meant both to produce timber without 
wasting trees and to avoid illness, both to divert torrents for irrigation and to strengthen 
U.S. citizens by improving hygiene, eliminating alcohol – or practicing eugenics132. The 
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country was, indeed, «gradually awakening to the fact of its own improvability»133. A 
crucial passage for the transmission and dissemination of these ideas was the 
Conference of Governors, held in May 1908 in Washington DC. The meeting was 
Pinchot’s brainchild. It was organized to discuss the proper use of American resources 
and had an impressive list of attendees, which included state governors, numerous 
experts in natural resources, delegates from more than fifty national organizations 
(mostly concerned in the development and use of natural resources, but there were also 
economic and scientific associations), then Senators, U.S. Representatives, Supreme 
Court justices and member of the executive. The geologist and Wisconsin progressive 
Charles R. Van Hise wrote two years later that «never before in the history of the nation 
had so representative an audience gathered together…never before in the history of the 
nation had the scientific men of the country met upon equal footing with those engaged 
in politics», stating that the Conference was «a meeting of the first importance in 
reference to the future of the nation»134.  
In his opening address, Roosevelt condensed the latest evolutions of 
conservationist and progressive thinking, calling the management of natural resources 
«the gravest problem of today» and connecting it to the greater, underlying “efficiency 
issue” present in the country as a whole135. He also underscored the presence of an 
overachieving national community – a superior body whose very existence was at stake 
(and whose protection rested on the state). As for the natural resources, Roosevelt stated 
that they were «the final basis of national power and perpetuity». He fully 
acknowledged the role these natural elements played in the industrial growth of the 
nation, as he said that the «vast wealth of lumber in our forests, the riches of our soils 
                                                                                                                                          
is the waste of time and labor. The waste of time by drunkenness, by poor work that must be done over 
and by idleness, makes a large item of loss in every line of business», p. 317. Similarly, in the 1908 report 
prepared for the National Conservation Commission (addressed later in this section), the (renown) 
American economist Irving Fisher discussed various methods to improve the national welfare and general 
“efficiency”. He explained, for example, how alcohol, tobacco, and long workdays could cause undue 
fatigue and provoke economic waste. Similarly, he mentioned the importance of «conserving» life 
through public and personal hygiene, and improving it through the application of eugenic measures. 
Irving Fisher, Bulletin 30 of the Committee of One Hundred on National Health, Being a Report on 
National Vitality, its Wastes and Conservation (Government Printing Office, 1909).  
133 Ibid., p. 14 
134 Charles Richard Van Hise, The Conservation of Natural Resources in the United States (New York, 
The Macmillan Company, 1910), p. 6. 
135 Theodore Roosevelt, Conservation as a National Duty (May 13, 1908), Proceedings of a Conference 
of Governors in the White House, May 13‐15, 1908 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1909). All the following quotes from Roosevelt in this paragraph are from the same speech.  
	 54 
and mines, the discovery of gold and mineral oils, combined with the efficiency of our 
transportation, [had] made the conditions of our life unparalleled in comfort and 
convenience…[they] promoted to an extraordinary degree the complexity of our 
industrial and social life». The regret for the «lavish use» of the past, however, directly 
turned into concern for the future of American resources. In fact, the president seemed 
to have little doubt about the dramatic status of American resources: «the enormous 
stores of mineral oil and gas are largely gone. Our natural waterways are not gone, but 
they have been so injured by neglect…that there is less navigation on them now than 
there was fifty years ago. Finally, we began with soils of unexampled fertility and we 
have so impoverished them by injudicious use and by failing to check erosion that their 
crop-producing power is diminishing instead of increasing». Moreover, if it was still 
possible to work to restore the status of renewable resources as forests, waterways and 
soils, nothing could instead be done to improve the reserves of coal, oil, gas, iron, and 
metals generally. Therefore, «in dealing with [them], all that we can do is to try to see 
that they are wisely used. The exhaustion», he said in a fatalist fashion, «is certain to 
come in time».  
The conference lasted three days, where private owners and corporations 
(especially in the mining and oil industry) were repeatedly bashed for their extravagant 
use of resources and exclusive focus on making profits. More important, however, was 
the follow-up of the conference. The meeting indeed resulted in the creation of the 
National Conservation Commission (NCC), consisting in forty-nine renowned 
personalities, about one-third of whom engaged in politics, one-third in the industries, 
and one-third in scientific work. Four sections were created: minerals, water, forest, and 
soil. The chairman was – again – Pinchot. The task of the Commission was to make an 
«estimate of the existing available resources, what proportion of these resources have 
already been utilized or exhausted, the rate of increase in their consumption, and if this 
rate continues how long these resources will last»136. This incredibly ambitious project, 
which had the president’s direct approval and backing, was a scientific endeavor as 
much as a political mission. The results, published in 1909 in three large volumes, 
accounted for what Roosevelt’s called «one of the most fundamentally important 
documents ever laid before the American people» and contained the first inventory of 
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the natural resources of the nation – «or ever made by any nation», according to his 
letter of transmittal137. The report furnished indeed «a basis of quantitative and 
therefore scientific discussion of the future of our resources», which could be 
considered an immense step forward in terms of technical knowledge available on the 
issue – at least in theory138. The project was so ambitious that its main goal – the 
production of scientific and reliable knowledge on which to build an informed public 
debate – could not be considered completely fulfilled, especially in the case of oil.  
Among the dozens of reports prepared for the study, which covered issues as 
diverse as «the influence of droughts on corn crops» and the «shrinkage in animal 
products due to injurious insects», or as «fisheries» and «phosphate reserves», there 
was indeed also the USGS assessment of the country’s petroleum situation139. 
Established in 1879, the USGS was formally an agency of the Department of Interior 
and had among its responsibilities the «examination of the geological structure, mineral 
resources, and products of the national domain»140. His director, George Otis Smith, 
was very closely associated with Roosevelt’s circle of «arch-conservationists»141. It was 
actually J. R. Garfield to select him for the job in 1907. The newly appointed Secretary 
of Interior had spent the previous two years as member of the Keep Commission, a 
position that allowed him to get directly in contact with Otis, who was serving as 
chairman in of one of the subcommittees. As soon as he became head of the Department 
of the Interior, Garfield promoted Otis. The very timely decision allowed Otis to addend 
the Conference of the Governors as new director of the USGS. Then, in accordance 
with the NCC‘s objectives, he asked a member of his staff, David Talbot Day, to write 
the report about the American oil resources.  
Day was a chemist turned into a petroleum expert and was affiliated with the U.S. 
Geological Survey (USGS) since 1895. His study – The Petroleum Resources of the 
United States – represented the first official federal publication on the matter. The 
USGS did not indeed consider oil as a major interest until the beginning of the twentieth 
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century. For the first twenty years of its institutional life, the agency busied itself mainly 
with the preparation of topographic maps and the study of American water supplies. 
The situation changed after 1901, when Lucas’ discovery at Spindletop initiated a 
cascading effect that would have brought the country directly into a new energy and 
industrial era142. The Division of Mining and Mineral Resources, created in 1900, began 
therefore investigating the presence and extent of coal and oil reserves at a time when 
the professional and managerial transformation of the U.S. administration had just 
started. When Day assembled its report, less than a decade later, the Pinchot’s 
revolution was instead in full swing. The reformist wave that had eventually hit the 
Department of Interior was visible in Day’s work, too, which perfectly served the 
scientific-conservationist narrative dominant at the time. Day described the country’s oil 
situation with an authoritative tone and a candid, dispassionate voice, making abundant 
use of figures and statistics to show the text’s scientific credentials. Despite the 
detached language used to express them, Day’s findings could however hardly be more 
dramatic: there was little oil left underground and the country was quickly running out 
of it. According to his calculations, given the increasing rate of production, all the 
petroleum resources of the United States could actually be exhausted in less than twenty 
years. The only way in which American oil could last up to ninety years was to freeze 
the production level – basically denying the industry and the national economy the use 
of one of its very engine of growth, i.e. the availability of a constantly increasing 
quantity of petroleum. After being submitted to the NCC, Day’s work was quickly 
popularized and became a landmark for early U.S. petroleum studies. Experts, 
government officials, and commentators would have made reference to both technical 
and theoretical aspects of Day’s study in the following years, indicating the tremendous 
influence it had in setting the terms of the discussion on American oil resources.  
The elements that made the analysis so appreciated at the time – i.e. its technical 
approach and its conservationist ethos – are also those that shaped its later historical 
assessment, which underscored the study’s scientific flaws and its ideologically driven 
design. Day estimated that the total amount of oil left in the United States was a figure 
comprised between 10 and 24.5 billion barrels. To reach this conclusion, he relied on 
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different methods of investigation with various degrees of accuracy143. For the fields 
about which very little information was available, Day inferred the capacity of the 
reservoir from the analysis of volumetric parameters: he looked at average thickness and 
porosity of the field’s pay sand (the section of the reservoir that contains recoverable 
oil) to come up with an estimate of its yield by cubic foot. At that point, he made 
projections about the entire oil-pool based on its reported size. This kind of calculations 
evidently implied a (large) amount of approximation about the extent of the fields, the 
geology of the reservoirs, and the characteristics of the petroleum-bearing strata. For 
other areas, instead, he simply relied on the analysis of the field’s known declining 
production curve, which expressed each future year’s yield as a declining percentage of 
the first year of output. In any case, as Day himself admitted, to determine the amount 
of oil obtainable from American known fields was «a matter largely of conjecture»144.  
A large part of these technical problems were, in fact, essentially unavoidable. To 
estimate with a high degree of precision the volume of country’s petroleum reservoirs, 
and therefore the total amount of its oil reserves, is a very difficult (if not actually 
impossible) task even today. To determine how much oil was still underground in the 
United States at the beginning of the twentieth century, when petroleum geology was 
still in its developing stage, was therefore simply out of the realm of possibility. The 
ability to locate oil was indeed still considered more an art than a learnt knowledge. 
Frenher calls oil finding throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century «a 
socially constructed process», since charisma, personal intuition, and local authority 
were often more valued in an oil expert than his understanding of dry geological and 
topographic notions145. Finding oil was basically a matter of luck, since even 
“scientific” prospecting relied simply on surface indicators. Even the most advanced 
formulation of the only credited theory of oil accumulation present at the time – the 
anticlinal theory – offered little practical assistance in finding petroleum besides 
generally suggesting oilmen to look for anticline structures or little domes in the 
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landscape146. As the USGS itself recognized in 1902, in several areas the «geologic 
structure makes it extremely difficult to determine the localities where oil and gas 
should accumulate in accordance with the theory. To an extent not general realized the 
flexures of the strata are irregular and discontinuous, and the development of one oil 
pool affords little, if any, assistance in locating others on the same or adjacent 
anticlines»147. The lack of consensus (and understanding) of the principles of petroleum 
accumulation actually forced for decades (and well into the twentieth century) 
American geologists to compete with dowsers and their divining rods for real authority 
on the fields.  
Day’s was therefore facing an impossible task; the way he decided to carry it out, 
however, made things worse. A national standardized survey of American oil regions 
had not been completed yet by 1908. Day, probably pressed by the tight five-months 
deadline for the completion of his study, lost the opportunity to carry out one. Instead, 
he chose not only to rely on different investigation methods, but also on different 
criteria in the measurement of the field’s parameters. The data that he aggregated to 
come up with a national estimate were indeed the result of separate regional USGS 
surveys, completed throughout the years by different geologists with different 
observation skills and levels of technical expertise. In using the same simplified 
calculations for all the areas, he therefore greatly overlooked local specificities and 
possible discrepancies, allowing himself to a large margin of error. Even more 
important, the nine previous USGS reports on oil were just a collection of production 
data from the various areas, with no specific discussion about the possible presence, 
location, or size of new fields. In basing his calculation on the available data, Day ended 
up calculating only the amount of recoverable oil present in known fields, or «proved 
territory», without including prospective and untapped reserve148. In estimating the oil 
left underground, Day not only discounted the probability of finding new reservoirs but 
also excluded the possibility of such event, failing to acknowledge the role (and 
common occurrence) of oil discoveries in the development of the industry – a (missing) 
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element that undermined, if not the descriptive value of the study, at least its 
prescriptive power about the end of petroleum resources. This exclusive focus on oil’s 
proved fields seems peculiar especially if compared with what was the usual procedure 
in similar investigations about another non-renewable resource like coal. Geological 
surveys, in that case, tried not only to determine the amount of coal that could be 
recovered through the improvement of mining and extraction practices (another 
important factor that Day did not take into consideration), but also to find seams with 
“hidden coal” - and so to catalog not only the proven quantity available but also 
probable and possible reserves149.  
The limits of Day’s study, when not strictly technical in nature, were closely 
connected, if not directly due to, the original research design. Since the very beginning, 
the goal was not to investigate oil as much as to prove the value of conservation as 
applied to oil. This was exactly what Day did, with a report whose alarming findings 
about oil scarcity underscored only the need for its more attentive and restrained use. 
Indeed, the only way to save petroleum for future generation was to actually save it, not 
to find more of it. As Madureira noted, «not only did the conclusions agree with the 
premises but the conclusions were, to a certain extent, also part of the premises»150. The 
report therefore represented as a static representation of the petroleum situation in the 
country, not a dynamic analysis of the resource. More than as a non-renewable resource, 
oil was treated as a fixed capital. The only valuable variable for ascertaining its duration 
became the rapidity at which it was used, or extracted. Similarly, the notion of “reserve” 
was not elaborated as to accord with the specific characteristic of the oil industry. 
«“Reserves” were understood as a stock; a finite stock that had to be economized, held 
back and set aside for future uses or contingencies. By adopting terminologies with 
familiar nontechnical meanings furthermore colored by the moving debate on 
presidential powers and federal forest “reserves”, geologists ascribed the meaning of 
the concept to an observable fixed asset»151.  
The politically loaded message of the report is visible also in Day’s conclusions. 
In order to preserve oil, he not only advocated for the federal withdrawal of oil-bearing 
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lands – just as conservationists were doing for public land – but also stated that some 
specific uses of petroleum (illumination and lubrication) were more valuable than 
others, therefore suggesting the possibility of extending governmental control over both 
the production of oil and its utilization. The idea of a federal authority able to restrict 
access to oil-bearing lands and even to direct companies and consumers’ choices on 
petroleum’s uses was definitely far from the actual condition of the oil industry: 
rampant, free form government intervention, and totally private and market-oriented. 
The report, designed as such, actually served not only the political aims of the 
conservationists but also the bureaucratic ambitions of the governmental agency that 
created it, in this case the USGS. In the interdepartmental competition for the 
redistribution of both administrative responsibilities and federal funds, the “need” to 
conserve oil was an organization opportunity before than a national tragedy. Once oil 
conservation was established as national policy, it would have fallen completely under 
the jurisdiction of the USGS and, at large, of the Department of Interior. Just like 
Pinchot had the national forests under his authority, the USGS and the Department of 
Interior would have had petroleum – a seemingly fundamental resource for national 
prosperity. Geologists like Day and Otis Smith, as other progressive era’s experts, were 
therefore acting as «policy and administrative entrepreneurs», seizing the opportunity 
to increase both the regulative powers and the federal appropriations assigned to their 
agency152. Day, for example, in his final recommendations called for two specific 
actions – «a general investigation of the conditions of accumulation of petroleum and 
its geographic distribution» and a «fundamental scientific study of the nature of 
petroleum…» – that only the USGS could have undertaken153. This attempt to expand 
not only the authority but also autonomy of the executive branch through the promotion 
of conservationist measures was exactly what Roosevelt was pushing for. In building a 
unique expertise within the administration, the president, in his statist vision, saw the 
possibility to claim for it exclusive jurisdiction over the nation’s affairs.  
 
This ongoing effort to establish a politically insulated, expert-oriented, efficient 
administration dedicated to the management and protection of the nation’s natural 
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resources would have actually suffered a sudden blow soon after Roosevelt left the 
White House. The idea to develop a centralized and independent bureaucracy, which 
could autonomously dictate the terms on which national, public interest would be 
defined, was however not as appealing to Roosevelt’s successor. On the (literal) 
battleground of national land and its resources, Taft pushed back. One of the first 
previous decisions that he reversed was exactly the appointment of Garfield at Interior. 
At his place, the new president nominated Richard Achilles Ballinger, who upon 
assuming office decided to revoke the status of millions of acres of public land 
previously put under federal protection during the Roosevelt’s administration. Large 
territories with commercial value, especially for the mining industry, were reopened for 
private leasing. The move initiated a national controversy that significantly contributed 
to the weakening and eventual breakup of the Republican Party in 1912. Ballinger was 
not anti-conservationist, but he adhered to the strict constructionist view shared also by 
the President and favored legislative authority over bureaucratic prerogatives154. 
Ballinger’s decision, however, looked as a political blow to environmentalists and 
progressives alike, since it meant granting large economic interests the opportunity to 
exploit for private benefit what was considered to be a national (public, collective) 
patrimony. Pinchot, who liked neither the theory behind Ballinger’s idea nor its 
practical results, used exactly that argument to attack him. The forester not only 
opposed the decision on conservationist ground, but also because it was a direct attack 
to his kingdom: the Bureau of Forestry, whose jurisdiction over the country’s lands was 
de facto being reduced by the Secretary’s decision. Pinchot therefore led personally the 
charge against the Secretary’s policy during the latter half of 1909, publicly denouncing 
his actions and accusing him of colluding with corporate interests. Taft stood firm and 
actually fought back, basically firing Pinchot for insubordination. Roosevelt, who was 
travelling in Africa at the time, was evidently upset. When, in 1911, the dusts settled 
and Ballinger finally resigned over the scandal, the damage to the Party’s unity was 
already done. 
Despite the abrupt end to their careers, Garfield and Pinchot did succeed, with 
Roosevelt’s support, in pushing their respective departments towards a modernization of 
their operational standards. More important, they won the public debate, effectively 
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shaping the national discourse around conservation and pushing it into the political 
agenda. Their era marked indeed the shift towards a new administrative regime – a 
«custodial» management of national resources, where the U.S. government is not just 
the (provisional) owner of the land, waiting for someone willing to pay for it and then 
ready to forgo any right, but also its steward and caretaker, ready to impose rules in 
order to preserve its bounty for future generations155. This “rational” planning served to 
actually promote the use and development of all national resources. As Hayes wrote, an 
underlying idea of efficiency «drew these federal scientists from one resource task to 
another, from specific programs to comprehensive concepts»156 
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2. Fuel Oil and Empire 
 
2.1 Going Global  
Theodore Roosevelt made his priorities clear since the beginning of his 
administration. The unexpected accession to the presidency after McKinley’s 
assassination did not seem to have found him unprepared. Quite the opposite, as he 
demonstrated less than three months after his inauguration, when he proceeded to lay 
before Congress his vast and comprehensive agenda for the country. His many previous 
political appointments and its adventurous life had provided him with a vast experience 
and solid beliefs. The new role represented an opportunity to implement a vision for 
government developed long before setting foot in the Oval Office. The presidential 
pulpit empowered him as statesman and broadened his audience; it amplified his voice 
rather than transform his message. 
If this was true in domestic politics, where Roosevelt had already expressed 
reformist tendencies in the past, it was even truer in international affairs. Before 
becoming president, he had actively sought the adoption of a muscular and expansionist 
foreign policy for years and, in the late 1890s, he had contributed in words and deeds to 
the creation of McKinley’s imperial legacy. It is not a surprise then that, once at the 
White House, he began immediately pushing for the protection (and possibly the 
expansion) of American commercial prerogatives and territorial possessions abroad. In 
doing so, he was not only repeating and developing policies already presented before to 
the American public, but also trying to make lawmakers and the nation at large fully 
aware of what the United States had become: an empire, competing for commercial 
opportunities and political influence on a larger, global scale. By 1901, indeed, the list 
of the major extra-continental territories under American jurisdiction had already grown 
to include Cuba, the Philippines, the Hawaiian archipelago, Puerto Rico, Guam, and 
part of the Samoa islands – a network of islands stretching from the western Pacific 
Ocean to the Caribbean, covering a straight distance of about ten thousand miles, more 
than twice the distance between England and India. The remoteness of some of the new 
acquisitions was even greater when actual travel routes were considered. At the 
beginning of the century, with the Panama Canal still far from being completed, any 
American (battle) ship sailing off the country’s East Coast and travelling to Manila 
	 64 
would have needed go round Cape Horn, covering more than eighteen thousand miles to 
reach the Philippine capital, which is more than five times the distance from London to 
Boston. To get a sense of scale, it suffices to say that reaching the same destination by 
travelling East across the Atlantic would have actually been faster if opposing currents 
and supply needs were not considered, since both the alternative itineraries – the one 
through the Suez Canal and the other round the Cape of Good Hope – were shorter.  
Transoceanic crossings were in fact neither new nor technologically prohibitive. 
Maritime explorations had after all been a crucial component of growth for colonial 
empires since the fifteenth century. Starting from the 1870s, furthermore, a series of 
technical innovations had greatly improved long-distance navigation and shipping, 
driving (or mirroring, depending on the economic and statistical interpretations) the 
boom in seaborne commerce and international trade registered in the forty years 
preceding the outbreak of WWI157. American merchants and shippers, who had been 
                                                
157 Between the 1870s and 1913, global trade increased by more than 400 percent. See Antoni 
Estevadeordal, Brian Frantz and Alan M. Taylor, The Rise and Fall of World Trade, 1870-1939, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, No. 2 (May, 2003), p. 394, and David S. Jacks, Christopher 
M. Meissner, and Dennis Novy, Trade Costs, 1870–2000, American Economic Review: Papers & 
Proceedings, 2008, 98:2, pp. 533, 534 Scholars have studied at length the relationship between the 
growth in world trade and maritime transportation. The decrease in shipping costs and freight rates at the 
end of the nineteenth century is usually considered the main reason behind the trade boom of the late 
nineteenth century. In the last decade, however, economists have review and refined the data supporting 
this causal relation, arriving at more nuanced (if not opposite) conclusions. Jacks and Pendakur (2008), 
for example, decided to treat freight rates as an endogenous variable in bilateral trade flows (i.e. 
influenced by the demand level itself, rather than as a factor exogenously determined by technological 
improvements – like the introduction of the steam engine). In this case, the explanatory power of the 
“maritime transport revolution” is lost and its role as prime driver of the global trade booms (pre-WWI 
and post-WWII) diminishes in favor of other factors, as income growth and price convergence. See, 
David Jacks, Krishna Pendakur, Global Trade and the Maritime Transport Revolution, National Bureau 
of Economic Research Working, Paper No. 14139, June 2008. Yet in a more recent work Jacks & others 
provided further observations on the issue. After having defined and calculated trade costs in a “broad 
sense”, including obvious barriers such as tariffs and transport costs but also many other barriers that are 
more difficult to observe such as the costs of overcoming language barriers and exchange rate risk, they 
confirmed that they had “overriding role” in promoting trade in the pre-WWI trade boom. When their 
effect on global trade was minimum was after WWII. They thus claimed that the role of trade costs in 
explaining trade has diminished over the long run. David S. Jacks, Christopher M. Meissner, Dennis 
Novy, Trade Booms, Trade Busts, and Trade Costs, Journal of International Economics, Vol 83, No. 2 
(March, 2011), pp. 185–201. For a completely different approach, see Michel Fouquin & Jules Hugot, 
Back to the Future: International Trade Costs and the Two Globalizations, CEPII Working Paper, No 
2016-13, May. Fouquin & Hugot show instead that trade costs had already begun to fall in the 1840s, thus 
contradicting altogether all the previous studies claiming that late nineteenth century technological 
improvements in shipping and communication were responsible for sparking globalization and trade. 
Factors as the introduction of the steamship and the telegraph did have an impact on world trade during 
the second half of the century, but they simply reinforced a pre-existing trend that began under (and by) 
other circumstances. For a more general presentation of the economic developments of the late nineteenth 
century, see for example: Larry Neal, Rondo E. Cameron, A Concise Economic History of the World: 
From Paleolithic Times to the Present, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, Fifth Edition), Ch. 12. 
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successfully competing with European traders for market opportunities in Asia since the 
1790s, had little left to learn about Pacific freight routes at the end of the following 
century and, if the volume of American commerce with the Far East was still limited, 
the business interest for the region was not158. China, Hong Kong, and Japan were 
already considered as future crucial outlet for American products159. American 
commercial and financial ties were even stronger with the countries across the 
Caribbean Sea and, more generally, with the southern part of the Western Hemisphere, 
over which Washington had tried to project his authority since the early 1820s. In 1895, 
about seventy years later President James Monroe’s declaration, which had actually 
failed to impress the European chancelleries at the time, Washington’s successful 
diplomatic intervention in the Venezuelan crisis effectively established the American 
ascendency over its neighboring countries. Meanwhile, the numerous contacts and 
contracts that American bankers and businessmen had developed in the Far East and in 
those states below the U.S. southern border represented an even more immediate 
measure of the country’s success in extending its financial clout far from its continental 
shores in those years.  
United States’ activities, if not presence, overseas could therefore be considered 
already substantial at the end of the century, before the conflict of 1898. Yet the 
«splendid little war» against the dilapidated Spanish fleet precipitated the establishment 
of a series of military, strategic, and political interests in the Caribbean and in Southeast 
Asia that were unprecedented, both in nature and in extent. The quick and resounding 
victory over the once-invincible Armada established the predominance of the United 
States in the Americas and projected its power across the Pacific, securing Washington 
new territories and prestige. It also, however, loaded the country with new tasks and 
responsibilities. Roosevelt had already emphasized the expanding responsibilities of the 
federal state in domestic affairs, arguing for an increase in executive authority. The 
                                                
158 The first ship to sail from the United States to China was the Empress of China, in 1784. For an 
account of the early American contacts and exchange with the Far East, and their economic implications, 
see James R. Fichter, So Great a Proffit: How the East Indies Trade Transformed Anglo-American 
Capitalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).  
159 The words of John Banett Moore, ex United States minister to Panama and Siam and delegate of the 
United States to the International Congress of American States, before the New York Chamber of 
Commerce are an example of the late-century enthusiasm about the American business prospects in 
China: «China presents the greatest undeveloped field for American commerce and trade. The future of 
our trade with Europe, South American, and Africa will show no such per cent of growth as that with 
China and the Far East». Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance of the United States, Vol. 8, 
Bureau of Statistics, Treasury Department (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), p. 2874. 
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government’s duties appeared even greater if measured by American new aims and 
commitments abroad. Winning business contracts in foreign countries – as private 
American citizens had been doing for decades, either with or without the help of the 
Department of State – was different from officially organizing and administering distant 
territories, subduing hostile populations, building, operating, and securing 
communication and transportation infrastructures all while defending the newly 
acquired lands from foreign intrusion and commercial encroachment.  
What Roosevelt did, as soon as he entered the White House, was therefore to 
accept and embrace this change, emphatically acknowledging the country’s new 
political and diplomatic status. Whether Americans «desired or not» - he stated – they 
must have recognized that they now had «international duties no less than international 
rights»160. In the president’s expansionist and racially biased discourse, this meant that 
the United States had to carry the burden of civilization and bring it to places like Cuba, 
Porto Rico, and the Philippines. It meant, above all, joining the other great powers, and 
England in particular, in “policing the world” to ensure the maintenance of peace and 
stability – a concept which Roosevelt would have elaborated on in 1904-1905, but that 
was already present in his public speeches at the beginning of his administration161. In 
fulfilling these new responsibilities, experience offered no actual guide. The previous 
pattern of contiguous continental expansion was of little practical help to the federal 
government. During the nineteenth century, the central authority had followed rather 
than led the westward movement of white settlers and pioneers. The new lands became 
instead U.S. soil by political compromise, through an administrative decision that 
preceded the introduction, let alone the establishment, of any actual American custom or 
community there. In order to govern them, Washington would have had to impose its 
rule over their peoples and actually organize the territories, not just vote to accept their 
request of incorporation. With the scope of operations stretching thousands of miles 
away from the nation’s coasts and in an increasingly competitive international arena, the 
colonial power needed to muster, and master, an extraordinary amount of resources. In 
                                                
160 Theodore Roosevelt, First Annual Message, December 3, 1901 
161 Already in 1901, Roosevelt spoke about a «regrettable but necessary international police duty which 
must be performed for the sake of the welfare of mankind», to avoid wars with «barbarous or semi-
barbarous peoples». Holmes has specifically traced back to Roosevelt, and to his past experience as 
police Commissioner in New York, the theory and early practice of an American global “interventionism” 
aimed at maintaining peace and order. See James R. Holmes. Theodore Roosevelt and World Order: 
Police Power in International Relations, (Washington: Potomac Books, 2006).  
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order to perform well on a global stage, the United States must however have been 
ready to play its new role. In this regard, nation preparedness required also a more 
general reconfiguration of the country’s security and defense paradigm. The state, in 
particular, had to further develop its fighting capabilities and acquire new expertise to 
confront possible challenges from foreign powers. It had to learn how to operate 
effectively on the only element whose military control really matters from the 
perspective on national aggrandizement and commercial expansion: blue waters.  
This was, at least, the gospel that Roosevelt and other American naval 
supremacists had been preaching since the 1890s and that, after the war against Spain, 
gained ground and visibility in the political debate. The President reaffirmed since the 
very beginning his position on the issue, referring to the American «naval expansion as 
the most important item on the executive agenda». «The work of upbuilding the Navy 
must be steadily continued», he wrote in his first message to Congress, making clear 
that «no one point of our policy, foreign or domestic» was «more important than this to 
the honor and material welfare, and above all to the peace, of our nation in the 
future»162. A stronger navy would have served Washington’s commercial aims, 
revitalizing overseas trade routes and protecting the rights of U.S. citizens abroad – a 
duty that had always been one the most, if not the most, important among those 
assigned to the nations’ navies. It would have also, and equally important, satisfied the 
country’s growing defensive needs, guarding the American long coastlines and making 
the United States feel more secure at home and abroad. When Roosevelt’s became 
president, the U.S. navy was still a dwarf among giants. The English, French, German, 
Russian, and Japanese fleets were all way superior to the American naval forces and 
therefore capable, at least in theory, to frustrate any further territorial and commercial 
ambition, disrupting Washington’s operations in both the Atlantic and the Pacific 
Ocean163.  
For a country like the United States, naturally shielded by the Oceans, a heavier 
and more effective presence at sea was presented as an ultimate and definite guarantee 
                                                
162 The quoted passages are all from Roosevelt’s First Annual Message (1901) 
163 For a concise presentation of Roosevelt’s foreign policy vision and the crucial role of the Navy see for 
example J. Simon Rofe, Preparedness and Defense: The origins of Theodore Roosevelt’s Strategy for the 
United States on the International Stage. And Carl Cavanagh Hodge, The Global Strategist: The Navy as 
the Nation’s Big Stick, both in Serge Ricard (ed.), A Companion to Theodore Roosevelt (Chichester: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2011). 
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against aggression. Furthermore, even if the continental integrity was not really at stake, 
the security of the new colonies still needed to be assured. With marine superiority in 
the hands of a foreign country, the argument went, none of the U.S. territorial, 
commercial, and diplomatic interests could really be considered safe. As president, 
Roosevelt clearly (and repeatedly) expressed this view, stressing the political 
importance and practical value of an investment in naval power:  
«So far from being in any way a provocation to war, an 
adequate and highly trained navy is the best guaranty against 
war, the cheapest and most effective peace insurance. The cost 
of building and maintaining such a navy represents the very 
lightest premium for insuring peace that this nation can possibly 
pay»164.  
 
The Navy would have indeed been Roosevelt’s “Big Stick”, a practical tool with 
which to keep friends and foes in check in an ever-challenging international 
environment165. One of the direct consequences of such a navalist and globalist 
approach to American security and economic growth was the prioritization of the 
construction of the Panama Canal, which went from being considered as a convenient 
development at the end of the nineteenth century to being treated as an strategic concern 
just few years later. The waterway would have allowed greater speed and flexibility, 
and thus providing a better area control to the American fleet while reducing the 
country’s double exposure in the two oceans. The passage, however, could have 
similarly facilitated the movements of enemy fleets. If not confronted – or at least 
threatened to be meet – with actual and superior strength, both in the Atlantic and 
Pacific theatres, foreign powers could have easily taken advantage of it. The creation of 
a powerful navy, which had to be «put and kept in the highest state of efficiency», 
became thus inextricably linked with the control of the Canal Zone and the protection of 
                                                
164 Roosevelt restated the same concept in many other occasions. The following year (1902), for example, 
he put it even more clearly: «a good navy is not a provocative of war. It is the surest guaranty of peace». 
Theodore Roosevelt, Second State of the Union, December 2, 1902. 
165 For a more detailed analysis of the Rooseveltian praxis of gunboat diplomacy, and of the ideas behind 
it, see for example Henry Hendrix, Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy: The U.S. Navy and the Birth 
of the American Century (Naval Institute Press, 2014).  
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the newly acquired overseas outposts. For Roosevelt, the two projects were 
interconnected – and their implementation equally imperative166.  
For the rest of the decade, the president would have lobbied incessantly for a 
naval buildup, pushing for the production of larger, heavier, and more expensive vessels 
to match (and surpass) European powers’ fleets, all while the construction of the 
Panama Canal was underway. By the time he left the White House, neither project 
could in fact be considered complete. Although the U.S. Navy improved greatly in 
terms of tonnage during the first decade of the century, not even the four additional 
years of Republican presidency under Taft were sufficient to make the American naval 
forces “second to none”, al later Wilson would have claimed. Institutional rivalries 
within the Navy and political opposition in Congress delayed innovation and prevented 
a more comprehensive growth of the American fleet. The obsession with the 
construction of always more «heavily armored and heavily gunned» battleships – a race 
that the United States would have lost anyway in favor of England and Germany in the 
decade preceding the outbreak of the War – would have actually led to the unbalanced 
development of the American fleet, too skewed towards capital ships, especially in the 
later years167. The completion of the inter-oceanic canal remained even more distant. It 
would have not been attained before 1914.  
Yet Roosevelt’s vision brought the country into the new century of power 
politics, in which military and commercial competition took place at the global level 
and, more importantly, in what was considered to be an increasingly “closed” world, 
where any territorial or commercial gain must have had come at the expenses of some 
other nation. The president’s long-standing emphasis on the Navy marked a 
reassessment of the country’s foreign policy objectives and defense needs. New 
concerns about American duties and responsibilities, as well as a heightened attention to 
business opportunities abroad, came to characterize the political and public debate 
during the decade and remained always strictly connected to the navalist discourse 
about the appropriate size and composition of the American fleet. The discussion about 
                                                
166 Roosevelt’s First Annual Message (1901) 
167 Theodore Roosevelt, Fourth Annual Message (December 6, 1904). In 1900, only around five percent 
of the active ships of the U.S. Navy were battleships (eight out of a total of one hundred and forty). In 
1912, the percentage had more than tripled (thirty two battleships out of 188 surface vessels, i.e. 
submarines excluded), one of the highest levels ever. Data on the American naval forces are from the 
official records of U.S. Navy, accessible online through the website of the Naval History and Heritage 
Command: https://goo.gl/CVYjDh  
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the Navy’s mission was indeed part of a larger one about the role of the United States 
itself in world affairs – two debates that Roosevelt tried to steer, dominate, and in fact 
merge, during his administration.  
As a consequence, by the time Wilson gained the presidency, the country had 
acquired, if not the best Navy in the world, at least a new awareness about its 
international role and its implication in terms of internal organization of the state and 
centralization of power. Equally important were the effects of the naval revolution that 
Roosevelt actively sponsored (before and) during his presidency. The buildup of 
American naval forces set in motion political, institutional, and industrial dynamics with 
long-term effects on country’s politics and foreign affairs. The redesign that the fleet 
underwent during those years was indeed technological as much as organizational and 
operational. It required the development of mechanical innovations, new logistical 
solutions for long-range maneuvers at sea, and a different strategic thinking. These 
changes would have not only lead to institutional and administrative readjustments 
within the Department but also, for example, to an unprecedentedly close relationship 
between the Navy’s private component suppliers and ship manufacturer – the American 
steel and ammunition industries – and the sovereign public buyer – the federal state –, 
in what has been defined as an early (and actually the original) version of the military-
industrial complex168. Lastly, the expansion and progress of the American fleet would 
have meant an increasing preoccupation – which would have soon turned into a fixation 
– for a specific aspect of naval operations that never had to be addressed before the 
advent of coal- and oil-burning boilers aboard the Navy’s vessels: the security of fuel 
supply.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
168 This had been specifically Cooling’s thesis. See: Benjamin Franklin Cooling, Grey Steel and Blue 
Water Navy: Formative Years of America's Military-industrial Complex, 1881-1917 (Hamden, 
Connecticut: Archon Books 1979).  
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2.2 The Nation and its Navies 
Sailors and shippers shaped the course of the country’s history since its very 
beginning. The first English colonies in the American continent were first of all 
commercial outposts. They throve on the expansion of transoceanic market routes and 
ended up fighting their motherland over (maritime) trade rights. Despite its seafaring 
origins, however, the American Republic decided not to maintain an established navy. 
The national government did assemble a fleet of ships (mostly converted merchantmen) 
to fight England during the Revolution, but demobilized it soon after the war and did 
not authorize the construction of new vessels before the very end of the eighteen-
century, when the Department of the Navy was also formed. Congress needed another 
half a century to found the first Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1845, a good forty 
years after the establishment of the military academy at West Point. Despite limited 
resources and an even more limited professionalization, until the second half of the 
nineteenth century the U.S. Navy duly accompanied and assisted the country’s 
continental expansion and commercial growth. From the declaration of independence to 
the Civil War, American warships fought to defend both the country’s territorial and 
political unity and its merchant marine. They faced the formidable English fleet twice 
(in 1775-1783 and in 1812-1815); engaged in combat with the French frigates (in the 
Quasi-War of 1798-1800); drove off pirates along the cost of North Africa (during the 
Barbary War, 1801-1805); roamed the Pacific coast and the Gulf of Mexico during the 
conflict with the southern neighbor (1846); and worked to disrupt Confederates’ supply 
and commerce during the Civil War (1861-1865). Since the creation of the original fleet 
during the revolution – the “Continental Navy” –, American sailors and commanders 
had proved their skills in many different scenarios. The fleet was used to open new 
trade routes, as Admiral Matthew Perry did with his historic visit in Japan in the early 
1850s; to patrol of distant seas to “show the flag”, as in the Mediterranean and along the 
South American coasts; to blockade (or avoid the blockade) of strategic ports, as during 
the Civil War169. The U.S. Navy was relatively small, but “respectable”170.  
                                                
169 On the early history and development of the American navy, see for example: Harold & Margaret 
Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918 Princeton (Princeton university press, 1939); Kenneth 
J. Hagan, This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power (Simon and Schuster, 1992); Stephen 
Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy 1775 – 1998 (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1999); James C. Bradford, America, Sea Power, and the World (Wiley-Blackwell, 
2016). 
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In the twenty years that followed the end of the American internecine war, the 
country’s naval readiness and operational standards changed significantly – for the 
worse. The fleet continued to have two main purposes, international diplomacy and the 
protection of merchant shipping, but served them with a degrading quality of men and 
material. The downfall was determined to a large extent by the structural limitations that 
the war, and its aftermath, imposed to naval operations. The reconstruction period 
brought a reassessment of the country’s priority and a renewed focus on domestic 
issues. The size of the Navy, which swelled during the war, inevitably shrunk (together 
with the amount of funds available) as soon as the state of emergency ended. The 
number of officers and enlisted man dropped from over 58,000 in 1865 to around 
15,000 in 1868. During the same period, 433 ships of the 671 active during the war 
were decommissioned171. The reduction of the naval fleet was connected with the 
decline of the national merchant marine that the Navy was bound to protect. 
Confederate riders had severely damaged the Union’s commercial fleet during the war, 
forcing northern manufacturers to rely more and more on other countries’ hulls to carry 
their goods at sea172. When the conflict ended, U.S. merchants and shippers found little 
incentive to revert this trend. To build, insure, and operate new ships under American 
flag was expensive – especially at a time in which iron was substituting timber as chief 
                                                                                                                                          
170 The Navy’s attempts at “respectability” begin early. One of the most famous references to the notion 
that the United States needed to have a decent-sized and honorable navy was that of Captain John Paul 
Jones who, in a letter to Robert Morris, wrote on October 17, 1776 that «...without a respectable Navy, 
alas America!». William James Morgan (ed.), Naval Documents of the American Revolution, Vol. 6 
(Washington: Naval History Division, 1972), p. 1303 
171 Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea, Pag. 218 
172 The Southern historian Frank Owsley wrote in the 1930s that there was a «complete destruction of the 
American merchant marine» and that it was «virtually extinct» after the war. Since his book, King Cotton 
diplomacy: foreign relations of the Confederate States of America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 
1931), historians have offered slightly less dramatic accounts of the events. The Confederate raiders 
destroyed between 240 and 260 ships (depending on the estimate), which actually represented only a 
small percentage of the total. The real problem was that the conflict forced U.S. ship-owners to sell their 
vessels abroad or to transfer them to foreign registry, as to avoid both the high risk of losing them at sea 
and the incredibly higher cost to insure them in the United States. Ships under British, French, or Dutch 
flags were instead protected by the neutrality status of their countries and could continue to operate in 
American waters. This was, of course, an expedient to prevent U.S. ships from being seized as sea, but 
led to the severe divestment of the American merchant marine, with more than half of it that went “lost to 
the flag”. The ships sold to foreign owners accounted for around 800,000 tons and, as the military 
historian Spencer Tucker noted, those «were the best ships. The one left were those that foreigners did not 
want». The actual number of ships transferred was between 700 and 1000. See Spencer C., A Short 
History of the Civil War at Sea (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), p. 135. Allen C. 
Guelzo, Fateful Lightning: A New History of the Civil War and Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), p. 310. Rodney Carlisle, Flagging-Out in the American Civil War, The Northern 
Mariner/le Marin du Nord, Vol. 22, No. 1 (January 2012), pp. 53-65. 
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material in vessel construction. The transition, which would have been costly per se, 
was made even costlier in the United States by the post-war focus on the domestic 
transportation and communication networks. During the second half of the century, the 
realization of iron-hungry projects (as national railroad lines and oil pipelines) drove the 
price of the metal up, making the investments in the new class of vessels not only 
politically unattractive but also economically unsustainable. The new global trend in 
naval technology that promoted the passage from wood to iron (later steel), and 
therefore from sail to steam-powered vessels, turned out to be particularly painful to 
follow for American shipbuilding industry, which failed to adjust to a market that was 
quickly moving towards the use of larger and stronger ships for oceanic crossings173.  
As the country lost its edge in the sector, the U.S. merchant marine grew old and 
unable to keep up with the expansion of American commerce. Indeed, its status kept 
deteriorating until the end of the century, with important repercussions on the structure 
and organization of the country’s trade. In 1860, more than sixty-five percent of U.S. 
foreign trade was carried in American ships174. By the end of the century, despite the 
fact that the country’s overseas commerce had almost quintuplicated in value since the 
Civil War, less than ten percent of its external commerce was still conveyed in 
American vessels175. In 1898, the U.S. registered tonnage for trans-oceanic shipping fell 
to around 725,000 gross tons – a historic low for the country. To put numbers in 
perspective, in the same year the total tonnage for the British vessels engaged in foreign 
commerce was more than ten times bigger, just below 8,000,000 tons176.  
The war with Spain did expand the country’s commercial network and stimulate 
shipbuilding. The presence of vessels flying the American flag in deep waters, however, 
                                                
173 An early account of the post-Civil War difficulties of American shipbuilding can be found in in the 
1900 Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance of the United States, Bureau of Statistics, Treasury 
Department (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), pp. 1378-1383 
174 Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea, Pag. 218 
175 Overseas trade increased from $281 million in 1865 to $1.4 billion in 1900. John H. Schroeder, 
Expanding and Defending a Maritime Republic, 1816-95, in James C. Bradford (ed.), A Companion to 
American Military History, Vol. 2, Wiley-Blackwell, p. 528.  
176 The aggregated data in this paragraph are elaboration from those provided in: Merchant Marine of 
Foreign Countries, Reports from Consuls of the United States, in Answer to instructions from the 
Department of State; Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of State (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1900). Review of the World’s Commerce, Introductory to Commercial Relations of the 
United States with Foreign Countries during the year 1898; Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of 
State (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899), Statistical Abstract of the United States, 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, No. 23 (1900; pp. 437-452) & 
No. 41 (1918, pp. 353-355), Washington: Government Printing Office. John B. C. Kershaw, Trade and 
empire: a Pamphlet for the Times (London: P.S. King & Son, 1903). 
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remained extremely limited. In 1900, for example, the total capacity of the U.S. 
merchant marine rose again above 5,000,000 gross tons for the first time since the Civil 
War177. Yet the portion destined to foreign trade was still relatively small. American 
ships employed in foreign trade accounted for just above 800,000 tons (a carrying 
capacity almost three times smaller than the one boasted by the German merchant 
marine at the time), while all the remaining tonnage was confined to national coasting 
and internal trade. When these figures are translated in numbers of actual vessels, the 
picture is even bleaker. In 1900, the English Board of Trade reported that «for serious 
competition with foreign nations for ocean-carrying trade» the United States could only 
count on 97 steamships and 125 square-rigged sail vessels (a sailing configuration that 
dated back to the fifteenth century, adopted by Christopher Columbus himself to cross 
the Atlantic in 1492), of which more than half were over 20 years old. According to the 
British institution, these were the only active U.S. ocean-crossing merchantmen that 
could carry over 1,000 tons – therefore able to offer a real option to long-haul shippers 
around the world – out of a total of more than 23,000 American-registered ships178.  
The decrease in ocean-going hulls transporting goods under American flags 
inevitably diminished also the number of war crafts necessary to protect and assist 
them. For the Navy, it meant a progressive reduction of responsibilities, and therefore a 
loss of relevance, if not prestige. With no formal colonies to protect, escorting 
operations had represented one of the naval forces’ most important missions. The 
scaling down of these activities, combined with the period of peace enjoyed by the 
country, justified the general disinterest for the Navy in the decades following the civil 
war. As for the other important role, the defense of the nation’s maritime borders, there 
was, after all, literally an ocean of water separating the country’s coasts from the 
European powers. The threat of a major direct attack was remote. Indeed, given the still 
limited level on naval weaponry and equipment, it was difficult to imagine any part of 
the American territory as running a serious risk. U.S. naval security strategy, which had 
always been limited to basic coastal defense, seemed more than appropriate.  
                                                
177 In 1861, at its maximum, the tonnage of the American merchant marine was around 5,500,000 gross 
tons. 
178 The Board of Trade Journal, Vol. 31, December 6, 1900 (London: Printed for Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office by Jas Truscott & Son, 1901), p. 522. According to the U.S. census the total number of 
American vessels over 1,000 tons in 1900 was in fact much higher. In this case, however, there seem to 
be no differentiation between oceangoing vessels and those reserved for American coastal trade. 
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As Americans grew unconcerned about the status of the fleet, the Congress 
became unresponsive to its financial needs. Small appropriations and widespread 
indifference thus condemned the Navy to a period of relative decay. Those, however, 
were not the only factors that impeded the development and renovation of the fleet 
throughout the second part of the century. Equally important was the attitude of 
American naval officers, who actively tried to resist technological change and 
mechanization – both direct consequence of the introduction of the steam engine. In 
doing so, more than simply rejecting modernity and innovation, they were fighting to 
maintain their traditional superior status within the Navy ranks. Steam powered 
warships were complex machine that required a different kind expertise to be operated – 
a new technical knowledge that younger naval constructors and engineers had and that 
many older officers, trained in wind sailing, lacked179. It was not just a matter of ship 
navigation and maintenance. In order to integrate and implement the new technology in 
maritime operations, Navy planners needed to have proper understanding of the 
advantages and liabilities of its use. Steam engines, for example, offered greater speed 
and versatility. At the same time, however, they reduced the vessel’s autonomy at sea. If 
ocean winds were inexhaustible, the coal available on board was not – a limit that 
forced ships to start planning for refueling stops. Coal dependency represented an 
unprecedented organizational constraint, which would have made calculations like the 
ones about the average fuel consumption, the time required to tank up, or the distance 
from the next coaling station a crucial component of the sailing profession in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. In ship management as well as in naval planning, the role 
and expertise of naval engineers and technicians was thus bound to become more and 
more important – a development at which line officers looked with distrust. Indeed, they 
actively tried to reverse the transition from sail to steam, worried, and actually 
dismayed, that the technological determinants of naval construction were about to 
become more relevant in defining naval policies and strategy than leadership and 
experience. The Vice Admiral David D. Porter had ordered all the Navy ships to revert 
to sail as early as 1869, threatening to make the captains personally pay for any 
unnecessary coal burned at sea. Porter, who was serving as the adviser of the Secretary 
                                                
179 On the internal dispute between line officers and engineers, see for example William McBride, 
Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865-1945 (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2000).  
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of the Navy but was the de facto head of the Department, had the authority to issue such 
a directive and see it implemented, as indeed it was. There was a series of tactical and 
economical considerations that could explain such a decision, which sounded 
anachronistic already in the 1860s. First, steam-propelled ships were still inefficient and 
unreliable machines and since the range of activities assigned to the fleet was destined 
in any case to recede after the war, their use may have seemed unnecessary. Second, and 
perhaps even more important, coal was not free and the money spent to buy it 
represented another line of expenses in the already strained budget of the U.S. Navy. 
Porter cannot, therefore, be scoffed at as a Luddite. He did have, however, a deep 
resentment for the degradation of the Navy’s warrior ethos and profession brought by 
the growing importance of the engineer corps. For seagoing officers like him, steam-
related technology and its practitioners added to naval operations an element of science 
and impersonality impossible to control and that needed therefore to be subdued. 
Porter’s ban was reversed in the following decade, but this kind of conservative attitude 
did have an important consequence: it significantly contributed to open the gap between 
the most powerful European navies, which embraced the technological transition 
instead of rejecting it, and the U.S. fleet, which quickly fall into obsolescence. In the 
1880s the American navy ranked not better than twelfth in the world, behind Britain, 
France, Russia, Germany, Holland, Spain, Italy Turkey, China, Norway-Sweden, and 
Austria.180 
The parallel, downward trajectories of the American naval forces and the 
country’s merchant marine began somewhat to diverge exactly in those years. Between 
1886 and 1889 the first steel-hulled warships were assembled. With the American naval 
industry still in a state of dismal, the completion of the vessels – four hybrid sail-steam 
cruisers still (very) far from the European state of the art naval architecture – 
represented the first sign of recovery after decades of apathy, and an indication that 
American officers had finally started to acknowledge the importance of steam and steel 
                                                
180 It was the Secretary of the Navy himself, Benjamin H. Tracy, to present the grim status of the U.S. 
Navy and its international ranking (based on the number of ships in service). Annual reports of the Navy 
Department, Report of the Secretary of the Navy (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889), p. 3. 
A number of scholars and naval historians, however, have reported a slightly different classification for 
those years, one in which the American fleet is still twelfth but behind (also) the Chilean navy. See for 
example: Miller, The U.S. Navy: A History, p. 144 and James Bradford, Admirals of the New Steel Navy: 
Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1880-1930 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013). 
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technology in naval activities181. While American commercial shipbuilding continued to 
suffer foreign competitions, the U.S. Navy began to turn abroad looking for best 
practices to reproduce in order to regain some ground. The humbling and unavoidable 
comparison with the European fleets, which risked becoming a serious embarrassment 
for the United States, was one of the main reasons that prompted American officials to 
(re)act. It would have taken however at least another decade for the “New Navy” to 
develop and for its corps of engineers to get at least part of the recognition it deserved. 
The first U.S. battleship, whose design was already outmoded the moment it touched 
water, was launched only in 1892, while the American Society of Naval Engineers and 
the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers were founded respectively in 
1888 and 1893182.  
These latest developments proved that the process of mechanization and 
professionalization had finally started, although slowly, also within the Navy – a 
progression that mirrored (or better trailed) what was already happening within the 
American industry, university, and government administration183. These early 
adjustments simply anticipated further and deeper reforms that would have taken place 
in the following two decades. Steam and steel technologies were so revolutionary that 
their adoption presupposed indeed an overall modernization of the Navy’s 
organizational structure and culture. The U.S. Navy that emerged at the beginning of the 
century would have therefore been more than the simple sum of a series of finite 
improvements in shipbuilding and design. It would have been the product of 
transformational change, a general metamorphosis entailing the acceptance and 
adoption of both a new naval strategy and a different defense paradigm.  
The ideas that informed this transition were those of Captain Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, a «reluctant seaman» turned lecturer in naval history and strategy at the U.S 
Naval War College (founded in 1884 at Newport, in Rhode Island) and whose writings 
                                                
181 They were the USS Atlanta, the USS Boston, the USS Chicago, and the USS Dolphin. The cruisers 
later became known as the “ABCD” ships because of their names.  
182 On the late nineteenth century development and the emergence of the new Navy, see for example: Paul 
H. Silverstone, The New Navy, 1883-1922 (Taylor & Francis, 2006); James C. Bradford (ed.), Admirals of 
the New Steel Navy: Makers of the American Naval Tradition, 1880–1930 (Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 1990); George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea power: the U.S. Navy, 1890-1900 (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University press, 1994); H. P. Willmott Kenneth, The Last Century of Sea Power: From 
Port Arthur to Chanak, 1894–1922, Volume 1 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009) 
183 See, for example: William H. Thiesen, Professionalization and American Naval Modernization in the 
1880s, Naval War College Review, Vol. 49 (Spring 1996), pp. 33–49. 
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quickly gained praise and popularity in the last decade of the century184. To an 
American Navy struggling to adjust to the rapid pace of technological progress, Mahan 
offered guidance. Although many of the concepts he used and the considerations he 
made about the role of naval power were not new at all, the Captain was nonetheless 
one of the firsts to offer a coherent and systematic interpretation of the country’s naval 
past and present condition185. His strategic thinking provided direction for future policy; 
it eliminated the ambiguities surrounding the role of the Navy, imparting operational 
clarity and restoring a sense of purpose to the institution.  
The Captain’s approach to naval warfare became public in 1890, when his most 
famous work to date, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, was published. The 
book – a collection of his lectures – analyzed the rise of Great Britain during the 
preceding two centuries and postulated the existence of a direct connection between the 
command of the seas and national greatness. The historical example of the British 
Empire was presented as undisputable evidence of the importance of naval supremacy 
in the acquisition, and maintenance, of the great power status186. Any other state sharing 
                                                
184 The expression appeared for the first time on the pages of an American magazine, American History, 
in 1997. Many different scholars have reported on his idiosyncrasy to sea duty. Mahan had been called a 
«mediocre seagoing naval officer», while his service had been defined as «particularly uneventful». It 
was actually Mahan himself who (ironically) made clear his distaste for the new, late nineteenth-century 
steel-hulled and steam-powered. Recalling his late stint as commander of the USS Chicago, he later 
wrote: «I had forgotten what a beastly thing a ship is, and what a fool a man is who frequents one». As 
many of older officers, Mahan preferred sail to steam. References respectively from: Donald Lankiewicz, 
Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Reluctant Seaman, American History, American History. Jan-Feb, 1997, Vol. 
31 Issue. 6, p. 24; David Jablonsky, Roots of Strategy, Vol. 4, (Stackpole Books, 1999); Craig C. Felker, 
Testing American Sea Power: U.S. Navy Strategic Exercises, 1923-1940 (Texas A&M University Press, 
2006), p. 10. Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire (eds.), Letters and Papers of Alfred Mahan, Vol. 2 
(Annapolis 1975), p. 114. 
185 On the early transformation of the naval culture see for example: Seager, Robert, II. Ten Years before 
Mahan: The Unofficial Case for the New Navy, 1880–1890, Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 
40 (December, 1953), pp. 491–512; Benjamin L. Apt, Mahan’s Forebears: The Debate over Maritime 
Strategy, 1868–1883, Naval War College Review, Vol. 50 (Summer 1997), pp. 86–111; Kenneth J. 
Hagan, American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877–1889 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1973). Hagan argues that a pretty definite idea (or policy), directly connected the expansion of the 
country’s commerce with the national greatness, developed within the navy since the early 1880s.  
186 The Bibliography on Mahan and his intellectual legacy is immense. Among the most representative 
and comprehensive on the subject, there are the writings of John B. Hattendorf. See, for example, Mahan 
on Naval Strategy (Annapolis, MD. Naval Institute Press, 1991); Alfred Thayer Mahan And American 
Naval Theory, in Keith Neilson, Elizabeth Jane Errington (eds.), Navies and Global Defense: Theories 
and Strategy (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995), pp. 51-68; and the vast collection of essays that he 
edited: The Influence of History on Mahan (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1991). On Mahan 
strategic thinking, see also Philip A. Crowl, Alfted Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian, in Peter Paret, 
Gordon A. Craig, Felix Gilbert (eds.), Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 444-480. The equally important comments of 
Walter LaFeber on Captain’s thought and historical significance will be instead specifically addressed 
later on.  
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similar ambitions should have therefore focused on building up the navy, since 
superiority at sea would have both reduced the risk of aggression and allowed for the 
control seaborne commerce – the real source of a nation’s wealth and prosperity in a 
world still dominated by mercantilist views of commerce and economy. Both in 
peacetime and in war, a country’s naval forces needed therefore to be ready to protect 
the free circulation of goods, as well as prevent and repel any attempts by foreign 
countries to disrupt or obstruct the routes of its merchant marine187. At the practical 
level, according to Mahan, it meant having not only a larger fleet but, and more 
important, a different fleet, formed by a different class of warships and maneuvered 
according to a different strategy. The United States would have had to turn to the 
production of heavily armored and armed battleships and practice the guerre d’escadre 
(squadron warfare) instead of the traditional guerre de course (cruiser warfare, or 
commerce raiding). Such interpretation of the war at sea, which revolved around the use 
of newly designed battleships for «single, Jominian-style», decisive engagements» 
between large fleets, implied the transformation of the U.S. Navy into a “fighting” 
force, able not only to roam along the American coasts to guard the country’s borders, 
but also equipped and trained to battle with the enemy and operate comfortably in blue 
waters188. The evolution of naval strategy proved the close and mutual relationship it 
had, and that it will always have, with technology. As practical improvements in 
navigation – like those connected with the use of steam and steel – were made, naval 
doctrine evolved to accommodate and make use of them. The establishment of 
advanced operational methods and objectives, in turn, spurred the further development 
of original engineering solutions to better serve newly created strategic needs, in a 
continuous cycle of mechanical and theoretical refinement.  
Presenting the naval buildup as the only secure path to reach international 
prominence, Mahan forced the country to restate the centrality of the Navy as institution 
                                                
187 Jon Tetsuro Sumida has reinterpreted Mahan’s writing of Mahan in the last twenty years, arguing that 
the Captain presented a far more complicated intellectual profile than the one with which he usually 
identified. Mahan’s views indeed evolved over time. According to Sumida, for example, the Captain 
believed that, as far as the protection of international trade was concerned, collaboration between great 
powers – not naval supremacy – would have been more effective. Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching 
Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 
1999) 
188 The reference to Antoine Henri Jomini, the Swiss general who served in the French army during the 
Napoleonic War, is from McBride, Technological Change, p. 38. Jomini, one of the most successful and 
celebrated war theorist and strategist, advocated the use of large, concentrated forces to destroy the enemy 
in decisive battle to be held in specific point of the war theater.  
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and its importance as instrument of power. His ideas, however, did not automatically 
turn into policy. Mahan himself was relatively unknown at the moment when his 
writings were published189. The work of translating words into action – to transform his 
theory of sea power into government legislation and naval practice – was thus carried on 
by an small but ever growing group of congressmen and government officials that 
began reproducing and enriching the Captain’s conceptualizations. Benjamin F. Tracy, 
president Benjamin Harrison’s Secretary of the Navy, was among the firsts to present 
the navalist cause before the U.S. Congress. His 1889 annual report explicitly called for 
the construction of a «fighting force», a «fleet of armored battleships» able not only to 
defend but also to threaten the enemy, «for a war, though defensive in principle, may be 
conducted most effectively by being offensive in its operations»190. The Secretary had 
completed his assessment of the country’s naval needs after months of consultation with 
Mahan and ended up in fact publicizing many of the Captain’s theses even before he 
himself could do it. The report, which would have remained as one of the most forceful 
documents in U.S. naval history, was submitted before the Mahan’s Influence of Sea 
Power upon History was sent to print.  
Tracy’s stance was repeated and actually reinforced by his successor, Hilary A. 
Herbert, who ran the Department of the Navy from 1893 to 1897 under President 
Grover Cleveland. Despite his affiliation with a Democratic Party whose platform 
rejected the navalist claims and his past opposition to the construction of large warships, 
Herbert became a strong advocate of the naval buildup. He directly credited Mahan’s 
for his conversion, a 180-degree change that turned him into an enthusiast of sea power. 
As Secretary of the Navy, he urged U.S. lawmakers to view the fleet as the spearhead of 
the country’s diplomatic growth and commercial development abroad, and to fund such 
vision by investing in bigger, better armed battleships.  
The popularity of Mahan and his thesis grew in the second latter of the decades, 
along with the general enthusiasm for the possibility of a military intervention in Cuba. 
As the national yellow press and the expansionists in Congress began beating the war 
drums, the case for a naval rearmament and mobilization grew inevitably stronger. 
Pressured by mahanian acolytes and fellow imperialists inside and outside Washington, 
the U.S. Congress did authorize the construction of new (modern) battleships in 1895 
                                                
189 Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, p. 220 
190 Annual reports of the Navy Department, 1889 p. 4 
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and 1896. The “statutory” role of the Navy, however, remained a matter of dispute. The 
legislation that approved their construction had them listed as «coastline» vessels, 
therefore implying that no real change had been recognized in the mission of the 
fleet191. The U.S. Navy was still considered as defensive force, operating mainly in 
home waters and close to the borders. It was, of course, not just an issue of terminology. 
The different perception about the true operational duties (and limits) of the fleet was 
destined to have a profound impact also on the technological and strategic development 
of the American Navy. If American ships were intended to fight near to the American 
coasts, Navy’s planners and engineers could continue to avoid working on logistical and 
technical solutions to solve problems that were outside the familiar scenario – like those 
related to the lack of continuous supplies (of manpower, food, shells, fuel) in a fleet 
maneuvering in blue waters far from home.  
During the previous two decades, as coal became the primary means of 
propulsion at sea, the United States had actually tried to set up a network of naval 
stations both in the Pacific and in the Atlantic. This attempt, however, had been largely 
unsuccessful. Not only Washington failed to put together anything resembling the web 
of fortified, strategically located, and easily defensible sites created by Great Britain, 
but also fell short of securing a series of agreements that would have allowed both 
American commercial and military vessels to use storage space on other nation’s coastal 
territories192. Worse, even in the cases where arrangements were eventually made with 
other countries, the lease of foreign lands turned out to be of very little use to the Navy. 
In the Samoa Islands, for example, the United States had acquired rights to build a 
coaling and naval station as early as 1872. Coal however was not delivered at Pago 
Pago until 1880 and, once there, sat outside on the assigned lot for almost a decade, 
since no actual construction work had ever taken place on site apart from the erection of 
                                                
191 Fifty-Fifth Congress, Third Session, March 3, 1899, as reported in the: Navy Yearbook, Embracing all 
Acts Authorizing the Construction of Ships of the “New Navy” and Résumé of Annual Naval 
Appropriation Laws From 1883 to 1917 (Washington: Government Printing Office: 1916), p. 147 
192 For a more ample discussion on, and more detailed account of, the early American attempts to secure 
coaling post in the Pacific, see: Peter A. Shulman, Coal and Empire: The Birth of Energy Security in 
Industrial America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015). Shulman’s thesis suggests that the 
U.S. fixation with energy security began well before the end of WWII and was connected with the early 
American commercial and territorial expansion, a claim that, although in different terms and with a 
different purpose, is expressed in this dissertation too.  
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a «light wooden wharf»193. No further plan was made to erect a naval station until 1889, 
when a dispute with Germany over the islands stirred again the Congress’ interest in 
them. Even at that point, the whole project was considered too expensive and ultimately 
not worth the effort. The site was indeed far from the usual patrolling routes. It would 
have been costly to maintain and difficult to defend in case of war. In the end, a naval 
base was built, but not before in 1899, almost thirty years later the original concession 
and only after the sovereignty over half of the Samoan territory had been formally 
transferred to the United States and definitive duty to protect the islands had arisen194. A 
very similar story took place in the long-cherished Hawaiian archipelago, where 
Washington had tried to obtain special access since the 1870. The first American 
coaling station in Honolulu actually dated back to 1860, but was a very short-lived 
experiment195. The site fell into disuse immediately, as first the Civil War first and then 
the Porter’s directive forcing American warships to return to sail eliminated such a 
distant coal deposit from the Navy’s priorities. The interest towards Hawaii grew anew 
in the following decade, while U.S. vessels slowly reverted to coal. Exclusive rights to 
establish and maintain a coaling station and repair station at Pearl Harbor were granted 
to the United States in 1887, but – again – not a single stone was laid down until 
1898196. In this case, too, it was the war with Spain that, causing the annexation of the 
islands, prompted also the setting up of a coal shed in Honolulu. About three thousand 
                                                
193 «United States Coaling Station on Pago-Pago Harbor», San Francisco Call, 3 September 1898. On the 
events surrounding the coaling station in Pago-Pago and the American interests on the island, see Kees 
van Dijk, Pacific Strife: the Great Powers and their Political and Economic Rivalries in Asia and in the 
Western Pacific (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015), pp. 80-96. 
194 The base, actually, was not completed until 1902. Gordon L. Rottman, World War II Pacific Island 
Guide: A Geo-military Study (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), p. 85.  
195 The American Pacific Mail, a postal steamship line with service to the Far East, began making stops in 
Honolulu in 1867 for coal. The route however proved to be too expensive and needed governmental 
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196 The U.S. Navy in Hawaii, 1826-1945: An Administrative History (Part 1: «Pearl Harbor: Its Origin and 
Administrative History Through World War II», section 26), Administrative History of the Fourteenth 
Naval District and the Hawaiian Sea Frontier. Vol. 1 (manuscript written in Hawaii in 1945 and identified 
as United States Naval Administrative History of World War II #121-A, located in the Navy Department 
Library's Rare Book Room and now accessible online at https://goo.gl/B6DvuA. 
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miles southwest of the Hawaiian coast, in the Kingdom of Tonga, where Washington 
had obtained a lease for a coaling station at about the same time of the one in Pearl 
Harbor (1886), there was instead no construction at all197. The United States lost indeed 
soon interest in the site and, after acquiring part of the neighboring Samoa (just five 
hundreds miles away), forewent any right over the island, so much so that it quietly 
became a British protectorate in 1900. 
These late nineteenth-century efforts to establish coal deposits on distant lands 
had indeed more to do with the economic considerations of those American investors 
willing to expand their interests into the Pacific and the Caribbean than with the 
country’s naval necessities or with Washington’s political design. For all those 
interested in facilitating the use of specific transportation routes and encouraging the 
commercial exchanges with the far eastern territories, the first step was indeed to make 
sure that coal was readily available along the way so as to make places were easily 
reachable. In order to direct the government’s attention towards such business ventures 
and secure its support in negotiating with foreign countries, the possession of refueling 
stations in the middle of the Ocean was repeatedly presented as an indispensable asset 
for the United States and for its Navy. As the fate of those sites during the last decades 
of the century demonstrated, the claim proved actually groundless. Even when 
presented with the opportunity, the United States ended up not establishing any overseas 
base. The reason was simple: the U.S. Navy did not need them. The country’s defense 
perimeter was so narrowly defined and so close to the nation’s continental coasts, there 
was no need to possess distant naval outposts. No real technical or strategic reason to 
explain such an investment in money and resources. American coal-powered battleships 
were able to sail for as long as their normal duty required them to do. Furthermore, any 
naval station that was too far or too difficult to defend given the existing condition of 
the fleet would have been more a liability than a resource in case of war.  
                                                
197 Edward M. Douglas, a civil Engineer and geological surveyor of the USGS, wrote as late as 1923 that 
«so far as can be ascertained no use has yet been made by the United States of the privilege thus 
acquired» to build a coaling and repair station in Tonga. Edward M. Douglas, Boundaries, Areas, 
Geographic Centers and Altitudes of the United States and Several States, (Washington: Government 
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practice of land acquisition, purchase, and transferring and the territorial and diplomatic issues associated 
with it, see Michael J. Strauss, Territorial Leasing in Diplomacy and International Law (Leiden: Brill 
Nijhoff, 2015).  
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As long as the framework of continental defense continued to be the dominant 
one, there was no room to justify imperial acquisition on the basis of the Navy’s 
practical, material requirements (which were a function of that very same defense 
paradigm). In the 1890s, the advocates of American territorial and commercial 
expansion worked specifically in this direction, often relying on the use of navalist 
rhetoric to try to shift the common perception of the country’s security – that is, how far 
the United States should have stretched itself just to defend its borders and its closest 
interests. The possession of overseas territories, the argument went, was important as it 
denied to other countries – Great Britain, Germany, Japan – the possibility to seize them 
first, thus preventing them from overcoming one of the major obstacles to directly 
challenging American national integrity and intruding into the country’s affairs (i.e. the 
lack of resupply points of their way across the Ocean). This type of strategic analysis 
presented very clearly the case for the establishment of coaling stations far from 
American continental shores. Yet such an argument was not self-evident. It was based 
on a very strategic vision that American expansionists had for the country, instead of 
reporting or reflecting any actual fuel-related, technical operational concern that the 
Navy was having at the time. Its validity was in fact theoretically and rhetorically 
constructed, projecting American defensive fears and territorial aspirations to a much 
larger scale than before.  
The ambivalence between the Navy’s (and the country’s) mission and 
capabilities resisted until the very end of the century. The length of the debate 
demonstrated that the transition from the present of a strictly defensive Navy and the 
future of a blue-water fleet with regional, if not global, reach was slow and, more 
important, that it was a politically driven process. The coal-centered, technological 
deterministic reasoning that was used to shore up the expansionist project – the idea that 
the adoption of coal as naval fuel somehow forced the country to compete for, secure, 
and maintain overseas stations in order to thrive – was exactly that, a reductionist 
argument that downplayed the importance of political intent in determining the 
country’s actual policy. It was a truism that steam engines necessitated coal, like to say 
that a country, if it wanted to keep its fleet moving, had to be sure that fuel was 
available. The use of such principles to steer the country into the acquisition of overseas 
territories, and so to rationalize their annexation, represented no more than an attempt to 
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obfuscate the real point of debate: the existence of a clear political willingness to engage 
in power politics. Indeed, it was not the need for coal that warranted the annexation of 
foreign lands as refueling stations. Quite the opposite: it was the acquisition of colonies 
– and the decision maintain them – that forced Washington to eventually establish naval 
bases and coaling deposits overseas in order to protect its new possessions. American 
territorial expansion and its high-powered Navy would have been not simply the 
unintended and inevitable result of the late nineteenth century technological 
innovations, but the product of a specific desire of national growth and development 
abroad. 
For the United States to finally, and fully, embrace such an expansionist project, 
two things however had to happen: a hastened war against Spain and the rise of 
Theodore Roosevelt within the administration.  
 
2.3 Liquid Fuels and Solid Bureaucracy  
Roosevelt’s enthusiasm for Mahan’s writings was immediate. In 1890, right 
after reading The Influence of Sea Power upon History, the then U.S. Civil 
Commissioner sent a note to the Captain to express his admiration for what he called 
«the clearest and most instructive general work of the kind with which I am 
acquainted»198. The friendship between the two would have greatly developed in the 
following years. Roosevelt repeatedly (and privately) shared views with Mahan on the 
development of the Navy and the future course of the country, injecting his own 
imperialist convictions into the discussion. Who really influenced the other is still a 
matter of debate199. What is certain is that by the end of the decade many of their ideas 
overlapped, brining the two to have very similar positions about what needed to be done 
to lift the nation. First as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, then as Vice-President, and 
later as President, Roosevelt would have laid down a series of political and strategic 
objectives that both the Navy and the country would have had to achieve on their path 
                                                
198 Roosevelt to Mahan, May 12, 1890. In Elting E. Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt – Vol. 1: 
The Years of Preparation, 1868-1898 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 221. Quoted also 
in H. W. Brands, T. R.: The Last Romantic, p. 236.  
199 See for example Peter Karsten, The Nature of ‘Influence’: Roosevelt, Mahan, and the Concept of Sea 
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to greatness. The professionalization of the Navy’s personnel, vowing to turn every 
officer commanding an American warship in an engineer200; the creation of a two-ocean 
navy through growing investment in shipbuilding and the development of first-class 
battleships; the construction of the interoceanic canal and the acquisition of control over 
territories and military bases far from American continental shores: by fighting for the 
implementation of a specific set of practical measures directly derived from the navalist 
playbook, Roosevelt substantiated Mahan’s claims and those of many other American 
imperialist like himself. He turned the sea-power doctrine into an instrument of 
government, one with which he was able to «dominate American naval policy for nearly 
a generation»201. 
Roosevelt began to bring actual change to the Navy as soon as he was in position 
to do so. In 1897, the Personnel Board produced a study under the chairmanship of the 
new Assistant Secretary recommending the integration of engineers, naval constructors, 
and other staff officers into the same career path reserved to seagoing officials, formally 
eliminating any distinction between the two groups. The Personnel (or Amalgamation) 
Act passed two years later, in 1899 – while Roosevelt was back in his home state for his 
short stint as governor, and assimilated the Navy technical personnel into the line 
(although on an inferior basis), de facto forcing also the most traditionalist officers to 
relinquish their sense of moral superiority over the corps of engineers. Between the 
presentation of the Board’s findings and their legislative approval, the United States 
fought and won a naval war against Spain that Roosevelt himself had much contributed 
to ignite and prepare for. The conflict, and the victory it bestowed, brought enormous 
publicity to Mahan’s works. To a degree, it vindicated the Captain’s view, after a 
decade in which the philosophy of sea power, although increasingly popular, had faced 
continuous opposition in the Democratic part of the Congress and in the more 
traditionalist sectors of the Navy.  
The war showed how important the ocean could be as theater of confrontation 
between the United States and the European powers. It also demonstrated the 
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superiority of the steam and steel technology that had been recently and finally 
implemented in American shipbuilding. In combat, after all, equipment and preparation 
do matter, and the warships built in the United States during the last decade of the 
century, although still not the cutting edge of naval industry, were already way more 
efficient to Spain’s outmoded ironclads. Marine superiority, like the one that the U.S. 
Navy easily enjoyed over its opponent in 1898, proved to be really the gateway to 
territorial aggrandizement and international recognition, as Mahan and Roosevelt had 
been saying for almost a decade. 
As the consensus for the new Navy grew, Congress seemed finally to fall in line. 
In the two years that followed the war, lawmakers authorized the construction of 
fourteen ships between battleships and armored cruisers – more than those 
commissioned between 1890 and 1897202. They also approved the construction of 
sixteen destroyers, a new class of vessels altogether. The debate over the annexation of 
the Philippines did give fresh visibility to those who opposed a naval buildup, but 
Roosevelt’s accession to the White House in 1901 virtually settled the issue over the 
role, size, and design of the U.S. Navy. From then on, his administration coherently 
moved toward the declared objective of building a world class fleet able not only to 
defend the country close to its continental coasts, as the old cruisers and frigates 
allowed to do, but also to fight in blue waters, extending the U.S. power far in the 
Caribbean and far into the Pacific.  
The realization of such a project required more than an increase in the number of 
ships or the introduction of faster engines and heavier ordnance. It depended on the 
acceptance of a broader role of the United States in international politics and the 
recognition that, as a consequence, the country’s naval forces had new and bigger 
responsibilities to bear. Either more by design or by “accident”, the acquisition of 
jurisdiction and control over Spain’s ex-colonies represented in this respect a crucial 
juncture. The necessity to oversee and defend the new territories forced American 
officers, even before than the American public and the congressmen on Capitol Hill, to 
acknowledge that the practical duties of the Navy grew more complex and larger in 
scope. The fleet had an expanded mission, which went well beyond the usual 
blockading and included the direct assistance to the ground operations of the U.S. 
                                                
202 Between 1890 and 1897 the Navy got permission to build ten ships between battleships and armored 
cruiser (nine battleships and one armored cruiser).  
	 88 
Army. American ships had now acquired new strategic and tactical needs, which 
required a different management, policy, training, and equipment in order to be met. 
Indeed, the inadequacy of the U.S. Navy for large-scale operations was one of the first 
practical lessons of the war of 1898 and of the protracted armed struggle that ensued in 
the Philippines. The squadrons on active duty both in the Caribbean and in the Pacific 
needed ready access to fuel, supplies, and ammunitions. Also, the new battleships 
commissioned at the end of the century were complicated devices whose mechanical 
parts had often to be repaired or replaced. Yet the Navy had no coaling station, 
magazine, dry dock, or shipyard close to Manila – the nearest naval base was in San 
Diego, CA, more than 7,000 miles away – and even in the Gulf of Mexico refueling and 
repairing vessels became problematic, given the lack of a sufficiently large and 
organized convoy of service boats and colliers203. The difficulties in logistics were so 
evident that prompted the establishment of the General Board in March of 1900. The 
committee, which had only an advisory role to the civilian head of the Department, was 
the first permanent agency dedicated to war planning – a skill that the senior officers 
sitting on the Board had to practice immediately. The squadron operating along the 
North China coast, deployed there to support the international expedition against the 
Boxer rebellion, was experienced similar resupply problems to those encountered in the 
Pacific after 1898204.  The timing of the Board’s institution, which took place roughly 
two years after the war, was itself a proof of the lack of coordination within the 
Department and of the delay that the Navy had accumulated in this kind of naval 
planning.  
One year later, as a President, Roosevelt capitalized soon on both the Navy’s 
fighting successes – the result of the end-of-the-century technological improvements – 
and its organizational deficits, which pointed to all that still needed to be done to have 
an efficient and powerful fleet. Together with the Navy General Board, he easily pushed 
through the construction of overseas naval bases. The President had barely to fight for 
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them, as the war and the difficulties in keeping the fleet afloat while fighting Emilio 
Aguinaldo’s insurrection had basically won the argument by itself. Construction work 
along the along the coast of Honolulu, for a start, took place immediately. The U.S. 
Congress had authorized the expansion of the Navy facilities in the Hawaiian capital 
and the dredging of the entrance channel to Pearl Harbor even before Roosevelt’s 
arrival at the White House. His administration then oversaw the enlargement project and 
seconded the gradual transfer of the naval activities to the latter site, which welcomed 
the first American gunboat in 1905205. Roosevelt also signed the original “lease” that 
gave «complete jurisdiction and control» of Guantanamo Bay area to the United States 
for use as coaling and naval station in early 1903206. The provision was part of an 
official treaty between Cuba and the United States that basically ratified the conditions 
for the island’s independence imposed by Washington after the war. The bay was set up 
immediately as a coaling station as soon as the Navy got hold of it, although it was not 
until 1909 that it became also a repair facility and an actual naval base207. As the two 
naval stations, one in the Caribbean and one in the Pacific, were finally being built, 
Roosevelt stepped up the efforts to connect them through an interoceanic canal. Always 
in 1903, after Colombia’s failure to ratify the treaty that would have granted the United 
States the control of narrowest section of the isthmus, Washington encouraged and 
supported the rebellion of the Panamanian separatists in the northern part the country. 
As soon as political independence was achieved, few months later, the United States 
signed an agreement with the newly established state of Panama and obtained the rights 
to build the canal on its territory and control the area surrounding it «in perpetuity»208.  
The post-war renewed and “forced” interest in naval planning expanded beyond 
the management of the supply chain. The twentieth century saw the development of a 
new, more professional and more integrated approach in the study of logistics, which 
pushed the Navy, and the government, to reconsider its overall operational and fighting 
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capabilities at sea. The problem of distance in naval operations, which got suddenly 
more serious for the American Navy, was to be tackled with the identification and 
acquisition of “stepping-stones” in the Pacific region and in the Caribbean. The issue, 
however, needed also to be addressed from its technical perspective. Faster vessels 
could reduce the fleet’s reaction time and the days necessary to complete their trips, 
while more efficient ships, or with an increased fuel capacity, could make ocean-
crossings less challenging. This is the framework in which, and the reason way, the U.S. 
Navy began in those years experimenting new technologies and practical solutions in 
maritime engineering. Substituting oil to coal in steam boilers – one of the most radical 
attempts at improving naval operations and transform vessels’ architecture – was one of 
the changes considered. 
In fact, the studies about the possible uses of petroleum in marine propulsion had 
begun in the 1860s, just few years after the Drake’s first oil discovery in Pennsylvania. 
The first practical tests, however, did not offer encouraging results. In discussing them, 
Benjamin F. Isherwood, Chief of the Navy’s Bureau of Steam Engineering, wrote in 
1867 what remained as one of the most famous indictments of petroleum as marine fuel. 
«The use of petroleum as fuel for steamers is hopeless», he admitted, «convenience is 
against it, comfort is against it, health is against it, economy is against it, and safety is 
against it. Opposed to these, the advantages of the probably, not very important 
reduction in bulk and weight, with their attending economies, cannot prevail»209. The 
experiments, conducted in the Navy Yards in Boston and New York, did prove that 
petroleum had a greater thermal efficiency than coal. They also showed that oil was 
lighter and easier to handle, that it needed smaller boilers to burn and that, when ignited, 
it produced less smoke and a fire that was easier to manage. Petroleum’s greater 
combustion power, however, was also the first cause of concern among Navy’s 
engineers. Oil evaporated easily and its insalubrious gas was sufficient to cause 
explosions if not properly contained – not the preferred scenario on board of a warships. 
Furthermore, liquid fuel seemed also more difficult to transport and store, as it required 
sealed containers and could not be just dumped on the ground like coal. Last but not 
least, oil was more expensive than coal. In 1870, a barrel of petroleum (around 160 
liters) cost $3.86 – slightly less than the price for a ton of coal ($4.39), which had a heat 
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content about four times higher and generated three times more energy than an oil 
barrel210. As Isherwood pointed out, oil’s practical drawbacks were simply too great to 
overcome at the time. The Navy’s own difficulties, due to the lack of funding and the 
stiff resistance to modernization expressed by senior officers in the post-civil war 
decades, did the rest. The idea of using petroleum as fuel was simply abandoned until 
the turn of the century, when the Navy’s officers, planners, and technicians found 
themselves facing a completely different scenario.  
Most of the credit for the Navy’s renewed interest in fuel oil was due to George 
Wallace Melville, President Cleveland’s Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, 
whose work and determination helped remodel the fleet’s design and characteristics in 
those years. Melville, who besides being a brilliant engineer was also a successful 
explorer, took charge of the scientific Bureau in 1887. He fought, successfully, for the 
institution of an Engineering Experiment Station (EES) in Annapolis and introduced 
countless technical innovations until his retirement, in 1903. Specifically interested in 
improving the vessels’ systems of propulsion, he began studying again the properties of 
petroleum as fuel in 1895-96. Thirty years after the first tests, and a generation of 
technological improvements later, he was able to get better results on the efficiency and 
reliability of oil-fired boilers. The prospects were bright enough to convince the 
Secretary of the Navy and the Congress to appropriate $15,000 for further 
experimentation right before the conflict with Spain in 1898211. For the following two 
years, the conflict and its busy aftermath diverted much of the Bureau’s attention, thus 
delaying any actual work on the matter. The war’s outcome, however, also presented 
powerful and unprecedented incentives for continuing, and actually accelerating, the 
studies on oil-powered engines for naval use. Together with the new strategic 
imperatives, which forced American engineers to focus on the creation of vessels with a 
larger radius of action, there were also clear economic considerations. As the number of 
naval operations rose, so did the amount of fuel necessary to keep the ships going. In 
1898, the Navy had spent on coal 220 percent more than the previous year. If the 
Department largely anticipated the rise of fuel expenses on account of the war, it also 
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expected them to diminish once the actual fighting had stopped. Instead, still in 1900, 
the total sum disbursed for coal and its transportation was still around $1,572,652, 
which was more than twice the amount paid in 1897 and actually $250,000 more than 
the entire appropriation for the Bureau of Equipment during that same year, the last one 
before the beginning of the war212. Part of the problem was that, even if the quantity of 
coal used by American warships had indeed decreased slightly in both 1899 and 1900, 
the price had meanwhile risen – even by about fifty percent in certain ports – as a 
consequence of the overall spike in demand. Furthermore, fuel expenses were not the 
only entry to take into account. To complicate the Navy’s balance sheet further there 
were the coal’s transportation costs, which had suffered a similar increase. The 
Department complained that in less than three years the average cost of freighting coal 
to Manila by steamer from the Atlantic coast had gone from $6.92 dollar to $10 per net 
ton213.  
The situation at the end of the century confirmed that the Navy would have 
largely benefitted from the use of a cheaper substitute of coal. In 1901, with perfect 
timing, petroleum finally proved to be that alternative. The extraordinary geological 
discovery at Beaumont, TX, at the beginning of the year, and the quick and large price 
drop that it generated, made petroleum a real fuel competitor only for industrial plants, 
trains, and cars, but also for mercantile vessels and navy’s ships. Extremely close to 
coast of the Gulf of Mexico as they were, the oil pools in Texas and Louisiana could 
have also offered the Navy a different, and closer, shipping point for its fuel cargoes to 
the Caribbean, thus cutting transportation costs. Furthermore, as if the tremendous 
increase in petroleum supply was not enough to convince American officials of the 
potential economic benefits of the transition, there were the simultaneous miners’ 
protests in Pennsylvania, by far the most important coal state in the country. Culminated 
in 1902 with a celebrated Coal Strike that became a national issue and required federal 
intervention, the agitation caused repeated spikes in prices during the first years of the 
century. Not surprisingly, then, the Bureau of Steam Engineering decided to list the 
identification of the «best means of utilizing liquid fuel for naval and maritime uses» as 
first among its objectives in 1901 and that, the following year, Congress appropriated 
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another $20,000 for practical tests214. In fact, the sum was still relatively small and at 
that point the idea of transitioning to fuel oil in marine transportation still failed to 
register as major topic of conversation both at Capitol Hill and generally anywhere else 
outside the Navy’s technical bureaus. The decision to further investigate the matter 
marked nonetheless the beginning of the Department’s interest in liquid fuel.  
The study of fuel oil continued for two years, throughout Roosevelt’s first term. 
In 1903, the U.S. Naval “Liquid Fuel” Board – the agency created ad hoc by Melville at 
the beginning of the century – completed its report, which was submitted and made 
public the following year. The four-hundred-fifty-page document was widely read (five 
thousand copies were printed) and confirmed the great potentialities of oil as naval fuel. 
In its conclusions, the Board emphatically stated that it regarded «the engineering or 
mechanical feature of the liquid-fuel problem as having been practically and 
satisfactorily solved»215. American engineers seemed indeed to have tackled some of the 
major problems preventing the use of liquid fuel on large vessels, understanding, at least 
in theory, how to safely and efficiently burn oil – spraying it, thanks to a mechanical 
atomizer – and how to diminish the risk of explosions arising from oil’s improper 
storage and evaporation. In order to put petroleum technology to actual test, the Board 
encouraged the installation of oil-fuel appliances on a limited number of monitors, 
torpedoes, and destroyers, smaller vessels specifically indented for coastal defense and 
short-range operations. No trial was instead suggested on board of armored cruisers and 
battleships, whose successful conversion to oil remained still years away. Indeed, 
despite the technical and scientific progresses, the Navy remained extremely wary about 
a major switch to oil and ultimately uncommitted. In discussing the matter soon after 
the Board’s findings had been published, the Secretary presented a very prudent 
position. In his annual report, he stated that the results of the tests did warrant further 
experimentation, but did «not prove that petroleum [could] be advantageously 
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substituted for coal as a fuel supply for naval vessels». «The difficulties of using a 
liquid-fuel plant upon vessels of war are many and obvious», he continued. The 
Secretary’s choice of words, with the use of a double negative to state what by that time 
was a simple and clear scientific truth – i.e. that oil was, in fact, a promising and viable 
fuel alternative – was also telling, showing the Navy’s cautious approach to the issue: 
«My own view with respect to the matter is that the use of oil as a fuel on board naval 
vessels is a question that cannot by any means be regarded as settled adversely»216.  
In the following years, the doubts about the overall feasibility and profitability of 
the transition to oil persisted and the internal resistance to the conversion prevailed. 
Until the end of Roosevelt’s second term, no real progress towards the practical 
conversion of the fleet took place. The reasons for such a cautious attitude were varied. 
One was the existence of factors outside the Department’s control and over which both 
naval engineers and officials were particularly worried. The first and most important 
was the future availability of petroleum. The Liquid Board itself had defined the 
uncertainties surrounding oil supply as a major hindrance to the use of crude petroleum 
as a standard fuel. The Navy’s specialists were not geologists and knew even less than 
the (very) little that was known at the time about the country’s petroleum prospects. 
Unimpressed by the recent developments within the oil industry, they were simply 
concerned that there would have not been enough oil in the future to satisfy the needs of 
an ever-growing and increasingly active fleet – a preoccupation that would have stayed 
with them for decades. The other reason why, after the initial enthusiasm, the Navy 
ended up stalling the process of transition had to do with the institution’s innate 
conservatism and, again, its internal bureaucratic competition.  
The organizational structure of the naval establishment at the time was pretty 
straightforward, with a civilian head (the Secretary of the Navy) supervising the work of 
a collection of different bureaus. The system was introduced in 1842 and revised in the 
early 1860s, but forty years later still presented major governance problems. Each 
bureau (Construction and Repair, Equipment, Medicine and Surgery, Navigation, 
Ordinance, Steam Engineering, Supplies and Accounts, and Yards and Docks) oversaw 
a specific area or part of naval operations and was formally the sole responsible for 
managing and carrying out the tasks associated with it. In practice, however, 
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administrative confusion and overlapping was inevitable given the lack of coordination 
between the bureaus. Each bureau chief was indeed supposed to report directly to the 
Secretary and, until the establishment of the General Board in 1900, the Navy lacked 
any centralized planning agency. In the following years the situation improved, but only 
slightly, as the Board had no authority over the bureaus or the fleet and thus could not 
offer (nor impose) any common policy or direction – a role that was left in the civilian 
hands of the Secretary217. Addressing complex and multifaceted issues in such an 
environment could easily led to administrative duplication and conflict between the 
bureaus, causing the entire institution to slow down. This was the case of the decision 
over the Navy’s fuel supply, in which three different bureaus had to have a say: the 
Bureau of Steam Engineering, the Bureau of Construction and Repair, and the Bureau 
of Equipment218. The first had the task to actually design the Navy’s boilers and steam 
engines, so it was supposed to be the bureau firstly and most directly impacted by a 
switch to fuel oil. Under Melville’s leadership, the Bureau of Steam Engineering had 
led the research on liquid fuel and, after many successfully trials, represented also the 
most open to the prospect of a switch. The Bureau of Equipment was less enthusiastic. 
In answering to an inquiry about possible progress in the adoption of petroleum coming 
directly from the White House, it specifically recommended that «there be no change 
from coal to liquid fuel for general use in the vessels of the United States Navy»219. The 
Bureau was the administrative unit purchasing, storing, and handing all the coal (or oil, 
possibly) present in the Navy’s refueling stations, currently in the process of being 
integrated into a large system of bases including several overseas sites. Given its 
domain and expertise, its opinion was not only welcomed but also crucial for any 
attempt at implement the change. In fact, its opposition to liquid fuel was clear. William 
C. Cowles, the head of the Bureau, conceded that the use of fuel oil was practicable 
«under certain conditions, and in certain parts of the world», but considered it 
impossible in military operations220. The actual availability of petroleum was, again, the 
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core issue. Oil, differently from coal, did not seem to be a very common raw material. It 
was not evenly distributed among nations and it could only be found in few places (in 
1905, the United States and Russia accounted for the 90 percent of the world oil 
production). Assuming a narrow practical perspective, the Bureau assumed that it would 
have been too complex and expensive to transport across the sea the enormous quantity 
of oil necessary to assure a constant flow of supply to the American ships. In fact, by 
the early twentieth century oil had become fairly easy both to move across the country 
(thanks to the use of pipelines), to stock, and to ship. The industry commercial growth 
proved that transferring large quantities of oil to places where originally there was none 
was not at all an impossible task. “Modern” oil tankers had indeed been consistently 
roaming the Ocean since the last decade of the nineteenth century and, by that time the 
Navy really took into consideration the idea to switch to liquid fuel, the largest oil 
company in the world (which happened to be an American company), based in the first 
oil producing country in the world (which happened to be the United States), had 
already sent its first oil carriers across the Pacific. Oil engines, in addition, were more 
efficient and would have guaranteed an increased steaming radius, thus reducing the 
actual amount of fuel needed to cover the same distance (without considering that 
equipping the vessels with oil-fired boilers would have made them easier to refuel at 
sea, too). These considerations, however, seemed far from the minds of those working 
at the Bureau of Equipment, who had spent the past few years trying first to establish 
and then to expand the Navy’s coaling stations in the Pacific and the Caribbean in the 
attempt to keep up with the new fleet’s requirements. To them, the sole prospect of 
having to throw away much of the work in order to build a new a supply chain, this time 
for a liquid fuel whose supply was not even regarded as secure, should indeed have 
sounded far-fetched, if not foolish altogether. 
The Bureau of Construction and Repair, which had instead the responsibility to 
build and service American ships, took a similar stance on the issue, advising against a 
generalized fuel transition221. Converting the entire fleet to oil, from the Bureau’s 
practical perspective, meant that its technicians would have had to retrofit all the 
existing ships, an incredibly complex and costly work whose success was far from 
guaranteed and whose potential benefits were, apparently, not worth the risks.  
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In the first half of the decade, the idea of converting the U.S. fleet was therefore 
buried by a series of particular and particularistic objections put forth by the different 
bureaus in defense of their own work and administrative domain. Lacking a strong 
centralized and centralizing leadership able to collectively evaluate the issues raised by 
the adoption of petroleum, properly weighting the impressive strategic and practical 
advantages of liquid fuel against the difficulties and uncertainties of its implementation, 
the Department ended up delaying the transition of a technology that was already there. 
The General Board should have exercised that function, but it did have neither the 
formal power nor the informal authority to do so, yet. As the decade progressed, the 
interest for fuel oil therefore remained but no tangible progress towards the conversion 
of the fleet was taken, as even the idea of having additional trials with some of the 
smaller ships, as recommended by the Liquid Fuel Board at the beginning of the 
century, was repeatedly postponed and only slowly implemented.  
If the Navy had an excuse during those years, it was that its engineers, 
mechanics, officers, and administrators were already hard-pressed to build the large and 
powerful fleet that the president, and his like-minded expansionists in the naval quarters 
and in Congress, had been asking for and reduce the distance with the more powerful 
European naval forces. The passage from an eminently defensive Navy to one able to 
fight in blue waters and project the country’s power across the ocean required huge 
improvements in American naval architecture. The ability to design, build, and operate 
large armored battleships depended on large investments by the federal government and 
the hard work and ingenuity of the Navy’s personnel. In this respect, Roosevelt’s drive 
and determination brought impressive results. Between 1901 and 1905, he was able to 
secure the Congress’ approval for the construction of ten battleships and four armored 
cruisers, plus more than ten other minor vessels, for a total spending that was «without 
peacetime precedent»222. During the first part of the decade the Navy enjoyed, and 
effectively exploited, the advantages of being a latecomer and greatly reduced the 
quantitative and qualitative gap with the Royal Navy. However, as the story of the 
(missed) transition to fuel oil indicates, to reproduce and adopt existing technology is 
one thing, to innovate is another. The difference was made clear once again by Great 
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Britain soon after, when it reminded the world that its navy was still leading the naval 
race and that all the other countries, United States included, were simply trailing. In 
1906, the Royal Navy commissioned the HMS Dreadnought, a revolutionized and 
revolutionizing battleship whose entering into service made automatically obsolete any 
other capital ship ever designed, included those that were being built at the moment. 
The HMS Dreadnought was superior in every aspect: it was faster, larger, heavier, better 
armored, and equipped with more powerful guns. It was indeed so advanced that the 
new class of battleships it represented was named after her. From then on, every other 
country would have tried to build its own dreadnought. 
The innovations in naval design presented by the British in 1906 did not come as 
total surprise to the American engineers, who had actually anticipated, at least on paper, 
many of those developments. Yet the U.S. Navy would have not been able to build and 
launch its first real (coal-burning) dreadnought until 1910. The problem, once again, 
was in the Department’s internal struggles for authority. Seagoing officers may have 
been forced to accept a formal equality with the Navy’s engineers in 1899, but they 
always refused to acknowledge any erosion in the power and influence that their class 
once enjoyed. As navy vessels became ever more complex and sophisticated machines, 
they kept fighting to maintain their edge over the Navy’s technical personnel in defining 
the institution’s present and future course. After the creation of the General Board, their 
senior members initiated a long and frustrating controversy with the Navy’s scientific 
bureaus, questioning the naval engineers’ ability to design modern and reliable ships. 
They repeatedly denounced the new vessels as defective and overall inferior to those of 
other countries’ navies, trying to prove the ineptitude of the Bureau of Construction & 
Repair and asking for greater powers for the Board itself in determining the strategic 
and technological trajectory of the Navy. The dispute dragged for years and was widely 
reported in the press. Following the launch of the HMS Dreadnought, also the design of 
the two American battleships that should have represented the response of the U.S. 
Navy, both laid down in 1907, became a matter of debate. A naval conference was 
finally organized in Newport in 1908 to settle a controversy, which had diverted much 
of the energy from actual shipbuilding and even caused the launch of a congressional 
investigation. The work of the fact-finding Senate commission, tasked to ascertain 
whether the Navy’s bureaus had actually been negligent in designing American ships, 
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eventually came to nothing. The U.S. naval officers, however, were still able to 
capitalize on a situation. With the scientific bureaus under public scrutiny and pressed 
to show results, they gained the upper hand within the Department. Most of them were 
proponents of the big navy and took the occasion to quash technical objections against 
the construction of even newer, larger, and more powerful battleships223.  
When ready, in 1910, the two first American dreadnoughts would have indeed 
been up to the level of the British original. These “all-gun” battleships would have also 
been the first capital ships of the U.S. Navy to be equipped with boilers able to burn 
both coal and petroleum. This was not, in fact, the revolution that the oil enthusiasts 
were waiting for, since they had both been designed as coal-fired vessels. Both of them, 
in practice, still had to rely on coal as primary fuel, while oil was supposed to be used as 
an auxiliary propellant, «intended to be used only to assist in maintaining power in full-
power runs after the coal fires become dirty, or when the trimming of coal in the fire 
rooms becomes difficult»224. The expected introduction of the mixed fuel system on 
board the two battleships represented nonetheless a progress, although limited and 
belated, in the development of oil-firing ships by the U.S. Navy. 
During the second part of the decade, indeed, the differences of opinion between 
the General Board and the Navy’s technical bureaus had indeed not been limited to the 
proper size of American battleships or the most effective type of ordnance they could be 
equipped with, but had touched also the ships’ propulsion methods. In a sort of role 
reversal since the previous decades, it was the Board that pushed for the installation of 
oil-burning devices on the entire fleet, capital ships included, showing signs of that 
comprehensive, overreaching strategic vision needed to drive and bring about such a 
change that the single bureau lacked. In 1908, impressed with the results attained aboard 
during the previous trials, the Board recommended the use of petroleum as an auxiliary 
fuel in capital ships and as the only fuel in destroyers and smaller vessels225. In the same 
year, the construction of ten small oil-burning destroyers (the Paulding class) was 
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authorized226. They would have been the first Navy’s ships ever designed to use 
petroleum as primary fuel. With their actual launch years away (none of them touched 
the water before 1910), however, the real situation of the American naval forces in 
regard to oil remained discouraging. There were more than one hundred and eighty 
Navy vessels in service at the end of 1908 and all of them burned exclusively coal, apart 
from a monitor, the Cheyenne, that had been refitted in October with oil-burning 
equipment to become a testing boat227.  
 
2.4 Naval Logistics and Interior Logic  
The difficulties and delays in transitioning to oil-fired vessels did not impair a 
more traditional, quantitative growth of the fleet, measured according to the more 
common standards of naval tonnage and number of capital ships. In that respect, the 
fleet’s development since the war against Spain had actually been impressive. At the 
end of 1897, the country’s naval force was composed of just about seventy ships. 
During the Roosevelt’s presidency, the number of first-class battleships went from nine 
to twenty-five. Similarly, the total of commissioned cruisers grew from nine to twenty-
seven, the one of destroyers from zero to twenty-seven. Roosevelt’s naval policy enable 
the American navy to surpass those of Japan, France, and Germany in terms of first-
class battleships in just few years and rival them even as overall tonnage. The overall 
strengthening and expansion had become impossible to ignore by the second part of the 
decade. Before leaving the White House, the President nonetheless wanted to make sure 
that everybody could appreciate the country’s naval progress, showcasing it for the 
whole world – and for the Japanese government in particular – to see228. In mid 1907, 
Roosevelt announced he would send sixteen battleships on a highly publicized voyage 
around the globe to demonstrate America’s naval prowess229. The journey of the “Great 
White Fleet”, as the naval force came to be known, began in December 1907 from the 
East Coast. The American vessels travelled south toward the Straits of Magellan and 
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then East across the Pacific. They docked again in Virginia in February 1909 after 
having passed through Suez and Gibraltar and having covered a total of more than 
43,000 miles, stopping at least once in every continent. The circumnavigation followed 
a complete reorganization of the U.S. Navy fleet, whose old squadrons were disbanded 
and their ships reassigned into two new regional fleets, one stationed in the Atlantic 
Ocean and one in the Pacific. Since the first U.S. dreadnought would have not seen the 
ocean until 1910, all the battleships composing the Great White Fleet were “older” 
vessels, belonging to previous classes. The fact that they successfully concluded the 
word tour proved the American industrial ability. It signaled the other naval powers that 
country was finally ready to become one of them and to the Japanese that the U.S. was 
in the Pacific to stay. After having been overlooked for decades, the U.S. Navy finally 
possessed a fleet able to operate in blue waters.  
Apart from the clear political message that the voyage was intended to deliver, 
the yearlong sailing trip was also planned as a unique training exercise for the Navy. 
The itinerary represented indeed a very demanding test for both the new personnel and 
the new equipment, as both had to prove to be able to endure the service and perform as 
planned. The time as sea became a very useful experience for both naval officers and 
engineers, who had the chance to see first hand the mechanical and operational 
characteristics of their fleet. Not everything they learnt, however, was something to be 
proud of. One of the most important lessons came indeed from the realization that an 
old problem was still there and not from its successful resolution. Despite the official 
success of the operation, the cruise had actually proved that U.S. Navy was still short on 
logistics and (very) bad at planning. If all the ships and sailors were able to make it 
home in 1909, it was only thanks to the foreign ships that came to the rescue. U.S. 
officers had to charter a number of colliers under foreign flags to deliver along the route 
the coal necessary to keep the American battleships going, since the U.S. Navy did not 
have auxiliary ships suitable for the mission. Even then, the Great White Fleet had 
serious resupply problems, as the Bureau of Navigation did not accurately calculate the 
lead-time for the shipments and the vessels missed them both in Australia and New 
Zealand.  
The issue was solved nor easily or quickly, and was actually aggravated in the 
following years. Less than a month after the return home of the Great White Fleet, Taft 
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formally succeeded Roosevelt as President. In naval matters, as in many other policy 
areas, Taft was supposed to follow and push forward his predecessor’s agenda. As in 
other many other policy areas, however Taft was not exactly able – either for lack of 
personal conviction or for the presence of a stiff opposition in Congress, or both – to 
further develop Roosevelt’s ideas in the building up of the U.S. Navy.230 Taft did, in 
fact, continue on the same path of naval expansion traced by the former administration. 
During his presidency, two new battleships were authorized each year and the total of 
the appropriations for the Navy actually surpassed that of Roosevelt’s second term. Yet 
these numbers were just part of the story. Taft held the presidency during a period of 
rising costs for the Navy. It not only had to operate, and provide maintenance for, a 
growing number of vessels, but it also had to continue investing in the design and 
development of more complex (and hence more expensive) ships in the attempt to keep 
up with the renewed naval race between Great Britain and Germany. Higher and 
growing appropriations were thus not really a choice if the country wanted to maintain 
the same level of preparedness, let alone trying to improve it. More important, Taft 
lacked the same strategic vision of his predecessor. The administration fought hard to 
secure authorization from Congress for the construction of additional battleships, which 
were considered the immediate measure of a country’s naval power, but failed to plan 
for the acquisition of various other categories of vessels whose presence within the fleet 
was necessary for the very protection and operation of first-class ships. The 
authorization to the construction of five colliers, obtained by the Navy in 1909 in the 
wake of the embarrassing refueling problems of the Great White Fleet, represented just 
a Band-Aid fix. Just to move a sizable fleet of battleships and smaller vessels to the 
Philippines via Cape Hope, according to the General Board’s estimates, would have 
indeed required a number of fuel ships at least three times higher231.  
The following year the two battleships with mixed-fuel systems were finally 
completed and commissioned, together with some of the ten oil-fired destroyers 
authorized in 1908. The Navy, at that point, had about ten ships in its fleet able to burn 
oil out of a total of almost two hundreds. Although they represented just a very small 
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part of all the vessels on duty, they still needed to be fueled and this further complicated 
the Department’s logistics problems. If the supply chain management and infrastructure 
for coal was still incomplete, the ones for oil were basically non-existent. The Navy had 
no carrier able to transport oil at sea, no oil deposit in the United States and no oil 
deposit abroad. For any need it had in the past or may have had now, the fleet had been, 
and still was, completely depended upon the availability of commercial vendors and 
private oil stations. The General Board tried to address the situation immediately, 
asking for the construction of fuel-oil depots in Key West (FL), Charleston, Norfolk 
(VA), and Narragansett Bay, while an old collier – the Arethusa, bought more than a 
decade before from the Royal Navy – was being converted into a oil tanker232. Despite 
the Board’s willingness to take urgent remedial action, these changes would have of 
course required a long time to be fully implemented. The creation of the oil deposits 
took a couple of years, and the expansion of the naval stations in Guantanamo and Pearl 
Harbor so as to accommodate new containers for petroleum took even more. 
Meanwhile, the construction of two new oil tankers to actually carry the fuel there, 
approved in 1912, lasted until 1915233.  
During the Taft’s presidency the strength and the abilities of the fleet remained 
limited from a strategic and operational perspective – or at least definitely below what a 
more far-sighted policy could have assured. This consideration was especially true in 
regard to oil and its generalized adoption as fuel for the fleet. The Navy’s bureaus, 
already busy catching up with the steel and steam technology, looked at fuel oil with 
distrust throughout the decade. Despite early promising results in the design of oil 
burning devices for naval use and the presence of increasingly convenient economic 
conditions for the switch, for the first part of the twentieth century the Department 
remained focused on the construction of a supply chain for its traditional fuel: coal. 
Then, when change in naval propulsion methods began finally (and slowly) to be 
implemented, long-standing weaknesses and delays in naval planning continued to limit 
the mobility and readiness of the fleet. Fuel oil, and the necessity of assure its supply, 
did not become an actual concern within the Department of the Navy until the very end 
of the decade.  
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Yet, and paradoxically, by late 1909 Taft had already authorized the complete 
withdrawals of more than 3,000,000 acres of federal land from public entry on the basis 
of the possible presence of oil underneath them. The justification of the President’s 
decision was the need to preserve it for its naval use. Ralph Arnold, the U.S. Geological 
Survey (USGS) field specialist in California, had been writing since 1907 to his 
Director, George Otis Smith, trying to convince him to take immediate practical 
measure to save the California oil land from speculation234. During the summer of that 
year, Arnold went as far as discussing the matter directly with J. R. Garfield, the 
Secretary of Interior. Otis Smith and Garfield, together with G. Pinchot at the 
Department of Agriculture, belonged to the close group of acquaintances who shaped 
Roosevelt’s conservationist policies towards the country’s natural resources235. Arnold 
was the first to attract attention to the situation of the California’s oil lands while 
surveying the state for the USGS. The data he collected became useful in Washington 
soon after, in 1908, when David T. Day assembled the gloomy and alarmist report about 
the status of the country’s oil resources to be presented at the Roosevelt’s (and 
Pinchot’s) National Conservation Commission. In his work, eventually published in 
early 1909, he would have called for a complete withdrawal of oil-bearing lands.  
Day did not make any specific reference to the possible use of petroleum as 
naval fuel in his report. His director, however, had already taken care of the issue. Otis 
Smith had indeed addressed the problem even before the Conservation Commission was 
convened, making sure to explain the urgency of the situation to the Secretary of 
Interior. On February 24, 1908, he sent a letter to Garfield, saying that it would have 
been «easy, if desired, to multiply the authoritative statements already in print 
concerning the superiority of liquid fuel» and pointing to the decision of the British 
government, which had already chosen to use oil as emergency fuel on its battleships236. 
If the first was an obvious statement, the second was a well-reported fact, although 
apparently not really so in the Navy quarters. Oil was such a better fuel that, he 
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predicted, its general adoption in naval operations was just a matter of price. From this 
premises, Otis Smith’s conservationist logic could only lead to a pretty straightforward 
conclusion. «For that reason», he wrote, «I have to recommend that the filing of claims 
to oil lands in the State of California be suspended in order that the Government may 
continue ownership of valuable supplies of liquid fuel in this region where all fuel is 
expensive». If the Department were not to act rapidly, the Government would have then 
been soon «obliged to repurchase the very oil that it had practically given away»237. 
Such a course of action was however difficult to implement from a legal perspective, 
since it would have impinged on the rights of the oil prospectors who had already 
legally claimed the land. In the following months various tracts of land were 
temporarily withdrawn for classification through administrative measures, but lacking 
an actual federal regulation little could be done to stop the oil exploitation in California. 
Nothing therefore really changed until the following year, when the works of the 
National Conservation Commission became public. Meanwhile, in early 1909, Taft had 
officially taken office and Ballinger had replaced Garfield as Secretary of the Interior. 
The following months were not easy at all for the newly appointed Secretary. Ballinger 
came soon under attack by Roosevelt’s circle of conservationists following his decision 
in May to restore to entry the about three million acres of land withdrawn by his 
predecessor. Repeatedly accused of favoring the large corporate interests over the 
national one, the Secretary could have become oversensitive to conservationist claims. 
On June, he went on to temporarily withdraw from all entry about 400,000 acres of 
California land classified by the USGS as oil-bearing – a measure that would have 
suspended any claims on those parcels, including the ones of legitimate prospectors, and 
that went even beyond Otis Smith’s own recommendation238. Probably sensing the 
moment and the rising tide of conservationism in Washington, Otis Smith wrote him 
again in mid-September, explaining that taking into account the growing need for 
lubricating oil «as well as the increasing use of fuel oil by the American Navy there 
would appear to be an immediate necessity for assuring the conservation of a proper 
supply of petroleum for the Government's own use»239. He then reiterated his plea for 
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federal intervention, recommending that «pending the enactment of adequate legislation 
on this subject the filing of claims to oil land in the State of California be suspended»240. 
The total area under consideration at that point was immense, almost as large as the 
entire state of Connecticut. Smith’s arguments worked. Ballinger forwarded the USGS 
Director’s claims to Taft the same day, making again «special reference to the present 
and future requirements of the American Navy»241. A little more than a week later, the 
President issued a degree authorizing the temporary withdrawal of an area covering 
approximately 3,041,000 acres of lands and including both public and private lots.  
Taft’s decision was remarkable for two reasons. First, his proclamation was 
technically “unlawful”. No bill had been passed yet sanctioning the president’s power to 
withdraw the territories selected by the USGS. There was no law expressly authorizing 
Taft’s move. Congress tried to rectify the situation nine months later, on June 1910, 
when it approved the General Withdrawal (or Pickett) Act, which gave the president the 
right to remove public lands from entry for further classification and to eventually retain 
their titles. Taft, who meanwhile had proceeded to withdraw additional parcels of land 
in California, Wyoming, and Utah, reconfirmed all his orders under the new Act. The 
law, however, was not retroactive. It therefore left the government exposed to legal 
action by the long list of private entities that saw their claims revoked or denied after 
the original president’s order, whose validity now seemed inevitably even more 
questionable242. Indeed, the administration would have had to spend years in court 
trying to prove the legality of Taft’s initial decrees. It would have taken the intervention 
of the Supreme Court to settle the issue. In 1915, the justices would have confirmed the 
legitimacy of the president’s action, although very on tenuous ground, stating that what 
gave Taft the power to issue the first decree was the «long continued practice, the 
acquiescence of Congress, as well as the decisions of the courts»243.  
The other element that made Taft’s decision particularly noteworthy was that, 
despite being based specifically on the immediate and growing need for oil of American 
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fleet, such a policy had apparently not been sought in any way by the Navy itself. In 
1908-1909, the naval officers and engineers were still trying to figure out if they really 
needed, or even wanted, oil as naval fuel. They left no indication of their desire, let 
alone necessity, to convince the administration of the importance and urgency of such a 
move. The geologists of the Department of Interior, instead, seemed to know before 
everybody else what was best for the Navy, and the country. In their conservationist 
crusade against private profiteering and the corporate abuse of national resources, it is 
possible that their zealous concern for the status of the Navy’s fuel supply was simply 
instrumental, and that their insistence about the necessity to lock up oil reserves for 
naval use was more a rhetorical device than real preoccupation, simply used to put forth 
the bigger argument they were trying to make about the existence and superiority of a 
collective interest. Yet, in doing so, they made a first and clear connection between such 
a national interest, whose protection warranted federal action to physically appropriate 
raw natural resources, and the supply of fuel oil of the U.S. Navy, upon which the 
country relied for security. 
As for the Navy itself, it did not make any claim upon the California lands 
before 1912. Until then, the members of the Navy seemed neither interested in securing 
an oil reserve nor concerned about the possibility of never having one. Only about two 
years after Taft’s first withdrawal order, in May, the Chief of the Bureau of Steam 
Engineering, H. I. Cone, wrote to the Taft’s new Secretary of the Navy George von 
Lengerke acknowledging the reality of oil’s impact and embracing its use aboard of 
American ships:  
 
 «The superiority of oil over coal as a fuel has been 
demonstrated so conclusively that this Bureau desires to extend 
its use to all new designs of important vessels driven by steam 
machinery»244.  
 
He went on to state that the fear of a failure of the supply had been a deterrent to 
the use of oil for naval purposes until then. Such a statement clashed with the reality of 
the country’s situation – the United States had been one of the two top world producers 
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for the previous forty years, with ever-increasing output levels, and had dominated the 
market. It also conflicted with the fact that, in the early twentieth century, the countries 
most willing to adopt to fuel oil, and most successful in doing so, were exactly those 
that lacked large oil reserves, like Great Britain, Germany, and even Italy. As an 
explanation for the Navy’s slow transition, it largely overlooked the Department’s 
internal bickering, hesitation, and delays, which effectively held back the use of 
petroleum for naval purposes and even the recognition of its ultimate value as a fuel. 
Yet the (fear of a) lack of adequate supply was, and would have been in the future, used 
to rationalize U.S. policy choices about oil. From being a justification for the Navy’s 
early missed chances with liquid fuel, the concern for petroleum supply became a sort 
of guiding principle in future actions, all on the basis of basically unfalsifiable 
statements about the oil scarcity on earth.  
In his letter, Cone then put forth similar considerations to those advanced by the 
USGS geologists, to state – like them – that what was really at stake was the national 
interest and security.  
«With the general use of oil by all navies, which now seems 
inevitable, and the probable considerable increase in its use for 
commercial purposes, this uncertainty of supply might develop 
into a condition menacing the mobility of the fleet and the safety 
of the nation»245 
 
Making specific references to the lands withdrawn in California, as well as in 
Alaska and Oklahoma, Cone recommended the creation of a reservation for the Navy’s 
future use. The General Board made the same request to Meyer, in June. The Secretary 
of the Navy wrote to Ballinger soon after, asking for «the cooperation of the 
Department of Interior to secure a definite reservation for the Navy by Executive Order, 
of oil-bearing public lands in California sufficient in extent to insure a supply of 
500,000,000 barrels»246. The Secretary of the Interior at that point referred the matter 
back to the USGS, which proved once again its role in determining government’s 
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policy. The federal geologists quickly identified what they thought was a suitable 
section of California land on Elk Hills, while Smith prepared the technical directive for 
the president. On September 2, 1912, Taft signed the Executive Order that established 
the Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 1. The selected tract, which measured more than 
30,000 acres, was within the perimeter of area removed from entry in 1909 and, as the 
original withdrawal, it did take up just open public lands. The land privately owned 
actually accounted to almost one-third of the entire area. The reservation was thus 
established “subject to valid existing rights”, with the Department expecting a period of 
litigation to clear titles to many of the lots.  
Instead of satisfying the Navy’s newfound appetite for oil, the creation of the 
first Petroleum Reserve increased it. It also confirmed of the USGS’s interest within the 
administration. Indeed, Taft’s decision further empowered the role of the Interior’s 
geologists, setting a far-reaching precedent in naval policy. Just a little more than three 
months later, on December 13, 1912, the president established a second naval reserve 
(Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 2) of roughly the same size at Buena Vista (CA). The 
move came after the Navy and the USGS had grown concerned about the actual size 
and profitability of the reservoir in the first site, worrying that it may not contain 
enough petroleum to fulfill the fleet’s growing needs. Between the creation of the first 
reserve at Elk Hills and the one at Buena Vista, the Navy had indeed begun the 
construction of the first two U.S. battleships designed to use oil as primary (and actually 
exclusive) fuel. The USS Oklahoma and the USS Nevada, significantly enough, were 
laid down on two different shipyards on the East Coast respectively in October and 
November 1912247.  
 
When Woodrow Wilson officially took office in spring 1913, he found a fleet 
that was incomparably stronger and more efficient than the one that the previous 
Democratic president, Grover Cleveland, had fifteen years before. The American navy 
could boast more than two hundred ships in commission – three times the number of 
those floating in 1897, when in terms of naval power the United States still lagged not 
only behind Great Britain and France, but also Germany and Russia248. Much of the 
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credit was due to Roosevelt, who planned and executed the cultural and material 
transformation of the Navy. The buildup that he embarked on, and that Taft with 
difficulty continued, marked also the beginning of a century of high military spending, 
consuming – alone – an average of almost twenty percent of the annual federal budget 
during the twelve years of Republican administration249. In fact, all the money spent and 
all the technological innovations introduced by the American engineers did not turn the 
U.S. fleet into the most powerful in the world. A series of long-standing structural, 
bureaucratic weaknesses limited the ability of the Navy to exhibit a strong political 
guidance and an overarching strategic vision, as the slow and uneasy, almost externally 
driven, transition to oil demonstrated. Furthermore, despite the efforts, Washington was 
neither able to match London’s established superiority at sea, nor to keep up with 
Imperial Germany’s obsessive spending in shipbuilding. In terms of capital ships and 
overall tonnage, the U.S. fleet was still behind the navies of both European powers250. 
Yet Roosevelt’s policies did bring remarkable results for the Navy and lasting 
consequences for the country. They assured the United States a new, more important 
role on the international stage and empowered the fleet as enforcer and protector of such 
transformation. The new territorial commitments, meanwhile, had forced the 
Department of Navy to adjust and, if not overcome, at least face its many operational 
limits, in a process of growth that had fixed for the country and for the fleet new 
strategic objectives – and needs. 
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3. Opening Up the Middle East 
 
3.1. Persian Oil and British Control 
On January 8 1901, exactly two days before Captain Lucas struck oil at 
Beaumont, Texas, William Knox D’Arcy met for the first time Antoine Kitabgi in Paris. 
D’Arcy was a resourceful English entrepreneur who had acquired a fortune mining gold 
in Australia; Kitabgi was a «well connected, well travelled» Persian General and 
influential ex-director of his country’s custom system251. The encounter would have 
been remembered as the initial step in the establishment of the first successful oil 
venture in the Middle East, an undertaking of unprecedented importance, which would 
have soon reshaped the structure of the industry and brought the region at the center of 
the world stage. At the time of the meeting, however, its outcome was not at all a 
foregone conclusion. D’Arcy had no experience in oil exploration, had never been in the 
Middle East, and was not even actively looking for an opportunity to get involved in 
such a business. Kitabgi, for his part, was more interested about the capital than D’Arcy 
could guarantee than about his qualities as captain of industry. He had very specific and 
material objectives to reach and, although obviously interested in the development of an 
oil business in Persia, he saw it as a means to alleviate Persia’s economic distress more 
than as an end in itself. Kitabgi, like his acquaintance Amin al-Sultan, the Persian Prime 
Minister, was well aware of the grave financial difficulties of the kingdom252. Muzaffar 
al-Din, the Shah who rose to power in 1896, was a profligate spender. After years 
financing the already expensive policies implemented by the previous Shah (Muzaffar’s 
father), the Persian government had been left with very limited options to repay the 
outstanding debts and cover for the ruler’s extravagant lifestyle. The best chance to find 
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the cash necessary to keep the country afloat seemed to continue borrowing it from the 
two foreign friends (actually guardians, if not handlers) of the Persian state: Great 
Britain and Russia. Both countries had been playing the “Great Game” in the region for 
the previous two centuries and were equally interested in maintaining their sway over 
the kingdom. Bankrolling the regime, through formal loans or informal baksheeshes, 
remained of course one of the most effective ways to project their influence.  
In the months preceding the meeting in Paris, the Persian Prime Minister had 
therefore turned once again to London and Moscow for credit. Kitabgi, meanwhile, had 
tried a different strategy. He went to Paris to find wealthy financiers who may be 
interested in obtaining an oil concession in Persia. Selling exploration licenses to private 
businessmen represented a good alternative to asking for money to national 
governments. Direct investments would have assured fresh, immediate, and effortless 
earnings for the government. Besides, Kitabgi could have hoped for a healthy premium 
as intermediary. The reason why he decided to bet on petroleum is easy to understand. 
The commerce of lubricants and other derivatives had proved to be extremely rewarding 
business and the Persian oil had already attracted the interest of wealthy European 
investors in the past. By then, indeed, there was no doubt about the presence of 
petroleum in the country. Oil seepages had been recorded for centuries, especially in the 
northern part of the country (close to the Russian Baku region, which once was Persian 
territory) and along the southwestern border (near the Iraqi city of Basra, an area that 
still today holds the largest share of the country’s reserves). Although unrefined – and 
therefore used only in a very rudimentary way, for illumination or as pitch –, Persian 
petroleum was actually already a traded item at local level. The only question, then, was 
whether it was possible to commercialize it on a national and possibly international 
scale, i.e. to extract, refine, transport, and sell Persian oil in a quantity (and a quality) 
sufficient to compensate for the exorbitant costs, and the tremendous work, required to 
set up and run an oil business in such a country. 
At the end of the nineteenth century, Persia had still the characteristics of a 
backward state. About a quarter of its population was nomad and half was living in very 
small villages. The total literacy rate was just around five percent and more than fifty 
percent of the people did not even understand Persian. A majority therefore spoke a 
completely different language, with Kurdish, Arabic, and Azeri being among the most 
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common. Moving around was also extremely difficult. There were just about over two 
hundred miles of paved roads and railways in a country of over six hundred thousand 
square miles, mostly covered by either mountains or inhabitable deserts253. Electricity or 
telephones lines could only be found in Teheran, which was also the only actual city in 
the entire kingdom. The other problem, from a business perspective, was the 
personalistic nature of the political power in Teheran. The Shah administered the state 
through deputies, loyal notables, and local proxies, in an overall arrangement that left 
little space for the functioning of an independent and official bureaucracy. The result 
was a system of government that was arbitrary, prone to corruption, and easily 
influenced by the external pressures of the country’s powerful foes, or allies.  
Running oil operations was therefore not going to be an easy task. In fact, the 
very first item on the list – finding petroleum in commercial quantity – still needed to be 
checked off. There had already been attempts to locate oil reservoirs large enough to 
justify an investment in the previous decades, but none of them had gone far. The 
British baron Julius de Reuter obtained excusive rights over the Persian mineral 
resources – all of them, from coal and petroleum to iron and lead – as early as 1872. 
The concession was never brought to fruition and was actually canceled the following 
year, after internal opposition to the project and the protests of the Russian 
government254. De Reuter was able to secure a second concession in 1889, but during 
the following decade he was forced again to abandon his venture. The situation on the 
ground – the hostile weather, the nonexistent infrastructure, the country’s capricious 
politics and legislation – represented an insurmountable obstacle. Despite the failure, 
the excitement around the Persian oil, and the possibility of commercially exploiting it, 
continued to grow in the last part of the century. One of the reasons was the report of a 
French explorer, Jacques de Morgan, who after a long and difficult field survey 
confirmed that Persia was «unquestionably petroliferous territory»255. His findings 
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became public in 1895 and further fuelled the interest in the possible establishment of 
an oil industry in Persia.  
The 1901 meeting between D’Arcy and Kitabgi could seem the natural 
consequence of these developments. It was however only through a series of improbable 
personal connections that the two found themselves in the same room in 1901. One of 
de Morgan’s relatives, Edouard Cotte, had also served as de Reuter’s intermediary in 
Persia at the time when the latter was trying to secure a concession. While working for 
the British baron in Teheran, Cotte had the chance to familiarize with Kitabgi, who had 
taken part in the negotiation on behalf of his government. A few years later, when de 
Morgan completed his report about the oil situation in Persia, Cotte informed directly 
Kitabgi, by sending him a copy. The geological assessment removed all doubts for the 
Persian General, who got convinced about the commercial potential of the Persian oil. 
As soon as it became clear that the de Reuter’s concession was destined to fail, Kitabgi, 
determined to not let the chance to sign a profitable deal for the country slip away, 
approached the ex-British Minister in Teheran, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, asking him 
to find a new financier willing – and able – to invest in petroleum exploration. Kitabgi 
knew Wolff because the latter, too, had been involved in the discussion around the de 
Reuter’s concession during his service in Teheran, between 1887 and 1890. The ex-
British representative welcomed Kitabgi’s requests with no hesitation. The prospect of 
having a subject of Her Majesty in control of a concession that would guarantee further 
influence and control over the kingdom was appealing in London, in the 1880s as in 
1900.  
About a month after having talked with Kitabgi, Wolff came across the person 
they were looking for during an informal gathering in London: D’Arcy, whose wealth 
and ingenuity seemed to make him the perfect candidate for such a high-risk venture. 
The preliminary meeting that took place in Paris in early January 1901 was actually 
only the first of the many that were necessary to introduce and explain the business 
opportunity to D’Arcy. It took weeks to convince him to undertake the project – and to 
fund it. At the beginning of spring, the action moved to Teheran. Indeed, persuading 
D’Arcy to accept was just the beginning. The real challenge was to cajole the Shah and 
all the other Persian dignitaries into granting a new mining concession to another 
foreign – British – capitalist amid Russian opposition. Kitabgi, Cotte, and Alfred L. 
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Marriot, D’Arcy’s new representative, travelled to the Persian capital and spent the 
following two months bargaining with the Shah’s ministers while trying to prevent 
Moscow’s interference and ultimate veto. They eventually succeeded. A deciding factor 
was probably D’Arcy’s idea to renounce since the very beginning any exploratory claim 
in the five northern provinces close to the Russian border – the only part of country that 
would have actually been excluded from the sixty-years concession despite its obvious 
value, in view of its proximity to the gigantic Baku fields256. The agreement between 
the Shah and D’Arcy, who would never actually set foot in Persia, was finalized at the 
end of May. It granted to the British entrepreneur the exclusive right not only to locate 
and exploit Persian petroleum, but also to build oil pipelines through the country and to 
the south coast. The latter provision was particularly resented in Moscow, as it 
effectively cut out the possibility to move quickly the Russian oil south and then, by 
sea, towards the new eastern markets. It would have both prevented the development the 
Russian petroleum exports and made it very difficult for the companies in Baku to 
compete directly with a future Persian industry.  
D’Arcy had two years to form a company and comply with the terms of the 
concession, which included also an upfront, one-off payment to the Persian government 
and a royalty for the state corresponding to the sixteenth percent the oil business’ annual 
profits. If it seemed hard enough to secure the exploration rights, to exercise them 
proved actually much harder. D’Arcy spent two years just trying to stabilize his 
financial position and define what would have been his role in the future enterprise. 
Before going further with what still seemed a highly speculative venture, he wanted to 
make sure to have enough resources and a clear legal backing. In fact, he struggled to 
raise the capital needed to cover the anticipated costs of starting the company and his 
associates opposed many of his deliberations – all while the geologist he hired, George 
Bernard Reynolds, had already begun spending his money to carry out initial, and very 
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expensive, prospecting work on the ground. The First Exploitation Company was finally 
registered with much effort in early 1903, just in time to respect the concession’s 
deadline.  
The creation of the Company did not alleviate D’Arcy’s concerns. In fact, it 
worsened them. As the drilling operations officially started, the investment was 
supposed to repay itself through the selling of petroleum products. There was one 
problem though: oil was nowhere to be found in commercial quantities. The expenses 
that D’Arcy had to make in order to continue drilling, with no return, during the 
following two years brought him on the brink of bankruptcy. His attempts to enlist the 
help of private banks and financiers in London, as well as that of the British government 
itself, were no more successful than the work of his geologists in Persia. What 
eventually saved the whole project was the involvement of the Burmah Oil Company, a 
British firm registered in Scotland in 1886 and operating in Burma and India257.  
Burmah Oil had established a flourishing business in the Far East in the 1890s 
and had enjoyed a monopoly in the Burmese oil market until 1901, when the Standard 
Oil expanded its operations in the country. By the early twentieth century, the 
Company’s growth and success attracted the interest of the British Admiralty, which 
was at the time considering the possible switch to fuel oil. The Royal Navy wanted to 
make sure to have a dependable source of supply available before moving forward with 
the process and contemplated signing a long-term contract with the company. Burmah 
Oil was the only sizable producer in the whole British Empire and the Admiralty was 
naturally inclined to turn to it. As a business investment, furthermore, the company 
deserved to be supported and possibly defended it from falling into foreign hands. 
Burmah’s powerful competitors were becoming more and more threatening. Both the 
Standard Oil and the Royal Dutch were actively trying to erode the Company’s 
privileged positioning in the large Indian market, thus risking destroying its early 
progress in the region. The collaboration with the Admiralty would have assured to the 
British firm an outlet for its products, thus easing the pressure of the competition. It 
would have also guaranteed a special consideration by the Indian government and 
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therefore help in keeping its privileges in the country’s market, as London would then 
have had a clear interest in maintaining the company on a solid footing.  
As advantageous as it could seem, such an agreement posed a serious problem to 
Burmah. Despite a seemingly endless growth in the first decade of operations, the 
company was now having difficulties in locating new reservoirs258. Without certainty 
about its own reserves, the Company could not guarantee the Royal Navy what the 
Admiralty wanted, i.e. that it would have been able to supply all the future oil needed by 
the fleet in peacetime and, above all, in the event of an emergency. This is why, when in 
1904 the Admiralty suggested that Burmah invested the D’Arcy concession, the 
company seriously considered the opportunity and eventually agreed to it. It indeed 
seemed a winning situation for all the subjects involved. Burmah could hope to 
diversify its sources without going through the complicated process of obtaining a new 
concession outside Burma and instead simply taking up a business already in place. In 
fact, the decision was not without risks, given the situation in Persia. The Company 
however did not really have a choice, since it was clear that the Admiralty, with which 
the negotiations for the supply agreement were still ongoing, wanted to have the deal 
done. London had indeed everything to gain. Thanks to Burmah’s assistance, the search 
for Persian petroleum would have remained a British-led endeavor, and, in case of 
success, it would have led to the creation of large reserves for the navy – all this without 
spending a single penny of government’s money. As for the cash stripped D’Arcy, it is 
difficult to see how at that point he could have wished for a better solution to his 
financial problems. The partnership between Burmah and D’Arcy was officially 
established on May 5, 1905, almost four year later the original concession was assigned. 
The contract between the Admiralty and British Company followed soon after and was 
formally approved in November. Meanwhile, in October, Burmah had also negotiated a 
truce with both the Royal Dutch and the Standard Oil, in order to stop their cutthroat 
competition in India259.  
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The Concession Syndicate Limited – the new enterprise created under D’Arcy’s 
name and with Burmah’s money – immediately took over the operations in Persia. For 
the following three years, however, the results basically stayed the same: not a single 
well proved productive. By the spring of 1908, there was very little glimmer of hope – 
and money – left. Then, in late May, with the Syndicate on the verge of collapse and 
ready to abandon the whole project, oil was struck at around 1,200 feet (almost the same 
depth of Lucas’ well in Spindletop) in Masjid-i-Sulaiman, in the Zagros Mountains in 
the southwest of the country. The strength of the oil flow soon removed any doubt about 
the importance of the discovery, which marked the beginning of the oil industry in the 
Middle East and remains still today one of the most important events in the country’s 
history. The well, located in a barren land where temperatures could reach fifty degrees 
Celsius during the summer, saved the Syndicate. D’Arcy and Burmah’s directors spent 
the following months working out the details of the new, re-capitalized company to be 
created for the exploitation of the field. In April 1909, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
(APOC) was finally established, about eight years after D’Arcy’s decision to enter the 
oil business. The British businessman became APOC’s director, but the appointment 
was more a matter of form than anything else. The man who really took charge of the 
new enterprise was Charles Greenway, a business associate of Burmah Oil who had 
helped the company to establish itself in India and fight off the attacks of its giant 
competitors there. Greenway became APOC’s managing director few months after the 
formation of the Company and was able to safely navigate it through the troubled 
waters of the post-foundation period.  
The discovery in 1908 did not automatically transform the D’Arcy concession in 
the glorious business that it eventually began. In order to be sold, the oil had to be first 
transported and refined – not an easy task at all given the complete lack of industrial 
infrastructure in the South of the country and the fact that between the oilfield and the 
Persian coast, from where the kerosene, gasoline, and fuel oil would have had to be 
shipped, there were about one hundred sixty miles of wasteland. The works for the 
construction of a pipeline, a telegraph line, and a refinery in Abadan began in 1909. To 
complete them, however, it took about four years, an immense logistical effort, with 
most of the equipment that had to be brought in directly from England, and an 
incredible amount of money, which left – once again – D’Arcy and the whole company 
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in debt. Worse, when the refinery began distilling the first batches of crude oil in 1912, 
it was quickly realized that the Persian petroleum was particularly heavy and difficult to 
process. The quality of kerosene and gasoline produced was poor, thus creating 
additional problems for the enterprise. APOC had not developed any distribution system 
so, in order to sell, he needed to find another oil company willing to market its products 
through its own commercial network. In this situation, the low value of Persian oil’s 
lighter cuts could not but worsen the Company’s position, leaving it without any 
negotiating power. Indeed, it forced it to accept the marketing arrangement – an 
unfavorable one – proposed by its main competitor: the Royal Dutch, which at that time 
had completed its fusion with the British transporting firm, Shell, and operated in the 
Far East through a subsidiary (the Asiatic Oil Company).  
Commercially disadvantaged and in urgent need of capital, APOC would have 
struggled to resist a takeover bid. Under the increasing threat of having to sell the 
Company, Greenway thus turned again to the British government for help. This time, he 
saw in it not only a potential lender and a powerful protector, but also a possible client 
and investor. Given the type of oil at hand it would have been easy for APOC to 
produce large quantities of fuel oil. The problem, in that case, would have been to find a 
buyer for such a commodity, since it continued to be one of the least marketable, 
especially in countries (like Persia and India) where the diffusion of internal combustion 
engines was still extremely limited. Greenway knew that, but he was also quick to 
realize liquid fuel’s potentials in the transportation and military industry and brave 
enough to bet on its success. He offered the Admiralty a long-term contract for the 
supply of fuel oil to the Royal Navy and the right to nominate up to two representatives 
on the Company’s board of directors in exchange for an annual subsidy to support 
APOC’s operations in the Middle East. The contacts between the Company and the 
British government continued during the following two years, growing into an intricate 
web of political, diplomatic, and financial interests that involved both the Foreign 
Office and the Admiralty. On the table, indeed, there was not only the survival of 
D’Arcy commercial enterprise but also the preservation of the British authority in the 
Middle East, the future character of the country’s naval policy, and the fate of what 
seemed an equally valuable mining concession in Mesopotamia, in the part of the 
territory of the Ottoman Empire that was just on the other side of the border from where 
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APOC struck oil. On the latter issue, in particular, both the government and the APOC 
had very similar views: neither of them wanted to see foreign investors or companies 
getting ahead and cutting the British out of the country’s political and economic 
opportunities.  
The fear of a foreign-dominated oil industry was exactly what Greenway used to 
convince the British government to support the APOC. The Company was successfully 
presented, and thus effectively considered as the only legitimate representative of the 
British oil interests in the region. In fact, London had at least another option. It could 
have chosen differently and associated itself with a way more solid and endowed 
company: the Royal Dutch-Shell. The oil giant was the result of the union, in 1907, of 
two different enterprises: the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, created in 1890 in the 
Netherlands by August Kessler, Hugo Loudon, and Henri Deterding (who quickly rose 
to take charge of the company) to operate in the Dutch East Indies, and the "Shell" 
Transport and Trading Company, founded officially in 1897 by Marcus Samuel Jr. and 
his brother Sam. The Shell was a fully British company. Their founders had taken over 
their father’s old commercial activity, the import-export of antiques and actual shells 
based in London, and slowly transformed it into an oil shipping company260. In the early 
1890s, they had inaugurated a new era in oil transportation by designing the first bulk 
tanker and sending it through the Suez Canal. The idea to move greater and greater 
quantities of oil by sea in a quicker and cheaper way through the use of large carriers, 
which they used to transport the oil from Baku to the Far East, was quickly adopted by 
both the Standard Oil and the Royal Dutch. In order to contrast the enormous resources 
of the American giant, which was rapidly catching up with the European companies’ 
operations in the region, the Royal Dutch and the Shell decided to join forces at the 
beginning of the new century, first with the creation of a joint subsidiary company (the 
Asiatic) in 1902, then with the amalgamation of the parent companies in 1907. In the 
new Royal Dutch-Shell group, the two commercial establishments remained legally 
different but operated as a unique entity. The final arrangement established that the 
Dutch side would have controlled sixty percent of the new conglomerate while leaving 
the forty percent to the Samuel brothers.  
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The fact that the Dutchman Deterding retained the controlling interest in the 
Royal-Shell combine (and that the other part of the shares were in the hand of the Jew 
Samuel) was repeatedly – an unscrupulously – used by Greenway in his dealing with 
the government. He pointed to the company’s previous attempts to dominate the market 
in the Far East and suppress the competition, Burmah and APOC included, as proof of 
its monopolizing attitude. Without the help of the British government, Greenway 
predicted, it was just a matter of time before the Royal Dutch-Shell would swallow the 
APOC and end up controlling all that was left of the world oil industry together with 
Standard Oil – a scenario that would have put Great Britain technically out of the “oil 
race” in the Middle East, reduced the country’s participation in the oil business to the 
activities of the Burmah Oil in India, and left the Admiralty without an all-British fuel 
supplier large enough to meet its increasing needs. The mistrust and suspicion towards 
Germany did their part, too. The long-standing imperial ambitions of the Second Reich 
over the Ottoman Empire were not a secret and the Deutsche Bank had indeed been 
fighting to secure an oil concession in Mesopotamia against British interests since the 
early twentieth century. In 1912, the German investors had struck a deal with a group of 
British and French financiers, signing a joint partnership agreement that included also 
the Royal Dutch-Shell group. The operation was completed during a time of tense 
relations between London and Berlin, with the Kaiserliche Marine challenging the 
Royal Navy in an expensive and threatening naval arms race, and the participation of 
the Royal Dutch-Shell group confirmed not only that it had beaten the APOC as the 
only company realistically able to develop the oil concession, but also that its Dutch 
manager was willing and determined to go to great lengths to expand his company and 
dwarf the competition.  
 
D’Arcy’s decision to invest in Persia had been an incredibly risky gamble. 
Thanks to a combination of luck and resolve, however, it would have ended up being 
one of the most consequential move in history of the petroleum industry. In about a 
decade D’Arcy’s private venture had indeed already turned into an enterprise of national 
stature, whose fate was interlinked with those of other, more important players in the 
petroleum business and whose growth was directly affected by the policies of Her 
Majesty's government. In the next couple of years, between 1912 and 1914, Greenway 
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succeeded in securing the official backing of the British Government against the 
competition of way more powerful opponents, making the partnership between the 
national authorities and the British company grown even deeper.   
The managerial skills and ingenuity of APOC’s director, although great, cannot 
account alone for such an improbable political and commercial victory. The story of 
how the Anglo-Persian Company became associated with the Royal Navy, which is 
reviewed and assessed in the next section, is indeed the story of how oil became a 
definite commercial and strategic interest in the minds of the British policymakers. In 
an atmosphere of heated antagonism among the European chancelleries, the focus on 
the next international dispute would have soon moved to the neighboring territories of 
the Ottoman Empire. 
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2. Mesopotamian Oil and International Competition  
Between 1912 and 1914 the British Navy underwent important change, both in 
leadership and, consequently, in policy. The institution’s internal developments made 
the Admiralty even more sensitive to the issue of liquid fuel and more concerned about 
its use and availability, thus providing fertile ground for Greenway’s arguments about 
the commercial value of the APOC and the importance of preserving the British 
ownership of the Company as well as its independence. The appointment of Winston 
Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty, in October 1911, marked the beginning of this 
new course, characterized by a renewed interest in petroleum and the acceleration in 
process of transition towards its use. Churchill, who was serving as Home Secretary 
before accepting the position as head of the Navy, wanted to offer a strong response to 
the German naval rearmament. He argued for an overall modernization of the Royal 
Navy, pushing for the design and construction of a new generation of battleships, armed 
with bigger guns, carrying a stronger armor, and able to reach greater speed261. This is 
where oil inevitably came into play. Its superior qualities as fuel made it the perfect, if 
not the forced, choice for anyone trying to make ships faster without having to sacrifice 
on their size or weight. The use of oil-fired boilers was indeed the only way to make 
even larger, heavier, and more powerful vessels – like those that the Admiralty had in 
mind – move faster than any of the competing class of battleships. The advantages of 
liquid fuel were so great that Churchill saw little reason not to speed up their adoption 
aboard Her Majesty’s ships. It was actually not the first time that the Royal Navy was 
confronted with the issue of fuel oil, nor it was new for British battleships to burn oil. 
Like the U.S. Navy, the Royal Navy had begun experimenting the use of liquid fuel as 
early as in the mid-1860s and, like the U.S. Navy, soon had to abandon the idea of using 
it in naval transportation262. As realized by the American engineers, the practical 
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drawbacks of burning oil at sea were simply too great to overcome with the technology 
of the time. Besides, differently from the United States, Great Britain was not an oil 
producer – at all. Even if the Royal Navy had understood how to safely burn petroleum, 
it would have had first to locate it and then learn how to transport it home. Coal, on the 
other hand, was abundant and of great quality. The Royal Navy had also a large 
transportation network covering most of the world through a system of integrated naval 
bases, reserved ports, and private contractors that made the use of coal particularly 
effective, cheap, and secure. At the turn of the century, then, changes in the global 
structure of the oil industry and in naval technology brought the Admiralty to reconsider 
the use of liquid fuel. The first important discoveries outside Russia and North America 
made oil more readily available. Petroleum was finally found in commercial quantities 
in the British Empire (Burma), as well as in Sumatra and Borneo (where the Royal 
Dutch begun its operations). At the same time, Romania emerged as the mayor producer 
in Europe (Russia excluded). In fact, it was not just a matter of quantity or about the 
number of new sources. Oil had indeed become also easier to move across large 
distances, thanks to the newly designed bulk tankers introduced by Shell. Samuel, who 
had identified since the very beginning the British fleet as a potential outlet for its oil, 
repeatedly tried to talk the Admiralty into using oil as fuel in the last decade of the 
century. Meanwhile, the Russian, French, and Italian navies – all driven by different 
incentives – began assembling for their ships mixed fuel systems able burn oil as 
auxiliary propellant. In the first case, it was the abundance of heavy petroleum from 
Baku that convinced the Russian naval officials and engineers to experiment with new 
oil-burning devices. The traditional reliance on small but fast ships for the country’s 
defense is instead what pushed the French Navy to opt for an early switch to oil aboard 
its torpedo boats. For the Italian Navy, by contrast, the (tentative) adoption of liquid fuel 
came out of necessity more than far-sightedness and vision. Italy lacked coal, so its 
navy had everything to gain in finding a cheaper and possibly more accessible 
alternative to its use. Despite the attempts, results were mixed. In France, the decision 
was soon reversed, as the use of oil was deemed impractical and, in general, none of 
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those countries came close to design a fully functional system for burning petroleum as 
primary fuel. Yet, if Great Britain wanted to keep pace with the progresses made by the 
other naval powers, it could not afford to stand still, especially considering that 
Germany too had expressed interest in using oil as fuel. Motivated by the recent 
developments, the Royal Navy conducted its first trials with liquid fuel aboard the 
destroyer Surly in 1898-99 and continued them retrofitting a cruiser (Bedford) and two 
battleships (Mars and Hannibal) in the early 1900s263. Their boilers were first converted 
to burn oil only, then altered again to use petroleum together with coal. Further tests 
were done with a third battleship, the Sultan, equipped with a mixed fuel system, and 
another destroyer, the Spiteful, which was modified to consume exclusively petroleum. 
In the last months of 1904, the destroyer’s performances at sea were compared to those 
of her coal-burning sister ship, the Peterel. The results unmistakably proved oil 
superiority over coal, especially in these smaller vessels. Equally important, the trials 
confirmed that oil-burning boilers needed less manpower to be operated, reducing the 
workforce necessary in the fire room and making more men available for other duties on 
board. These successful experiments, together with the important improvements in the 
design of oil-burning devices achieved by British naval engineers, convinced the 
Admiralty to plan the conversion of the fleet by the end of 1904. All the existing 
cruisers and battleships were gradually refitted to burn both oil and coal, while mixed 
fuel systems were to be installed in all future vessels. As for the destroyers, it was 
instead decided for a complete switch: they began to be designed to use oil as primary 
and only source of power. In the United States, at the same time, the results of 
Melville’s report had just been published and the practical trials aboard the navy’s 
vessels had not even started yet.  
These changes took place under the watch of the Admiral Sir John Fisher, who 
became First Sea Lord in 1904 and was an enthusiastic supporter of the conversion to 
oil. He had been one of the first and most convinced advocates of the use of petroleum 
in naval propulsion, championing the switch to liquid fuel since the 1890s, and would 
have remained one of the most vocal and authoritative promoters of change even after 
he left his position as professional head of the Royal Navy in 1910. The “Oil Maniac”, 
as Fisher’s colleagues dubbed him, had indeed met both with the Shell’s Chairman 
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Marcus Samuel and D’Arcy between 1899 and 1903, when he was rapidly climbing the 
Admiralty hierarchy ladder, interested in finding reliable sources of oil in anticipation of 
a possible transition in the Navy264. Fisher’s worries about the availability of supply 
were not as premature as they may have seemed. The issue became an actual and crucial 
concern for the British naval establishment just a few years later, in the mid-1910s, after 
the main engineering problems had been solved and the Royal Navy decided to start 
converting its vessels. Indeed, despite Fisher’s early interest and the Admiralty 
attempted planning, exemplified by the agreement with Burmah Oil in 1905, it was soon 
realized that an oil-burning fleet would have consumed a quantity of petroleum greater 
than the one that the British Navy had available in its depots or could have immediately 
procured in case of war. The disappointing news coming from Persia, where D’Arcy’s 
geologists seemed unable to find any of the much-anticipated petroleum reservoirs, only 
emphasized the limits of the British oil resources, as well as those of the Royal Navy’s 
supply strategy. The mounting budget constraints that the Admiralty faced in those 
years completed a bleak picture for all the oil buffs. In 1908-09, the British navy 
basically was forced to partially revert its policy, ordering to return to coal-fired boilers 
for the next class of destroyers. The sixteen ships of the Beagle (or G) Class, completed 
between 1910 and 1911, would go down in history as the last of their kind designed by 
the British engineers to burn coal265.   
The conversion of the fleet slowed down. The idea of a complete switch was 
however never abandoned. Its implementation was just postponed – until Churchill’s 
arrival at the Admiralty. The then Home Secretary proved to be the perfect heir to 
Fisher in regard to oil, an issue about which the two had talked at length in the previous 
years. They found themselves largely in agreement. Many of Fisher’s ideas – his 
fixation about speed and his steadfast belief in oil’s superiority – were taken up by 
Churchill, who used his characteristic charisma and determination to move things 
forward. When the new First Lord of the Admiralty took office, the country’s oil 
situation however had not really improved [four years peacetime – royal commission]. 
The Navy had tried to escape what seemed an inevitable oil shortage by stockpiling oil 
home and abroad, so to have enough fuel to operate the fleet for sufficient number of 
months in case of emergency. Yet the efforts to build up its storage capacity had largely 
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failed by 1911 because of the rising costs and the difficulties and delays in designing 
and constructing specific tanks for liquid fuel. Any plan to renew the fleet and transform 
it into a fast, powerful, oil-burning war machine continued therefore to be thwarted by 
the scarcity of supply – or, better, by the long-standing lack of a source of fuel oil that 
was considered strategically secure, cheap enough for the Admiralty’s coffers, and 
sufficiently reliable in the long run. By the end of 1911, the Navy had already built or 
was building fifty-six destroyers and more than seventy submarines «solely dependent 
on oil»266. All its other ships (except the recently designed G Class) were equally able 
to burn petroleum, although only as auxiliary to coal. Struggling to secure the fuel for 
the smaller vessels already at sea, the Royal Navy did not seem to have any margin to 
turn also its biggest and most prestigious fighting items – the battleships – into oil-
depended hulls.  
The unpromising scenario did not deter Churchill from his purpose. Committed 
to find a solution that would have allowed him to go on with the introduction of all-oil 
battleships, in December 1911 he established a secret committee to find a solution to the 
problem of supply. In the following weeks, the committee held talks with oil experts 
and oil business leaders. Among them there were both Deterding and Greenway, who 
did not miss the chance to make his case and present the APOC as the only dependable 
and loyal fuel provider for the British navy, in contrast with the self-interested and 
foreign dominated Royal Dutch-Shell combine. In January, Captain Pakenham, Fourth 
Sea Lord and committee’s chairman, confirmed in his final report that the Navy’s 
existing oil depots were not sufficient and recommended to expand the total capacity as 
to amass at least twelve months of projected wartime usage worth of reserves. No 
comprehensive or definitive answer to the questions regarding the viability of a 
complete conversion was found, though. The situation of the Navy’s oil supply was 
indeed deemed so precarious that the committee’s findings must have appeared more as 
a rejection than a validation of Churchill’s proposal for oil-only capital ships. 
Unwavering, Churchill doubled the stakes instead of backing down. In mid-1912, he 
pushed through the inclusion of his long-cherished “fast division” of five oil-only 
battleships in the naval budget. He then decided to set up a Royal Commission on Fuel 
and Engines to finish the job of the Pakenham’s committee, asking no less than the 
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“godfather of oil”, the Admiral and friend John Fisher, to chair it267. To him, Churchill 
had personally asked to solve this «liquid fuel problem»; he urged Fisher «to find the 
oil; to show how it can be stored cheaply: how it can be purchased regularly and 
cheaply in peace, and with absolute certainty in war». Last but not least, the 
commission’s chairman would have had to develop «by all means…its application in 
the best possible way to existing and prospective ships…»268.  
Fisher of course accepted. What Churchill needed was a clear and authoritative 
endorsement of his naval oil policy, able to clear the way for further government 
spending in liquid fuel and a closer, more active collaboration with private companies 
by the Admiralty – and what Churchill asked, the Commission delivered. The results of 
its fact-finding work were published at the end of the year. The report stressed the 
overwhelming advantages of liquid fuel and, while calling for the construction of new 
storage facilities, basically confirmed that there was enough petroleum in the world to 
justify and move forward with a complete switch. In fact, Fisher went as far as 
prescribing the adoption of diesel engines in naval transportation – one of his old oil-
related obsessions, but also an impossible solution given the technological level of the 
time. The Committee had no executive powers and Churchill used only the parts of its 
work that he needed to cement his policy proposal. Among Fisher’s final 
recommendations, which came in three reports published between the end of 1912 and 
the spring of 1913, there was the stipulation of long-term agreements with the oil 
companies, as to stabilize the supply, allow for a better naval planning, and insulate the 
government from the price fluctuations. In July, Churchill proposed the British cabinet 
to sign forward contracts with the oil majors, adding that, as general principles, the 
country should have aimed at: maintaining the access to multiple sources of supply; 
fighting off monopolization tendencies in the petroleum market, which would have 
inevitably brought back the Admiralty to a situation of dependency on a single 
company; relying as much as possible on British-controlled firms and territories as fuel 
supplier. Churchill’s final purpose was to bring the Admiralty directly into the oil 
business, hoping that it would have been able one day to control its own supply without 
                                                
267 Kent, Moguls and mandarins, p. 42, Jones, State and Emergence, p. 168. Timothy C. Winegard, as 
well as other, mentions Fisher’s nickename: Timothy C. Winegard, The first world oil war (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2016), p. 44. 
268 Churchill, The world Crisis, p. 137-8.  
	 129 
having to rely on external providers, basically making the Royal Navy produce and 
refine its own oil. In this respect, the correct and continuous development of the Anglo-
Persian oil supply became therefore «indispensable», as Churchill himself explained at 
Whitehall269. Indeed, the negotiations with the APOC had meanwhile already begun. As 
with the Pakenham’s commission, both Deterding and Greenway had the opportunity to 
present their proposals before the Royal Commission and try to convince the Admiralty 
to enter an agreement with their companies. Despite Fisher’s relationship with (and 
strong admiration for) the Royal Dutch’s director, Greenway’s arguments about the 
“Britishness” of the Anglo-Persian eventually prevailed. By mid-1913 Churchill had 
probably already made up his mind about the company he wanted to affiliate with and 
the kind of agreement that he wanted to achieve, so much so that he decided to send 
John Cadman and the Vice-Admiral Edmond Slade to Persia to examine – in person – 
the concession and its value. The trip was intended to break the last resistance, still 
strong within the Navy, against the idea of the Admiralty mingling with a private 
business – and it worked. Cadman and Slade, who would have become two of the 
protagonists of the British oil policy in the following decade, advised upon their return 
to take «all possible steps should be taken to maintain the Company as an independent 
British undertaking»270. It was January 1914. In June, Churchill finally won the 
approval of the House of Commons, making full use of the nationalist rhetoric 
presenting the Anglo-Persian as an imperial achievement and vital resource, besides a to 
the international oil monopolies. The final approval arrived in august, a week after the 
entrance into WWI. The British government went on to acquire a controlling interest of 
fifty-one percent of the Anglo-Persian’s stock in exchange of an injection of more than 
two million Pounds into the Company’s pockets. According to the agreement, two seats 
on the company’s board were also to be reserved to government representatives. 
Whitehall therefore became the de facto owner and manager of APOC, which in a 
separate understanding also agreed to provide fuel to the Admiralty for twenty years at a 
lowered price.  
For Churchill, it was a personal, political, and military success. He later claimed 
that the «aggregate profits» of the investment, when fully realized, would have been so 
great as to claim «that the mighty fleets laid down in 1912, 1913 and 1914, the greatest 
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ever built by any power in an equal period, were added to the British Navy without 
costing a single penny to the taxpayer»271. The British naval programs in the years 
immediately preceding the war were indeed unprecedented, as it was Churchill’s 
decision to build a fast battleship division in 1912 – a move that marked the point of 
return for the Royal Navy, since then fully (and forcefully) committed to liquid fuel. 
The agreement with the Anglo-Persian however was not an inevitable and foregone 
conclusion nor a brilliant, calculated gambit proving the far-sightedness of the British 
Admiralty, as Churchill and the other supporters of the decision presented it. When the 
British government decided to became the majority shareholders, the Company was «on 
the brink of bankruptcy; it was in no position to supply the Royal Navy in adequate 
quantity, it was entirely depended on one field in one country», and its refined products 
were still below par272. To market them, since it lacked any downstream structure, it had 
to rely on other companies including (actually, primarily) the Royal Dutch-Shell. The 
APOC had actually problems also to transport them, since it did not even have its own 
tanker fleet, which would have taken years to complete. From a commercial and 
economic perspective, an agreement with the much more solid and resourceful Royal 
Dutch-Shell group would have made more sense. Choosing the APOC was a risky and 
not totally indispensable move that, after a great deal of time and effort, fortunately paid 
off. The real success was therefore for the Anglo-Persian, which avoid selling out its 
assets to its competitors and was allowed to survive and actually further develop under 
the protection of the British state. Greenway, thanks also to a series of coincidental 
circumstances and events, was able to entice the government into doing something it 
was normally inclined to reject – directly participate in a private business enterprise – 
by appealing to its imperial vanity and naval ambition. The reality of the oil industry 
was however different from the triumphalist rhetoric of the Admiralty. Churchill knew 
it well, too. The apparent rejection of the Royal Dutch, for example, was not really so. 
The Admiralty still needed its oil, as APOC’s output levels were indeed too low to 
satisfy the navy’s needs, especially with a war to wage. Despite the cries about the 
“Shell menace”, Churchill never seriously antagonized Deterding. The Admiralty and 
the Royal Dutch-Shell continued instead to have a working relationship even as the 
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former was presenting the latter as untrustworthy. The same did Greenway, who had 
repeatedly accused Samuel and the Dutchman to be unscrupulous monopolists: it was 
exactly in the spring of 1914, when the agreement between the Admiralty and the 
Anglo-Persian was already in sight but not finalized yet, that Greenway, Samuel, and 
Deterding became actual business partners in the exploitation of the other equally 
promising Middle Eastern concession, covering part of the immense territory of the 
Ottoman Empire.  
The area at stake corresponded to the Ottoman provinces (vilayets) of Mosul and 
Baghdad, still today one of the most important (and sought after) oil region in the world. 
As in Persia, the presence of oil deposits in the area was already well known. The 
“Eternal Fires” of Kirkuk – located halfway between the Iraqi capital and the northern 
province of Mosul – had been burning since the dawn of time, or at least since the fifth 
century BC, when Babylonian King Nebuchadnezzar threw three Jews in them, as 
chronicled in the Book of David in the Old Testament273. The late nineteenth century 
Sultan Abdul Hamid had a different and less gruesome idea about how to make use of 
the oil seepages in Mesopotamia. In 1888, sensing the commercial value of the 
reservoirs, he acquired by decree all the oil rights and placed them in his Privy Purse – 
the Sultan’s private treasury. In the same year, the Ottoman government granted to the 
Deutsche Bank the concession for the construction of the railway from Constantinople 
to Konya. In was not unusual for European investors to finance large construction 
projects in the Middle East. In fact, it was the norm among the main European powers, 
bankers, and capitalists to compete to obtain the authorizations from the local 
governments and take up the burden (and the costs) of the work, as every new mile of 
railroad, telegraph line, electrical grid, like every new seaport, street, and bridge, 
brought larger outlet for their products, more clients for their services, and easier access 
to the country’s natural resources. In 1888, almost eighty percent of the foreign total 
investments in the Ottoman Empire had «the commercial purpose of obtaining raw 
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materials and selling industrial products»274. The Deutsche Bank completed the 
Anatolian railway in the 1896. In the Sultan’s mind, it was supposed to be only the first 
stretch of a much longer, and more ambitious, train line connecting Constantinople with 
Baghdad. When presented with the idea, however, the German group was not 
enthusiasts. The project was too costly and basically not worth the trouble. The situation 
changed dramatically few years later, when a further look into the region’s topography 
undeniably confirmed the presence of oil. Calouste Gulbenkian, a young Armenian oil-
enthusiast, was among the firsts to produce a complete report about the Mesopotamian 
oil prospects. Calouste’s father, Sarkis, was an oilman himself275. He became rich 
importing kerosene from Baku and even richer when he took the position of tax 
collector for the Sultan’s private treasury. His superior, the minister of the Privy Purse 
Hagop Pasha, was the man who had asked the twenty-years old Calouste to survey the 
area in the early 1890s. Gulbenkian did not really do it. He simply put together the 
existing information about the region (travel books, previous geological expeditions, 
and the stories of the people working on the Anatolian Railway who had been in those 
territories). He had earned a degree as civil engineer in London in the early 1880s, but 
he never acted as one. He became an expert in the oil geography of Iraq, a subject he got 
to know probably better than any of the European geologists that visited the region in 
those years, but he was never a “field man” and never spent a single day drilling for oil. 
Yet he became one of the most influential oilmen and industrialist of the early twentieth 
century, whose name was inextricably associated with the birth of the Iraqi oil industry 
– a feat he achieved without ever setting foot in the country.  
In 1901, a first technical study confirmed that the Mosul’s area was «a veritable 
lake of petroleum»276. Meanwhile, D’Arcy had launched his business venture in Persia, 
looking for oil just east of the southern part of the Mesopotamian region. Two years 
before, in 1899, the Deutsche Bank had finally agreed to build the southern part of the 
railroad. It is difficult to say who was the real winner in the deal. The Sultan, who 
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strongly wanted the rail track to be built, specifically wanted the Germans in charge of 
the works. He had received several other proposals from other European investors (both 
Russian and British), but had rejected all of them. Kaiser Wilhelm II, who had 
personally paid a visit to Abdul Hamid the year before, and its subjects were the only 
foreigners he trusted – or, better: those who he distrusted the less. The German 
influence on the Ottoman Empire was indeed at its height at the end of the century. As 
the neighboring Shah, the Ottoman Sultan, too, feared that letting British enter the 
county to take over the project would have inevitably meant an expansion of London’s 
unduly and unwanted influence over the Empire. Building the railroad was a sensitive 
enterprise. Besides offering new market opportunities, it carried serious military and 
strategic implications that made its importance even clearer well beyond its immediate 
commercial value. At the time, the train represented the fastest and most important 
means to move troops across large territories. Laying rails further south, to Baghdad and 
possibly to Basra, on the Persian Gulf, meant giving the possibility – to whoever 
country controlling it – to quickly deploy its army relatively close to the southwestern 
Russian border and project its armed forces into the Indian Ocean, therefore towards the 
jewel of the English imperial Crown: India. This is way the Kaiser Wilhelm II, who had 
personally paid a visit to Abdul Hamid in 1898, got also interested a project. The 
exciting prospect to connect Berlin to Baghdad by train became at that point more than 
just a fantasy. An integrated railway network going from central Europe, where trains 
were becoming more common and popular, down the Euphrates valley could have given 
Germany access to the Persian Gulf provided it with a direct route to its farthest 
colonies in central and south Africa, while keeping in check the British and Russian 
expansion in the region. Needless to say, both Russia and Great Britain strongly 
opposed the idea of Germany working on the railway. Moscow announced that any 
attempt to get too close to its borders and to Northern Persia, an area that it considered 
firmly under its influence, would have not been tolerated, warning of possible «military 
consequences»277. London, meanwhile, made sure that the rails would never actually 
reach the Persian shores. The Foreign Office struck an agreement with the Sheikh of 
Kuwait, who promised not to cede to any foreign government the use of its coastal 
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territory in exchange for the British military protection278. It was 1899. A few of years 
later, in 1903, reiterating a concept already expressed in private by Lord Curzon at the 
turn of the century, the British foreign secretary Lord Lansdowne would have 
announced what the American newspapers called «a British Monroe doctrine in the 
Persian gulf»279. «I say without hesitation», he stated before the House of Lords, «that 
we should regarded the establishment of a naval base or a fortified port in the Persian 
Gulf as a very grave menace to British interests, and should certainly resist it by all 
means at our disposal»280. The Foreign Office actually feared Moscow’s intrusion more 
than Berlin’s, but the message was clear for everyone: no external power would have 
been allowed to extend its interest in the Gulf zone.  
Between the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid and Freiherr Marschall von 
Bieberstei, the German ambassador at Constantinople, it was probably Georg von 
Siemens, the managing director of the Deutsche Bank, the person less enthusiast about 
the railway concession he had just been awarded. The project was extremely costly and 
presented all the characteristics of an engineering and logistic nightmare. Furthermore, 
the prospect of economic returns from the actual use of the railway by local passengers 
was very slim, since it would have crossed large unpopulated areas. The estimated 
expenses for the construction works were so high, accounting to at least five hundred 
million francs, that the Deutsche Bank had to look for additional investors willing and 
able to finance the venture. The search for fresh capitals and the war of attrition between 
the European chancelleries – always trying to keep in check each other’s plans and 
moves on the ground – stalled the project until March 1903, when the Baghdad Railway 
Company (BRC) was finally created and the construction works began281. Along with a 
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tax exemption, the Company had received mining and exploration rights within twenty 
kilometers strip of land on either side of the planned track route. In 1904, then, a formal 
authorization was granted to the German group to survey the provinces of Mosul and 
Baghdad for oil. 
 The first 120-miles section of the railway, from Konya to the small town of 
Bulgurlu in the eastern part of the country was completed in a little more than a year. 
The enthusiasm for the early success, however, did not last long. The construction 
works stopped there. Back in 1899, the Sultan had given the Railway Company eight 
years to complete all the 1,400 miles of the line to Baghdad and had set even stricter 
terms for completing the preliminary exploration for oil. When the German group 
planned to resume the works, in 1908, the concession had expired. Not a single mile of 
track out of Bulgurlu had been laid, or a single well been sunk. The period of prolonged 
inactivity puzzled several later observers, who had difficulties accounting for the delay. 
The political theorist Timothy Mitchell, who has recently presented one of the freshest 
accounts of the political and economical implications of the global switch from coal to 
oil, pointed to other scholars’ selective blindness to explain what happened in the 
Middle East at the beginning of the century. The period of inactivity had been difficult 
to explain, Mitchell argues, because everyone normally assumed that the Deutsche Bank 
cared about the project and wanted to move forward with it. In fact, he states, the 
German group was not really interested in the railway, or in the extraction of 
Mesopotamian oil. As noted by T. Mitchell, its goal, like the one of the other large firms 
of the time, «was not to develop important new sources of oil, but to delay their 
development», as to avoid oversupply and increase the products’ prices282. Once the 
usual interpretative approach is reversed, the construction suspension can finally appear 
for what it really was, according to Mitchell: a perfectly logical and intentional dilatory 
move by the Germans. The Deutsche Bank’s tactic in Mesopotamia is actually 
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presented as just one part of a grander and grandiose scheme put in place by oil 
companies to restrict the production on a more global scale. European firms worked to 
acquire Middle Eastern concessions simply to prevent their competitors from doing it, 
so to deny them the possibility to extract oil that everybody in the industry much 
preferred to keep buried underground. In particular, a more immediate aim was to 
maintain the giant fields of Baku as isolated as possible by precluding access to the 
Persian Gulf to Russia and physically blocking its oil from reaching larger markets. The 
British presence and activities in Persia were supposed to confirm this alternative 
reading. Burmah’s decision to invest in the D’Arcy venture, from this perspective, 
became simply a «speculative investment…to keep the concession afloat as a means to 
prevent others from producing oil in the Middle East, or pumping it there from 
Caucasus, which would only add to [the company’s] problems in India»283.  
The long series of formal and informal market agreements punctuating the story 
of the industry’s development definitely confirms that the oil business was, since its 
very beginning, characterized by collusion, speculation, and monopolistic tendencies 
more than free and fair competition. Yet it is difficult to see how this interpretation can 
be applied so strictly to the events in Persia and (even more so) in Mesopotamia at the 
time. The events surrounding Burmah’s involvement in Persia do not really tell a tale of 
astute and farsighted management as one dominated by pessimism and self-preserving 
instincts. Burmah Oil’s management turned increasingly cautious and conservative by 
the mid-1910s, unable to diversify despite growing concerns about the drying up of the 
company’s own reserves. Investing in Persia may have seemed a good opportunity to 
prevent others from extracting Middle Eastern oil, but it was not what the company had 
planned or was planning to do. Indeed, the choice to save D’Arcy was not even a 
spontaneous one. The decision, in 1905, came after the Admiralty, with whom Burmah 
had just signed a supply contract, had specifically asked the company to act – a request 
from which it could not really shy away. Once in the country, instead of simply running 
out the clock and frustrate its competitors, the Burmah became deeply involved in the 
project. By the time the Anglo-Persian was officially registered in 1909, it would had 
invested in Persia nearly £400,000284. The sum was almost twice the money (£200,000) 
that the Company spent in double the time (until 1911) looking for oil in Burma 
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itself285. Squeezed by competition in its home turf in the first part of the decade, 
Burmah was holding on to London’s imperial protection and a market agreement forced 
upon by its main commercial rival (the Royal Dutch) to survive, with no certainty of 
going much further, let alone growing, given the company unfavorable long-term 
prospects. In this delicate context, the efforts that went into developing the D’Arcy 
concession, and the interest it arose during the years, do not really seem to fit into a 
narrative that sees the Persian venture simply as a tactical, painless speculative stunt. 
Furthermore, the possibility of Russia having direct access to the Gulf had basically 
been shut down by London and its imperial-minded representatives in India themselves 
since the beginning of century.  
In Europe, meanwhile, the Deutsche Bank agreed to divide up the European 
markets with the Standard Oil. The compromise left eighty percent of the pie to the 
American giant and twenty percent to the newly created European Petroleum Union, a 
company that included British (Shell), Russian (Nobel), French (Rothschild), and 
German (Deutsche Bank’s subsidiary in Romania, Steaua Romana) interests286. The 
arrangement represented indeed a clear attempt to cartelize the industry in Europe. The 
Deutsche Bank did want an orderly and stable market, with fixed prices, protected by 
sudden increases in supply – whether they were coming them from Russia or elsewhere. 
The agreement, however, was found only in 1907, after the German group had stopped 
its works in the Ottoman Empire and, above all, after it had fought and lost an all-out 
price war with the Standard Oil on the European soil. Therefore the Deutsche Bank, 
together with the other European firms, was basically forced to settle for just a quarter 
of the continental market by the overwhelming power of Rockefeller’s company, since 
it could not bear the (low) costs imposed by the Americans287. If anything, instead of 
being a burdening or destabilizing asset, a supplemental source of cheap oil, as 
Mesopotamia would have proved to be, could have come in handy in the mid-1910s. 
This appears even truer if one considers that the greatly feared Baku production 
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dramatically dropped at the beginning of the century because of the ethnic conflicts and 
discriminations in the area involving the oil workers. The quantity of oil extracted 
declined between 1901 and 1904 and then collapsed in 1905, when generalized violence 
erupted in the region. The thirty million-barrels difference between the 1901 and the 
1905 Russian output was far greater than the annual production of Romania, Galicia, 
India, and Dutch East Indies put together. The only fields that in those years could make 
up for the losses and keep up the global production levels, which slightly diminished in 
any case in 1905-1906, were the ones in Texas and California. If there was a time when 
it seemed possible to gain market shares in Europe and elsewhere – or, at least, when it 
would have been worth and important to do so, in order to stop the flood of American 
oil –, that was the time.  
What stopped the construction work for the Baghdad Railway at Bulgurlu was 
actually the lack of money. In 1903 the Ottoman government had agreed to pay the 
German company every year a fixed sum of money for each mile of railway completed. 
This compensation was to act as kilometric guarantee for the Deutsche Bank in building 
unprofitable tracts of the railroad. The clause was uneconomical for the Ottoman 
administration, but the Sultan was willing to diminish the financial risks of the German 
investments by paying back the Company just to see the railroad built. The problem 
arose when the financial situation of “Sick man of Europe” aggravated and the payment 
became an actual burden for the Ottoman state, raising serious doubts about its ability to 
honor its obligations. The revenues from the train service on the tracts already built, 
meanwhile, were lower than expected. Without governmental guarantees and knowing 
that the sections ahead would have been the most expensive and the more difficult to 
build, and probably the least commercially profitable to operate, the Germans stopped 
the works, patiently waiting for more positive developments. As for the oil exploration 
rights, although extremely valuable, they were still only additional benefit for a 
multinational conglomerate originally established two decades earlier to build a 
railroad. In mid-1910s, it is difficult to see how a company that was not even able to 
muster enough resources to lay rails on the ground should or could have bore the costs 
of setting up an oil industry in an impervious region of a desolated and far away 
country.  
	 139 
The unwillingness to embark in further oil drilling and exploration, and to 
massively invest in it, could therefore be ascribed to a lack of foresight, not to an excess 
of it, by the Germans, who did not anticipated the tremendous economic changes that 
the development of the regional oil resources would have brought about. In this regard, 
it is worth remembering that looking for oil in the Middle East was still considered an 
extremely risky and difficult venture, a business gamble that few were willing to take. 
After all, the British had been trying, in vain, to locate a commercial well just on the 
other side of the borders for years – a period of time in which D’Arcy had repeatedly 
failed to find investors to help him in Persia, let alone buyers to whom resell his 
concession rights. Not even the intervention of a “real” oil company, Burmah Oil, in 
1905 seemed to have been enough to improve the situation.  
If the German’s strategy was to wait for a more propitious time to continue the 
railway and develop the oil concession, it did not pay off – at all. In 1908, after the 
Sultan had raised the custom duties to pad the state’s coffers, the Deutsche Bank 
worked to resume the railroad construction by signing a new agreement with the 
Ottoman state. In was the beginning of June288. A month later, the revolution of the 
Young Turks erupted. The large reform movement shook the foundation of the Sultan’s 
power and questioned the Ottoman Empire’s political and financial affiliation with the 
Wilhelmine Germany. Both the contract for the realization of the Baghdad railway and 
the concession for coveted oil rights for the two Mesopotamian provinces were now 
back on the table and open to discussion. They would soon become bargaining chips for 
the new leadership in dealing with the European states and, in fact, important pieces in 
the game of international power-politics being played at the time.  
In the following years, the tumultuous political situation in the country brought 
the Ottoman state to often change and realign its sympathies towards the European 
powers. With Abdul Hamid cornered by reformers, Germany’s fortunes declined after 
the revolution. London’s influence, on the contrary, grew – although only temporarily – 
as the Young Turks gained power in the country and forced the restoration of the 1876 
constitution. From 1907, Germany had become also more isolated at the international 
level as a result of the signing of Anglo-Russian convention, with which London and 
Moscow agreed to settle their rivalry in the Middle East and Central Asia. Both 
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countries, together with France, presented now a united diplomatic front against 
Germany, in Europe as in the Middle East. The recent and moderate Anglophilia in 
Constantinople would have been redressed relatively soon, as the country swung away 
from Great Britain. The territorial disputes arose in the Balkans following the conflict in 
the early 1910s, the continuous Russian menace at the border, as well as the British 
aims in the Gulf, which mined the Empire’s territorial unity, would have eventually 
encouraged Constantinople to turn back to Germany and the central powers, with which 
the Ottoman Empire would have ultimately – and fatally – sided during the war.  
Meanwhile, however, Germany had to defend its political and commercial 
investments in the region against the encroachment of the other European countries, 
first of all Great Britain. After 1908, and even more after the ousting of the Sultan in 
1909, the Deutsche Bank was put on the defensive and struggled to maintain a hold on 
the concessions that Abdul Hamid had assigned it289. To complicate the matter further, 
the news of Burmah’s oil discovery in Persia arrived. The perfect timing of the British 
breakthrough, dated May 1908, caused the stakes on the Mesopotamian concession to 
skyrocket. The Ottoman government understood the situation immediately. Few months 
later, in September, it decided to take away the oil rights of the provinces of Mosul and 
Baghdad from the Sultan’s Civil List and put them under the authority of the Ministry 
of Finance. The decision was confirmed by decree in May 1909 – a move that officially 
voided all the previous agreements and restarted the race for the Mesopotamian oil, now 
open to all sorts of contestants. International financers and oilmen did not really play 
hard to catch. Both the British and the Royal Dutch-Shell had already approached the 
Ottoman government in the previous months. In fact, D’Arcy had tried to petition for a 
concession as early as 1904, in the attempt to revive his dying bid for Middle Easter oil 
and find in Mesopotamia what he could not find in Persia. Four years later, after oil 
started flushing out of the ground in Masjid-i-Sulaiman, his reasons for trying to acquire 
the Ottoman fields were even more valid. Although he was not the only British financier 
interested in the concession, he would remain the only one to receive direct support by 
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the Foreign Office. When, for example, Shell’s director Samuel turned to Her Majesty 
government for assistance, he was (once again) rebuffed in reason of his partnership 
with non-British interests.  
Whitehall’s refusal to collaborate with Samuel and its foreign associates did not 
really prevent the Royal Dutch-Shell to reach what it wanted. It turned out that, indeed, 
London’s help was not needed negotiating with the Sublime Porte when you could 
count on the services of Calouste Gulbenkian. In 1907, the Royal Dutch-Shell had 
opened an office in Constantinople with the help of the Arminian «oil factotum», who in 
the occasion was also appointed as company’s representative in the country290. 
Gulbenkian had become a British national in 1902 and had connections extending well 
beyond the borders of the Ottoman Empire. In 1908, he and his uncle, Boghos Nubar 
Pasha, took up the work of setting up the National Bank of Turkey (NBT). The institute, 
which was created to satisfy the nationalistic and liberal aspiration of the new 
government, would grow up to be a key connecting link between British and German 
interests in the country. Through the bank, and the men behind it, London and Berlin 
sealed a diplomatic truce and a new, mutually beneficial commercial partnership in the 
Ottoman Empire.  
After months of negotiations, the NBT was officially established in mid-1909. 
Henry Babington-Smith, the former the British representative on the Ottoman Public 
Debt Administration, was its president, as advised by the Foreign Office. Sir Ernest 
Cassel, a Prussian-born banker and financier, acquainted with King Edward VII and 
Churchill and equally well connected to the German political and financial circles, was 
one of the directors. Gulbenkian, who directed the operation since the beginning, 
reserved for himself thirty percent of the bank’s shares. The events that followed 
exemplify perfectly the intricate networks and combination of financial, commercial, 
and diplomatic interests surrounding oil, in the early twentieth century as today.  
For the Young Turks, the bank was supposed to be a sign of discontinuity with 
the past and had to serve as a way to balance out the foreign, and primarily German, 
influence of the previous years. For the British government, it could be used as an 
instrument of imperial policy, as a means through which channel British capitals into 
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the Ottoman Empire and expand the British control in its territories291. For Gulbenkian, 
the NBT was first of all an opportunity of self-aggrandizement, a unique chance to get 
more of what he knew best: oil. Loyal to the saying that suggests joining those who you 
cannot defeat, Gulbenkian’ next move was to incorporate the German interests, the 
original holders of the oil rights in Mesopotamia, into a new company with limited 
liability registered in Great Britain: the African and Eastern Concessions. The new 
business entity thus included the National Bank of Turkey and the Deutsche Bank. 
Along with them, Gulbenkian brought on board the Asiatic Petroleum Company. This 
was, of course, not a random choice. The Asiatic was the subsidiary of the Royal Dutch 
created before the amalgamation with Shell, in 1902, through collaboration between 
Samuel himself and the Rothschild bank. Such an arrangement thus combined together, 
in a single business venture, the second biggest oil company on earth (the Royal Dutch-
Shell); the most important French financier (the Rothschild family), who had ties in the 
Russian oil industry and had also recently bought a quota in Deterding’s enterprise; 
British capitals, through the National Bank of Turkey, an institute that the Foreign 
Office overtly supported, and the only European company that had actually worked in 
the area: the German bank, who had agreed to transfer what was left of its oil rights 
from the Anatolia and Baghdad railways company to the new combine. This seemingly 
unbeatable multinational conglomerate officially assumed the new name of Turkish 
Petroleum Company (TPC) in early 1912. Gulbenkian, whose ego was as big as his 
talent, had stated in his memoires that in these negotiations – and in all those that would 
have followed until the late 1920s – he was the real deus-ex-machina. In fact, there were 
other men connecting all these interests and who acted as power brokers. One of them 
was, for example, Frederick Lane, oil businessmen, long-standing business associate of 
Samuel, board member of the Royal Dutch-Shell, and Rothschild’s representative, who 
had also been involved with the Armenian in the creation of the Turkish National 
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Bank292. Another one was Cassel himself, who also became director of the TPC. 
According to the final agreement, the Turkish National Bank would have controlled 
fifty percent of its shares, with the Deutsche Bank and Royal Dutch-Shell both splitting 
up equally the remaining half293.  
The only one who could reasonably be unhappy about the creation of the TPC 
was the Anglo-Persian director, Greenway. His company had been completely (and 
purposely) left out of the arrangement by its competitors, who were outmaneuvering 
him in the Middle East. If successful, the Mesopotamian venture would have posed a 
formidable challenge to Burmah and D’Arcy interests. In the Far Eastern market, which 
was supposed to be APOC’s preferred outlet, the Royal-Dutch was already squeezing its 
British competitors, having forced them to compromise and sign a marketing 
agreement. The Turkish syndicate now threatened to block APOC out altogether. It had 
deep pockets and resources that were, at least on paper, much greater than those that 
Burmah and D’Arcy could ever put together. Last but not least, it could rely on the solid 
and large distribution network of its parent companies to sell its products in Europe and 
elsewhere.  
As precarious as its position was in 1912, the British company was neither alone 
nor lost. The ‘special relationship’ that Burmah had built with the Admiralty and that 
APOC was trying to replicate was a powerful asset, an important connection with the 
imperial power to be used as a leverage to obtain from higher authority what business 
competition had put out of reach. Between 1912 and 1914, Greenway indeed negotiated 
with London not only a long-term fuel supply contract for the Royal Navy, but also 
APOC’s access to the Mesopotamian oil in the form of participation in the TPC. The 
two things were obviously connected, for both the Company and the British 
government. As the possibility to partner up with APOC was being evaluated, the 
Admiralty took a natural interest in the company’s financial and industrial landscape. In 
this respect, securing a solid footing for the future meant avoiding the murderous 
competition within the oil business promised by foreign investors’ moves in the Middle 
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East. The reasons that were pushing the Admiralty to sign an agreement with the Anglo-
Persian were indeed the same that eventually induced it to help the company in gaining 
admission to the TPC. The Turkish combine could be interpreted as a perfect example 
of the monopolist attitude that Greenway ascribed to Deterding and that upset London, 
whose worries about the prospects of an oil industry dominated by a handful of 
corporations, none of them British, became an important determinants of the final 
decision. Besides, APOC’s entrance in the TPC would have allowed London to further 
establish its presence in the Persian Gulf, put a check on foreign encroachment, and 
ultimately enjoy greater control and authority in an area that the Foreign Office 
considered – and wanted to maintain for the foreseeable future – of exclusive British 
influence.  
The British government therefore saved APOC twice: first by guaranteeing the 
company a secure outlet for its heavy oils, then by helping it not to be cut off from the 
development of the Ottoman oil fields. In fact, the two objectives were achieved 
practically at the same time. In mid-February 1914, the British cabinet informally 
consented to the Admiralty’s signing of the agreement with the Anglo-Persian. On 
March 12, a committee was appointed to draft the official contract. A week later, on 
March 19, the representatives of the various parties involved in the creation TPC (the 
British and the German governments, the National Bank of Turkey, the Deutsche Bank, 
and the Royal Dutch) sat together at the British Foreign Office with the directors of the 
Anglo-Persian to reach a compromise on Mesopotamian oil. In fact, the meeting was 
only one of the final steps of a long negotiation process that saw the two imperial 
governments in London and Berlin as major actors. The discussion about the future 
composition of the TPC was slow and actually quite complex, but despite the initial 
advantage that Germany and the other non-English members of the Turkish syndicate 
enjoyed on the field, there was little that they could do to resist British pressures once 
Great Britain decided to throw its diplomatic weight on the issue. The German 
government, seeking to reconcile its interests with those of the British and establish a 
modus vivendi with the other European powers in the region, eventually accommodated 
London’s requests for increased participation294. The agreement signed in March at the 
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Foreign Office was still very general, lacking specific details about how the oil 
company would actually be run, but did set a couple of principles whose crucial 
importance in the development of the Middle Eastern oil industry would have been fully 
appreciated only a decade later, when they became the reason of a bitter international 
diplomatic dispute with the United States. The first concerned the proprietorship of the 
TPC, whose (relative) majority of shares was now to be held by the all-British group. 
This result was achieved by transferring the stock of Turkish National Bank, which 
accounted to fifty percent of total, to the Anglo-Persian. The Deutsch Bank and the 
Royal-Dutch would again split the rest. The problem was Gulbenkian, one of the 
original ‘founders’ of the NBT, who with the new configuration would have lost any 
right on the Mesopotamian oil. A solution was found by asking both APOC and the 
Royal-Dutch to each cede 2.5 percent of their shares to the Armenian oil broker. 
Gulbenkian, who would have entered the oil mythology as “Mr. Five Percent”, received 
in fact only the “beneficiary interests” of those bonds – i.e. he could enjoy the financial 
gains deriving from their possession but had not voting rights. The ownership of the 
future TPC would have then been divided as follow: 47.5 percent to the Anglo-Persian 
group, 22.5 percent to the Deterding and Samuel, 22.5 percent to the Deutsche Bank, 5 
percent to Gulbenkian.  
There was a second aspect on which all the parties involved agreed on: the 
necessity to limit, if not eliminate altogether, aggressive and harmful competition 
among themselves. Standard Oil’s commercial menace was big enough to convince 
European companies to use their resources to try to contain the expansion of the 
American giant, instead of hindering each other’s business. The “Foreign Office 
Agreement” signed in March therefore contained a so-called “self-denying clause”, 
through which the participants pledged not to become involved – either directly or 
indirectly – in the production of oil in the Ottoman Empire outside the common 
framework of the TPC. Independent actions by the signatories were allowed in Egypt, 
Kuwait, and in the “transferred territories” along the border with Persia, which were 
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expressly mentioned in the article, but not anywhere else in the country. The proviso 
was in fact already present in the 1912 original TPC agreement between the Turkish 
National Bank and the Deutsche Bank. It was reconfirmed and embraced in 1914, just 
before the war could bury any hope of its real application. Resurrected after the conflict, 
this self-imposed constraint would have become the centerpiece of the interwar oil 
politics, the single most important organizing principle around which the companies 
developed their maneuvers, eventually shaping the industrial development of the whole 
region.  
The negotiations on the TPC ran parallel to those that Great Britain and 
Germany undertook to settle the different, although closely related, dispute concerning 
the construction of the Baghdad Railway. The timing of the resolution of the two 
controversies leaves little doubt about their actual connection. A first understanding had 
been found in 1913, when it was established that the railroad would have stopped at 
Basra and that no extension to the Gulf coasts would have ever been planned without 
London’s consent. Formally, the accord was between the British government and 
Sublime Porte. Such conditions, one of which dictated for the presence of two British 
nationals on the board of the Baghdad railway company, could have however not been 
set without the approval also of the German government. Indeed, Germany’s official 
acceptance did not come much later. An Anglo-German agreement ratified those very 
same terms on June 15, 1914, less than three months after the two countries had found a 
compromise on the future structure of the TPC at the Foreign Office. Two days after, on 
June 17, 1914, the parliamentary debate on the proposed participation of the British 
government in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company took place in London. Churchill, who 
had introduced the measure not as a part of a financial bill but in a policy paper, won the 
approval of the legislative body on the acquisition of the fifty-one percent of the 
company’s shares.  
In a matter of months, Great Britain had not only taken control of a private 
enterprise through the very usual means of direct participation in its ownership but also 
secured for the national government a say in the development of the oil industry both in 
Persia and in the Ottoman Empire, through APOC’s entrance in the TPC. The missing 
piece of this regional plan of political and economical control was the actual concession 
for the ottoman territories around Baghdad and Mosul. The only oil rights the TPC 
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could claim were indeed those transferred to it by the Deutsche Bank in 1912 – i.e. the 
original exploration privileges granted to the Baghdad Railway Company by the 
Ottoman government, which had repeatedly contested their validity during the course of 
the first decade of the century and had never agreed on or sanctioned their reassignment. 
To shore up the shaky legal foundations of their joint enterprise, the British and German 
governments had petitioned the Sublime Porte to grant a new concession to the TPC 
soon after the signing of the Foreign Office Agreement. The Grand Vizier’s reply 
arrived at the British and German embassies in Constantinople on June 28, 1914 – about 
ten days after the decision of the British parliament to invest in the Anglo-Persian. The 
message announced the government’s consent to the new lease while leaving the 
definition of an actual contract to future discussions295. No talk, however, would have 
ever been held. On the very same day a young Slav nationalist named Gavrilo Princip 
shot and killed the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand with his wife six hundred miles 
northwest of the Ottoman capital. The assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian 
throne in Sarajevo triggered a series of reactions that led straight to armed conflict in 
Europe. Less than a week after, on August 4, Great Britain sent a formal declaration of 
war to Germany. The conflict halted any prospect of collaboration between the two. As 
fighting raged in Europe, the situation surrounding the Turkish syndicate and its claim 
over the Mesopotamian oil were largely overshadowed by much more pressing war-
related concerns and considerations. A couple of months later, the entrance into WWI of 
the Ottoman Empire on the side of the Central Powers definitely compromised any 
hopes for a favorable conclusion to the common endeavor. The sough-after new 
concession for the TPC was never drafted.  
 
The intricate web of financial and political relationships behind the efforts to 
secure remunerative and territorially extensive concessions contracts in the Ottoman 
Empire mirrored the equally complex balance between the European powers in those 
years. The painstaking negotiations to define the terms of the railway and the mining 
contracts, which took place in London before than in Constantinople, revealed a 
situation in which the distinctions between private investors and official agents, 
between commercial aims and national policy, was not always clear-cut.   
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The creation of the Turkish Petroleum Company in 1912, on the wake of the 
successful operation in Persia, was a perfect example of this combination of interests, in 
which imperial motives mixed with, and often hid behind, financial and business agents. 
The enterprise, however, also indicated a new alertness about petroleum. The possible 
presence and production of hydrocarbons in the Middle East was now looked upon 
carefully, as oil gained importance both as naval fuel and as economic factor – one able 
to multiply investments and provide tremendous incentive for the development of an 
even more structured and integrated oil industry. 
Intra-European rivalries were however not the only problem interfering with a 
stable and orderly development of the Ottoman resources and the implementation of 
construction projects so needed by the country. Another element risked disrupting the 
precarious equilibrium that the European courtiers were trying to maintain around the 
Eastern Question: the arrival of American capitalist and diplomats, who entered the 
game exactly in those years and attempted to rebalance the power relations in 
Constantinople.  
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3.2 The Americans: Nosing into the Business, Attempting Control, and Finding 
Competition 
 
The war interrupted a coordinated and almost successful scheme by the main 
European oil companies to lay hands on the Ottoman oil and, more broadly, to divide up 
the Middle Eastern petroleum resources among them – a project carried out with the 
support and active collaboration of the European powers, interested in putting forward 
their own territorial interests in the region. One of the main purposes of the British, 
German, and Dutch oil companies’ rush to secure exclusive access to the desolate 
Mesopotamian lands was to defuse the menace of an ever-growing Standard Oil 
company, whose rapacious business practices had already put the European businesses 
on the defensive in multiple occasions. Seeking (and possibly obtaining) new 
concessions in the Middle East offered to them a double opportunity: on the one hand, 
to deny the giant Rockefeller’s group a opportunity of further expansion; on the other, 
to gather enough resources themselves to, if not fight back, at least hold their ground in 
possible future commercial wars against the American oil superpower. The realization 
of the European companies’ final objective – a (mutually beneficial) stabilization and 
pacification the continental market – would have unmistakably passed through the 
control of the Middle Eastern production. From this perspective, the attempt to keep the 
region out of Standard’s reach before the war was a complete success. In fact, this 
achievement may have been more the result of the American lackadaisical approach 
than the European business acumen. Although the shadow of Rockefeller’s company 
always loomed over the negotiations, its threat never materialized. The company did not 
try to participate to the production of Middle Eastern oil and, in reality, did not even 
seem interested in doing so. Standard’s oil scout, John Worthington, did visit the area, 
but not before 1910, when the European oil interests had already encroached upon it. 
His report about the Mesopotamian oil resources was, of course, positive, but no direct 
attempt to acquire them came from it. This conduct was partly a reflection of the more 
general passive, detached attitude that the United States had towards the region. For 
Great Britain, Germany, Russia, and France, as well as Italy and, of course Austria-
Hungary, the “Eastern Question” had been, and still was, a constant reason of interest 
and serious concern, which led to decades (in fact: more than a century) of diplomatic 
jostling and military involvement. By the early twentieth century, the main European 
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powers and namely Great Britain, Germany, Russia, and France, had all tried, with 
various degree of success, to extend their influence in the Persian and in the Ottoman 
Empire and participate in the imperial land-grabbing game in the area. The United 
States, on the other side, was thousands of miles away from the Middle East and the 
strategic anxieties it generated, both literally and figuratively. While London worried 
about presiding over every land and sea transit routes to India and Moscow about 
guarding its southeastern borders, Washington was busy finding a way to cut through 
Panama to strengthen its hold over the rest of the western hemisphere, signaling 
profoundly different regional priorities.  
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States did have interests in 
the Ottoman Empire, as well as in Persia and Egypt, and, as every other country, 
worked to maintain and possibly expand them. Those were however mainly related to 
the many American religious, philanthropic, and educational initiatives that targeted the 
Middle East since the early nineteenth century. Commercial matters were important, 
too, and increasingly so from the 1890s on, but their scale and scope remained inferior 
to those boasted by the European powers involved in the region296. There were, overall, 
no specific strategic aims for the United States there at the turn of the century. This 
proved true, for example, in 1897-98, when both McKinley and Roosevelt – whose 
distain for the decadent Ottoman Empire was absolute – chose not to deploy US Navy’s 
ships in the Mediterranean following the Armenian Massacres of the mid-1890297. In 
showing its military strength, the U.S. would have not only joined the other European 
powers in their attempt to pressure the Sultan into stopping the onslaught but also 
offered the Ottoman government a convincing reason to provide compensation for the 
loss of American properties. Washington refused to take up the issue. Differently from 
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other circumstances, the classic tools of the American gunboat diplomacy were not 
used. The events – and opportunities – in the Caribbean were more important. First the 
fight against Spain, then the subduing of the Filipino resistance, absorbed all 
Washington’s resources. Soon after, it would have been the correction of the “chronic 
wrongdoings” in the region to deserve the administration’s full attention. In fact, in 
1905-1906, the U.S. did get involved in a controversy in the Mediterranean, after 
Germany repeatedly challenged France’s authority over Morocco. Roosevelt acted as a 
mediator between the two sides, leading a situation that risked spiraling out of control to 
a peaceful resolution. The president’s decision to enter the dispute was dictated more by 
his desire to enhance the country’s international status (and to neutralize the threat of an 
unnecessary and destabilizing clash between two European powers) than by any 
territorial or commercial aim that the U.S. could have ever had at stake in the issue.  
The United States’ first encounter with the Ottoman Empire dated back to the 
early years of the Republic, when American ships in the Mediterranean (now without 
the British military protection) came under repeated attack from North African pirates. 
Washington met these actions with determination, sending its navy to fight against the 
Barbary States – a collection of loosely controlled territories along the North African 
coasts, roughly corresponding to today’s Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia, which were at the 
time all under Constantinople’s authority, plus Morocco, the independent kingdom 
where the United States opened its very first consular post in the Arab world. After two 
wars and more than two decades of diplomatic and armed confrontation, the pirates’ 
threat eventually began to decline in the 1820s. In the following years and until at least 
the second half of the century, however, despite the growth of American trade with the 
region, the relationship between Washington and the Ottoman Empire remained 
essentially “nonpolitical”. Adhering to a strict policy of nonintervention and neutrality, 
the U.S. diplomatic missions were slow to develop into an official structure of 
representation and even slower to coherently project and promote a specific national 
interest in the area. Indeed, American diplomats in the Middle East during the 
nineteenth century were often neither diplomats nor American298.  
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U.S. consulates usually developed out of private trading houses, like the one 
opened by David Offley in 1811, which eventually became the first consular post in the 
Ottoman Empire. Offley was a Philadelphian Quaker, who arrived in the eastern 
Mediterranean port of Smyrna to represent his trading firm and expand his business. He 
spent the following years fighting against the high custom duties imposed to American 
goods, before being formally appointed as consular agent by Washington in 1823. The 
United States, however, did not establish formal diplomatic relations with the Sublime 
Porte until 1831, when David Porter was sent to the Middle East and appointed as first 
chargé d’affaires in Constantinople299. It was therefore only one year later, in 1832, that 
Offley assumed the title of consul for the post in Smyrna. Together with John Porter 
Brown, nephew of the head’s legation in Constantinople, dragoman and soon to be 
named consul there, Offley became the only American officer of that rank to actually be 
a U.S. citizen300. Indeed, although new consular posts were being opened in the 
northeastern part of the Ottoman Empire (where the presence of Armenians and other 
Catholic minorities was concentrated), as well as in Aleppo, Beirut, Alexandria, and 
Cairo, no American officials knowledgeable enough in Arabic (and sufficiently well-
disposed) to be dispatched to those outposts were found. The newly appointed U.S. 
representatives were citizens of other countries, specifically Europeans, who had been 
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in the region long enough to know the local language and customs. It was not an 
entirely unusual practice, as Washington had to appoint non-Americans in many other 
consular stations around the world in the early years of the Republic. Once combined 
with the list of locations where Washington chose to appoint a representative, however, 
a more precise picture about how limitedness and selectivity of the American 
diplomatic engagement with the region emerges. U.S. missions were only in 
Mediterranean ports and/or in areas of high missionary activity. In Egypt, for example, 
which was formally under Constantinople’s authority but soon to become a de facto 
British protectorate, American consular activities developed relatively fast. The country 
was a large cotton producer, as well as one of the main access points to the Middle 
Eastern market and a crucial transit zone towards the Far East. The first U.S. consul in 
the country was an Englishmen, John Gliddon, appointed in the early 1830s to operate – 
not by chance – from Alexandria, Egyptian biggest port301. For the following two 
decades, indeed, American official representation in Egypt remained a (British) family 
matter:  John’s son, George Robbins Gliddon, became vice-consul at Cairo, while his 
son-in-law, the Scottish Alexander Todd, eventually took his place in Alexandria in the 
1840s. The first American born-consul to the country, named Daniel Smith McCauley, 
was appointed only in 1849. Despite the long wait, and the informality and nepotism 
that characterized the American Foreign Service in the country, Washington’s official 
ties with this coastal section of the Ottoman Empire were much stronger than those with 
other, more inner areas. One of them was the territory corresponding to today’s Iraq, 
where the U.S. had no representative and, apparently, no intention to have one. The first 
American consul to ever be appointed to Baghdad was John Henry Haynes, who took 
office more than half a century later his fellow U.S. consuls in Constantinople, Cairo, 
or Jerusalem. He arrived indeed to the Iraqi capital only in 1889, at a time when the 
British – who had opened their legation there almost a century earlier – were already 
battling with Germany for control over the area. Worse, Haynes was everything but a 
diplomat and his new position had very little to do with the advancement of American 
interests. He was an archeologist, today remembered as one of the pioneer of 
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archeological photography, who had spent years travelling the Middle East and who 
though that the title of consul would have facilitated his next mission in Mesopotamia 
as one of the leading members of an archeological expedition organized by the 
Babylonian Exploration Fund at the University of Pennsylvania. He thus pressured an 
uninterested Congress into sending him to Baghdad as official representative, so that he 
could carry on the work he was really interested on: the excavation of the old Sumerian 
city of Nippur. The U.S. government did accept the request, but with a catch: Haynes 
was to have no pay, since the title of consul would have been mostly symbolic and he 
would have not done any actual consular or diplomatic activity302.  
If in the Ottoman provinces the American official presence was limited, in other 
Middle Eastern territories it was even scarcer. In the central and inner regions of the 
Arabian Peninsula – an area larger that France, Spain, Germany, Italy, and the United 
Kingdom combined – Washington had no representatives. The absence in this case was 
understandable, since what would later become part the Saudi Kingdom was nothing 
else than collection of desolate lands, roamed by Bedouins and inhabited by ancient 
Arab tribes, where very few westerners dared to venture. The problem is that 
Washington did not seem to find anything interesting along the coasts, either. The next 
American post south of Baghdad was in fact on the sea, and specifically in Muscat, 
Oman, a whopping 2,000 kilometers away from the Iraqi capital. Yet despite being the 
only one in the entire Peninsula, the Muscatian station remained of marginal 
importance. Opened as early as 1838, it was “infrequently manned” and almost 
forgotten until 1880, when it was officially turned into a consulate303. Even then, its 
fortunes did not exactly improve: the office was disbanded in 1915 (and not reopened 
until 1971). The short-lived Omani experiment was the only attempt that the U.S. 
government made to have American envoys along the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Aden. 
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In the seaside territories south and north of the sultanate, Washington lacked any kind of 
diplomatic footing – and would have lacked it for decades. The Trucial Sheikdoms 
(today’s United Arab Emirates) were British protectorates and saw the establishment of 
an official American diplomatic presence only in the 1970s. Similarly, formal relations 
with both Qatar and Bahrain would have been set up only after the two territories 
reached their independence, in the second half of the twentieth century.   
The situation was relatively better in the northeast-neighboring Kingdom of 
Persia. The United States had had the first diplomatic contact with the country, at the 
time ruled by Qajar dynasty, back in the 1850s. It would have taken however another 
thirty years for an official American legation to find its way to Teheran. The first U.S. 
representative to move to the Persian capital was Samuel Greene Wheeler Benjamin, 
who presented his credentials as chargé d’affaires and consul general to the Shah only in 
1883. As in other locations, the decision to open a diplomatic mission had nothing to do 
with the advancement of specific territorial or commercial interests. It was the presence 
of American missionaries in the country that prompted the U.S. Congress to act. There 
were about sixty professing Christians living in Persia in the early 1880s who had 
travelled from the United States. The number may seem small, but once put into 
perspective it is not. Compared to those of other countries, the American group was the 
largest. As Goode put it, by the time Benjamin arrived in Teheran, the United States had 
sent more missionaries in Persia than all other nations combined304.  
Expressing its concerns for the pilgrims’ safety and well being, Washington had 
then finally decided to dispatch an agent in Teheran. The religious dimension (and 
objective) of the American mission was so paramount that the first choice for the job 
was, in fact, an actual missionary: Reverend Henry H. Jessup, who was active (and well 
known) in Syria. His refusal made way for Benjamin, who was a journalist and was 
himself born from missionary parents305.  
Throughout the nineteenth century, the protection of American lives and 
properties remained the main concern of U.S. representatives throughout the region. 
Consular-related matters were exactly what busied (and troubled) U.S authorities the 
most, as an ever-growing number of American merchants, philanthropists, explorers and 
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adventures went to tour the Middle East. Artists and writers, too, began roaming the 
southern half of the Mediterranean, bringing to an enthusiastic public fascinating tales 
and images about the Holy Land and the culture of the people living in the area. 
Nobody, however, did more to shape Americans’ perception of those distant territories 
than the missionaries themselves, who continued to be the most populous group among 
American expatriates in the Middle East306.  
Pilgrims and missionaries had begun travelling from the United States to the 
“Bible lands” as early as 1810s. By the beginning of the twentieth century, their 
presence had grown immensely and produced an extensive and well-structured network 
of places of worships, schools, and associations. In 1900, there were a total of about 250 
missionary stations that managed over 700 schools with more than 40,000 students in 
the territories of the Ottoman Empire (including Egypt) and Persia. This was without 
accounting for hospitals and churches307. Their Christian proselytism within the Middle 
East was tolerated, if not respected, thanks also to their civic engagement and their 
commitment towards the overall betterment of their host society. Many American 
missionaries were not only devoted preachers and evangelists but also physicians and 
educators, carrying out a caring and much-needed service for their communities. The 
fact that they were not persecuted and could in fact live and work freely did not mean, 
however, that their presence in the Middle East was unproblematic. First, as their 
number and activities grew, so did their visibility within the Muslim society, with 
inevitable frictions between their work – whose ultimate goal remained the Muslims’ 
conversion – and the traditionalist stance of the local authority. The characteristic 
paranoia about foreign influence and intrusion, whose tide rose rapidly in 
Constantinople at the turn of the century, contributed to negatively affect the daily life 
of American missionaries, placing limits and restrictions to their operations that 
Washington’s official representatives in the region constantly rejected on the basis of 
U.S. nationality. Indeed, similarly to the European nationals, American citizens living in 
the Ottoman Empire had a privileged status thanks to the capitulations imposed on the 
Sublime Porte with the Turkish-American Treaty of 1830. The various legal and 
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financial exemptions granted to foreigners remained a source of resentment throughout 
the years and, even when not directly responsible for the unwanted attention of local 
officials, they nonetheless set the stage for multiple conflicts between the ‘rights’ of the 
Americans living in the country and local regulations. U.S. diplomats increasingly 
busied themselves with denouncing the erosion of American privileges and fighting the 
harassment – both targeted and occasional – towards their nationals.  
The influx of American missionaries into the Middle East at the end of the 
nineteenth century turned out to be problematic also in another respect, although the 
adverse effects of their presence and commitment were visible only in hindsight. 
Besides determining much of Washington’s consular activity in the region, they also 
were a crucial factor in shaping the perception of an Ottoman – and more broadly: Islam 
– society that they were, in fact, trying to change. American missionaries became a 
relatively important interest group, able to convey powerful representations of the 
Middle East, its customs, and its traditions. The image that they presented, which 
emerged from a specific cultural background defined by the principles of their own, 
self-proclaimed, proselytizing and civilizing mission, was not flattering – and it is 
difficult to see how it could have been otherwise. As many other Europeans, Americans 
evangelists saw the Ottoman civilization as decadent and inherently backward. The 
political crisis of the Empire was the inevitable consequence of an underdeveloped 
society that, even when pushed and prodded by more advanced and (religiously) 
righteous western societies, refused to change and actually evolve – much to the 
frustration and disillusionment of the American missionaries. The numerous reports of 
violence against the Armenians, in particular, represented a major factor in shaping the 
negative reputation of the Ottomans. This view contributed to greatly reinforce and 
fixate western Orientalist vision, which informed both the European and American 
perception of the region during the twentieth century. Washington’s knowledge of the 
area that, at the time, was known as “the Near East” remained for decades limited and 
partial, imbued by a sort of moral judgment that worsened the position of the Islamic 
society in the eyes of the foreign observer.  
The lack of appropriate knowledge about “the other” was, in fact, reciprocal. 
Accounts from the early twentieth century reveal that Middle Eastern authorities had 
little if not no familiarity at all with the United States. Among those who had very scant 
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information about the American state there seemed to be also the Persian Shah. About 
two decades later, in 1901, the United States finally appointed its first minister 
plenipotentiary to the country: Lloyd Carpenter Griscom. Upon meeting the Persian 
authorities, the Shah first dubiously asked him about the presence of rivers and plains in 
the United States, and then said that he intended to pay a visit to Roosevelt – travelling 
to Washington by caravan308.  
This distance, ideal and real, between the United States and the Middle East had 
also, and paradoxically, positive implications for the relationship between the American 
government and those in the region. The fact that Washington had little presence and 
limited official activity in the Ottoman Empire, as well as in Persia, Egypt and 
elsewhere, revealed a narrowness of aims that was somewhat reassuring for Middle 
Eastern authorities. Compared to the envoys of the European countries, which had long 
been trying to manipulate them and control both them and their territories, American 
officials and businessmen appeared more straightforward, less interested in meddling 
with their domestic affairs. The risk of political intrusion and territorial encroachment 
seemed to be indeed much lower in dealing with the Americans – a consideration that 
contributed to the fostering of relations between the two sides. The relatively more 
positive characterization of U.S. citizens and representatives helped also to sustain the 
expansion of the country’s commerce in the region. In the second part of the nineteenth 
century, U.S. trade with the Ottoman and the Persian territories was minimal. American 
merchants imported mainly licorice roots and rugs, together with other items such as 
dried fruits, nuts, and raw wool309. The first signs of change began to appear – at least in 
Washington’s attitude – at the beginning of the century, when under the push of new, 
outward-looking Secretaries of State the United States began to look more effectively 
for markets abroad and new avenues of commerce, even in the Middle East. First John 
Hay (1898-1905), then Elihu Root (1905-1909) and Philander C. Knox (1909-1913) 
restructured and reoriented U.S. foreign policy in accordance with the objectives and 
expectations of Roosevelt and Taft, two presidents whose administrations they 
eventually contributed to define. Hay, Root, and Knox not only oversaw a shift in policy 
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but also the evolution of the instruments of its implementation. The structure and 
composition of the Department of State changed substantially in the first decade of the 
century: its internal organization was rationalized; its network of consular and 
diplomatic posts was expanded; its personnel were improved, both in quantity and 
quality.  
Recounting the time in which Hay took office, the historian Tyler Dennett 
described the Department as «small and relatively private affair» with a workforce 
composed of few laborers and a staff of about sixty people, of whom only about a tenth 
was actually doing some job. «It was an antiquated, feeble organization, enslaved by 
precedents and routine inherited from another century, remote to the public gaze and 
indifferent to it. The typewriter was viewed as a necessary evil and the telephone was an 
instrument of last resort»310. The number of employees identified by Dennett, who was 
writing in the 1930s, matches pretty well with official figure provided nowadays by the 
U.S. Office of Historian, which states that a total of eighty-two people working for the 
Department in 1898. They were what would have later been called domestic/civil 
servants, i.e. State’s employees working in Washington DC or within the United States. 
In a little more than a decade, their number would have almost tripled, surpassing two 
hundred and thirty by 1910. As for the members of the diplomatic service (one of the 
two groups of people, together with those belonging to the consular service, serving for 
the Department abroad), they alone grew by thirty percent between 1900 and 1910 
(from 93 to 121). The increase in the Department’s annual spending during the same 
period was more than forty percent (from $3.4 million to $4.9 million). In the Middle 
East, in particular, the structure of official representation was strengthened through the 
establishment of new posts and the elevation of the rank of U.S. envoys to match the 
prestige and importance – at least formally – of those of the other European powers. At 
least four new American agencies were opened in the Ottoman Empire by the end of the 
decade, bringing to the number of those directly under the jurisdiction of the consulate-
general at Constantinople to fourteen311. The American legation in the capital was 
actually raised to embassy status in 1906, when Washington decided it was time to have 
its first representative with the rank of Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. John G. A. 
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Leishman, who had been envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in 
Constantinople since 1900, presented his new credentials in October and then proceeded 
to purchase – using his personal funds – the building where the American mission was 
staying. Palazzo Corpi, a classical and distinctive edifice designed by an Italian architect 
for a fellow countryman and shipbuilder and realized with woods and marble imported 
directly from Italy, became the second building outside the United States to be owned 
by the federal government. The other one was the residence of the American legation at 
Tangier, which however had been acquired as a gift from the Sultan of Morocco in the 
1820s. The property in Constantinople, instead, was the first to have been actually 
bought – and the only one to have been paid for with money won playing poker312. The 
American legation in Teheran, too, was elevated to a superior rank at the beginning of 
the century, with the chief of mission’s official title going from minister resident to 
envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary. An American diplomatic service 
member with the rank of ambassador, however, would have not been seen in Teheran 
until after the Second World War.  
Change took place not only in the formal structure and composition of the 
Department but also in its internal working organization. The progressive and reformist 
furor of the earlier twentieth century did not spare one of the most important 
administrative units of the federal bureaucracy. Professionalization became a must 
rather than a matter of choice. Roosevelt tried to eradicate the spoils system that defined 
the access to departmental job, the internal promotions, and – above all – the 
distribution of foreign appointments. At the beginning of his second mandate Roosevelt, 
with the collaboration of his secretary of state Root, tried to implement a new merit 
system based on the successful completion of competitive examinations and the 
possession of specific qualifications to obtain a position in the Department and climb 
the career ladder. The new criteria were confirmed and actually made more stringent by 
Taft, which oversaw also the most important rationalization of duties and 
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responsibilities to date within the Department. Tasks were finally distributed to a series 
of newly created bureaus with jurisdiction over specific issues and/or geographical 
regions. Four geographical divisions were established in 1909 to divide up the globe in 
just as much macro-areas: Western Europe, Near East, Far East, and Latin America313. 
The formation of the Bureau of Near Eastern affairs (NEA) did not, per se, signal the 
emergence of any particular focus on the Ottoman or Persian Empires. The region under 
its jurisdiction was so large that seemed to defy the very idea of subject and area 
specialization. Besides the Middle East, it included Central, Southern and Eastern 
Europe, thus combining together countries as different as Germany, Italy, Russia, 
Austro-Hungary, Serbia, Greece, Egypt, Turkey, Persia, and even Abyssinia314. As 
Michael B. Oren has noted, moreover, «none of the NEA’s original staff could speak a 
Middle Eastern language or product a contemporary map of the area»315.  
The creation of such an administrative division was nonetheless a substantial 
improvement. It reflected a different sensibility about the region as a whole and its 
commercial opportunities316. This new awareness about the necessity to manage foreign 
affairs in a different manner in order to assist more effectively any private or public 
interest that may have arisen abroad was promoted directly from the Taft 
administration, whose approach to diplomacy was pragmatic and business-minded317. 
Both the president and his Secretary of state, Knox, saw U.S. representatives abroad as 
instruments to facilitate and expand American financial activities abroad. Diplomacy’s 
role was closely connected with the promotion of American trade and therefore with the 
providing of assistance to U.S. merchants and entrepreneurs. Private capital was, in this 
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regard, as valuable as anything else in opening up new markets and bridging 
connections with countries with whom Washington had previously had little dealing318.  
The administration’s activities in Asia and especially in Latin American, 
characterized by the willingness to «all proper support to every legitimate and 
beneficial American enterprise abroad», won Taft’s foreign policy the familiar label of 
“dollar diplomacy”319. In the Middle East, too, the Department of State tried to 
reproduce similar dynamics, taking up opportunities to expand American presence in 
Ottoman territories. The chance to reverse Washington’s previous indifference came 
thanks to the work and disposition of Colby Mitchell Chester, admiral of the U.S. Navy 
and veteran of both the Civil War and the Spanish-American War, who decided to 
launch into a grandiose as challenging venture in the Middle East once retired. The 
“Chester Project”, as the business endeavor came to be known, involved the 
construction of a more than 1,200-mile railway system crisscrossing the country. The 
plan contemplated the realization of two trunk lines: one going from Samsun, on the 
Black Sea, southeast to stop in Sulaimani, close to Persian border; the other starting 
from the Syrian Mediterranean coast and running northeast through Aleppo to reach 
Bitlis and Van, two old Armenian cities (today with a Kurdish majority) in the eastern 
part of Anatolia. The two tracks would have intersected at Diyarbakır, in southeastern 
Turkey. The first American to come up with the idea of developing a railway project in 
the Ottoman Empire seems to actually have been the son of the president of an 
American railway supply firm in 1906, after a trip in Syria and Turkey. The man was C. 
Arthur Moore Jr. and the name of the company Manning, Maxwell, and Moore. The 
initial plan was to build a much smaller section, connecting the Mediterranean coast 
with the inner part of the country. What got the Admiral involved in the project was his 
own son, Colby Mitchell Chester Jr., who was also both Moore Jr.’s brother-in-law and 
the treasurer of the family company. Chester Jr. asked his father for assistance as soon 
as he learned about the possibility of investing in the Ottoman Empire. He then went on 
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to enlist the help of another member of the family: the Commander Arthur Chester, his 
brother and the Admiral’s other son.  
Details on exchanges between them are very scarce, but it is not difficult to see 
why they both would have wanted the elder Chester to actively take part in the venture. 
The sexagenarian Admiral not only had a certain status in Washington (he acted as 
Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Observatory from 1902 to 1906), but also a direct 
experience with the Ottoman Empire and its rulers. He had already met the Sultan 
Abdul Hamid at the beginning of the century, entertaining a very amicable meeting with 
him during an otherwise particularly delicate situation. Chester arrived for the first time 
in in Constantinople in 1900, as Captain of the USS Kentucky – the newest, largest, and 
more powerful pre-dreadnought vessels of the U.S. Navy to date. The battleship, 
commissioned just a few months before, was officially en route to the Far East to join 
the Asiatic Fleet. There was no stop scheduled in Turkey but, according the American 
Chargé d’Affaires in Constantinople – the same Lloyd C. Griscom who would have 
soon been sent to Teheran as minister plenipotentiary –, it was he himself who wrote to 
John Hay in Washington and asked him, in turn, to persuade the Secretary of the Navy 
to change the itinerary of the USS Kentucky. Griscom’s idea was to use the coincidental 
passage of the imposing battleship to pressure (in fact, to scare) the Sultan into paying 
reparations for the properties the American missionaries lost during the anti-Armenian 
raids in the mid-1890s320.  
At the time of the events, the Sublime Porte had refused to pay any kind of 
indemnity. The administration had decided to not to publicly pursue the issue and 
refrained from exercising any form of gunboat diplomacy, but had continued to expect 
some form of compensation. Frustrated by the Sultan uncooperative attitude, the 
American had stepped up the pressure at the turn of the century. At that point Abdul 
Hamid, willing to avoid the embarrassment of being forced to walk back from his 
previous stance, started looking for some of private, «indirect payment method»321. 
Griscom wrote in his memoirs that he had proposed him the purchase of an American 
cruiser for an increased price, as a discrete way to channel back money to Washington 
while saving the appearances. The menacing presence of the battleship was to show 
exactly of how easy would have been for Washington to resort to coercion, if only 
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wanted, thus pushing the Sultan into taking the deal and sign the contract. Chester 
apparently took up the role perfectly, sailing into the Turkish harbor of Smyrna with 
«decks cleared for action», ready to fire its oversized thirteen-inch guns, and arriving so 
close to the seawall that the inhabitants started to flee in panic of an imminent 
bombing322.   
The money arrived in Washington, eventually, but not in the time and manner 
originally envisioned by Griscom. The American diplomat recalled in his manuscript 
that the Abdul Hamid did not really bow to the direct threat and signed the contract only 
weeks later, at the end of December, after the USS Kentucky had left Turkey. The 
official documents – and among them, the telegrams sent to Washington from 
Constantinople by Griscom himself – tell a slightly different story, one in which the 
battleship’s trick seems to have worked even less. The Department of State continued 
indeed to complain privately with the American envoys about the Sultan’s stubborn 
refusal to offer compensation for months after Chester’s visit. In February 1901, Hay 
took care to specify that the President himself had requested the legation to «insist upon 
immediate payment» from Constantinople323. In June 1901, Abdul Hamid finally 
deposited about 20,000 pounds sterling to the credit of John G.A. Leishman, the new 
American Minister Plenipotentiary, in the Imperial Ottoman Bank324. No reference to 
any direct connection between the payment of the indemnity and the purchase of 
American vessels, let alone the signing of a contract by the Sultan, was made in the 
cables discussing any of these developments with Washington.  
What the two versions have in common remains the account of the meeting 
between Chester and Abdul Hamid, described as a real success both in Griscom’s 
memories and in his private communication with the State Department. Upon the arrival 
of the USS Kentucky, the Sultan, sensing the situation, had arranged for an official 
reception to welcome Chester and his crew. The Ottoman ruled transformed the evening 
in a sort of celebration of friendship between the Constantinople and Washington, 
showing his positive disposition towards the United States and signaling his interest in 
expanding the commerce and the investments between the two countries – a message 
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that apparently resonated both in Chester’s ears and in Washington, as to become the 
reason of the Admiral’s next encounter with the Ottoman authorities.  
In 1908, Chester would have come back to Constantinople, this time on an 
official mission to investigate any new commercial opportunities in the Empire. Again, 
details about timing of his visit, as well as the events surrounding it, are conflicting. The 
Admiral had retired from active service in 1906 and had been since then on special duty 
in the Bureau of the Equipment, which among its responsibilities had also the 
overseeing of the U.S. Navy coal supply. Since 1905, following an internal 
reorganization, the Bureau had to require for «all coal for steamers' and ships' use» and 
have charge of the «naval coal depots and naval coaling stations within the continental 
limits of the United States, outside of navy yards and naval stations»325. Records 
confirm that already in 1907 the U.S. government had designed (following the 
suggestion of the American National Geographic Society) the Admiral as U.S 
representative at the Ninth International Conference of Geographers, to be held in 
Geneva from July 27 to August 6, 1908326. He was then named also as delegate at the 
Eleventh International Congress of Navigation, which would have taken placed in Saint 
Petersburg just about month before, from May 31 to June 7, 1908. Chester duly attended 
both327. At the Swiss convention, the Admiral (who delivered a speech on “The Physical 
Geography of the Sea”) was accompanied by a few other notable U.S. experts and 
researchers. Among them, in particular, there was David T. Day: the United States 
Geological Survey (USGS) geologist who had just submitted to Roosevelt’s 
Conservation Commission the first tragic estimate about the future of American oil 
supply. Day presented a paper exactly on “The Distribution of the Petroleums (cit.) of 
the World”.  
It is impossible to say whether Chester was familiar with the subject of 
petroleum at that time, as well as to know his views on the much-debated issue of 
‘conservation’ of natural resources. Similarly, there is no evidence that the two weeks 
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spent in Geneva had any influence on the Admiral’s reasoning or business ambitions. In 
fact, it is not even clear if the Admiral and the geologist ever discussed these matters 
together – or if they even meet at all. The only confirmed piece of information is that 
Chester begun soon after to negotiate with the Ottoman authorities for what would have 
become one of the most (if not the most) contested Middle Eastern mining concessions 
ever assigned to western investors.  
According to Chester’s own account, which was written and circulated in the 
early 1920s, when the subject became (again) a major topic of debate within the 
administration, he began discussing the commercial agreement directly with the Sultan 
Abdul Hamid. He also claimed that he initiated his mission in 1908 after receiving 
authorization and support, via the Department of the Navy, from Roosevelt himself. He 
added that the Secretary of State Root, too, was aware of his trip and actually 
encouraged it. In fact, he stated, he idea of applying for a concession in Turkey came 
from a report that the U.S. consul in Syria had produced and transmitted to Washington 
in 1908. Chester said that his mission replicated the one entrusted a short time before to 
Admiral Lord Charles Beresford of the British Navy, which was sent with the sanction 
of the British Government to report on the possibility of increasing the British trade in 
the Far East. No reference to the self-enriching scheme of Moore and Chester himself 
was made.  
The same version was publicized in article published in 1922 on the popular 
magazine Current History328. It discussed the American oil claims in Turkey and 
chronicled the birth of the Chester concession. The author was Henry Woodhouse, a 
prolific writer who often appeared on Hearst's yellow press and who had recently 
penned a series of pamphlets and essays on petroleum and the post-WWI Anglo-
American controversy in Mesopotamia. Woodhouse wrote that the trip took place in 
May and June 1908 and that, while still in the United States the Chamber of Commerce 
and the Board of Trade and Transportation of New York furnished the Admiral with a 
commission, asking him to report on any matters of interest to the American commerce. 
He also specified that Chester had Washington’s full support since the very beginning, 
repeating the claim about Roosevelt’s personal involvement and stating that, before 
leaving, the Admiral had requested and obtained the sanction of the Secretary of State 
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Root. Woodhouse declared that the «undertaking originated in the State Department 
itself», since the project was based on the report of an American consul in the Middle 
East. This time, however, he cited the one in Alexandretta and not in Aleppo. «It is a 
matter of record », he added, «that not only was the syndicate assured of such support 
from the American Government, but that in the ensuing negotiations no attempt to open 
up trade for American citizens in a foreign country ever received more cordial and 
helpful co-operation from the Federal Government than that Chester group»329.  
Woodhouse should have been well informed, since in those years he was also 
Chester’s business partner. After the conflict he had actually helped the Admiral 
forming a new syndicate, in a renewed attempt to secure the concession in 
Mesopotamia. Both Woodhouse and Chester had therefore a vested interest in 
presenting the story of the project as a long-standing government-sponsored – or, better: 
government-mandated – enterprise, with the aim of securing the assistance of the new 
administration, a form of official backing that was considered necessary if success was 
to be achieved. Indeed, when, in 1923, the Department of State tried to put together an 
official version of events, it found little in its internal files to back the Admiral and 
Woodhouse’s story. As proof of the President’s direct involvement, and interest, in the 
1908 trip to Constantinople, both had made reference to the decision to dispatch a 
portion of the U.S. fleet to Turkey, with the only instruction to take on board and carry 
to the United States ten Ottoman officers. The move was reported as an act of courtesy 
to Constantinople directly connected with the Admiral’s mission. The American 
battleships, however, docked at Smyrna only in 1909. The Department’s official 
compiling the report defined the compliment paid to the Sublime Porte as «an 
afterthought», which had been first suggested by Lewis Einstein (the American Chargé 
d'Affairs in Constantinople) to the Secretary of State after the Turkish authorities had 
planned to send a group of officers overseas330. No evidence of Roosevelt’s direct 
support was mentioned in the report. Similarly, no clear reference to the supposed report 
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of an American consul discussing possible concessions in the Ottoman Empire before 
Chester’s trip could be produced at the time.  
These discrepancies should not be surprising; especially once Woodhouse’s own 
personal story and dubious reputation are taken into account. Chester’s associated had 
indeed a fascinating and bizarre life, which somehow reflected the maneuvering and 
unscrupulousness permeating the oil politics and industry in those decades. His real 
name was Mario Terenzio Casalegno. He was an Italian, born in Turin in 1884, who 
traveled overseas in 1904 after having wandered throughout Europe. Once in the United 
States, he begun working as in the kitchen of a restaurant in Upstate New York and was 
soon accused, convicted, and jailed for the murder of a coworker. Upon his release, after 
4 years in prison, he wrote a few articles on the Baltimore Sun under the name of Henri 
Casalegno, posing as an Italian culinary artist331. He then changed subject and began 
focusing on aviation. Henry Woodhouse, as he now came to be called, quickly gained 
credit as an expert in the field. Thanks also to his newly acquired friend and powerful 
editor Robert J. Collier, who was also the president of the Aero Club of America, 
Woodhouse acquired a national reputation. He founded his own magazine – Flying – 
and actively participated to public debate during WWI as an aviation specialist. 
Meanwhile, concealing his previous conviction, he was also able to obtain the American 
citizenship in 1917332.  
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At the end of the war, a series of disputes with the other members of the Aero 
Club about the association’s administrative management brought him to court, where 
his past was finally exposed. The legal battle began in 1918 and lasted for years. The 
New York Times followed the process and reported on Woodhouse’s previous 
conviction, his name change, and his dubious naturalization as they emerged during the 
last proceeding, which took place in 1922333. The trial and the public disclosure of his 
past, however, did not stop his hustling. By the time the process was over, Woodhouse 
had already managed to reinvent his life once again, this time as oil expert and 
entrepreneur. In 1920, he began taking interest in the petroleum situation, looking for 
profitable opportunities abroad. It was at this time that he got closer to Chester, whom 
he had already met through the common passion for aviation. Their partnership 
eventually failed, but what did not change was Woodhouse’s attitude towards life. He 
remained extremely resourceful, continuing to show a limited deference to the truth. In 
the following decade, he went on to become what he is most known today for: a forger 
of historical documents. In the 1930s, he began collecting and trading antiques related 
to the early history of the country. Several of the items sold, it was soon discovered, 
were however contemporary counterfeits. Woodhouse specialized in replicating the 
signatures of the American presidents and managed to dupe a considerable number of 
people into buying historical documents he had forged himself.    
This is the background of the author of some of the most informative accounts 
on the early years of the Chester project. His writings would have indeed resurfaced 
later on, as bibliographical sources in the works of those historians who tried to 
reconstruct the story of the concession and analyze the American foreign oil policy. E. 
W. Chester, late twentieth-century American historian, relied heavily on Woodhouse’s 
1922 article to write about the activities of his namesake Admiral in Turkey. He 
reported, for example, Woodhouse’s statements about Chester’s mission, stating that the 
Admiral went in Turkey from the United States «in May and June of 1908»334. Yet 
Chester was still in New York on May 18, as reported by on of the city newspapers335. 
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The Admiral had just arrived there and was presumably passing through, getting ready 
to leave and reach Saint Petersburg before the start of his first conference as U.S. 
delegate, about ten days later. Until at least mid-June, therefore, Chester could not be 
anywhere near Constantinople. Woodhouse appears in the bibliography of one of 
Marian Kent’s books, too. She actually wrote that Chester applied for a railway 
concession (and not a mining one) for the first time at the very beginning of spring, 
even before the timeframe suggested by Woodhouse, in March 1908. The statement, 
which is not backed up by any direct reference, appears equally incorrect336. In mid-
March 1908, the Admiral was in Washington, where he gave a speech about the 
importance of the Navy while attending the 2nd Army Corps Association337. 
Furthermore, in the previous months Chester seemed very much focused on something 
completely different, namely airships. The Admiral was «one of the more enthusiastic 
balloonists, or “balloonatics”» in the country and, apart from planning to «navigate the 
air in his own balloon», was busy trying to convince the Department and the general 
public that the dirigibles were destined to become the “eye of the navy”, to be used as 
«an antidote for the submarine»338. W. Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, British 
administrators in Iraq after 1921 (when the country acquired a semi-independent status) 
and Land and Liaison officer for the Iraqi Petroleum Company in the 1930s, offers a 
third version about Chester’s trip to Constantinople. Longrigg was appointed Officer of 
the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, served in WWII, and went on to 
become a respected academic after the conflict. In the late 1950s, he wrote that Chester 
arrived in Constantinople as early as January 1908. He also added that by that time the 
Admiral had already received the commission from the Chamber of Commerce of New 
York. This combination of events is of course even more improbable, if only because 
Chester himself never presented it as possible. Woodhouse is also among the sources 
used by John DeNovo, probably the most authoritative American historian to have 
worked on the U.S. foreign oil policy of those years. DeNovo noted that the State 
Department in the 1920s considered Woodhouse a man of «questionable reputation». 
He avoided quoting him directly, but it is unclear whether he was actually aware of his 
                                                
336 She may have actually mixed up the years, since something similar to what she described as happening 
in March 1908 – Chester securing a railway and telephone concession – happened instead in March 1909.  
337 Admiral Chester Defends Navy, The New York Tribune, 14 March 1908.  
338 Ballon Craze in Gotham, The Green Bay Press-Gazette, 16 December 1907; Airship for the Navy, The 
Washington Post, October 29, 1907. 
	 171 
personal history, since the events that characterized his life are not mentioned or 
discussed at all339.  
DeNovo admitted that the available record left «some obvious questions 
unanswered» and remained vague on the Chester’s mission, simply stating that the 
Admiral arrived in Turkey in the «summer of 1908», after attending the conference in 
Geneva340. This is the version emerging from the Department of State’s files, which 
show no clear reference to the project before the fall of 1908. The «earliest data» on 
Chester’s trip in the official documents seem to be in a letter sent by Charles A. Moore, 
the Admiral’s original business partner, to Root on October 14, 1908341. In his message, 
Moore recalled to the Secretary of State that Chester had gone to Constantinople during 
the summer with the knowledge and consent of the Department, acting at the request of 
a series of American business organizations. He said that Chester had obtained a 
commission from both the New York and the Boston Chamber of Commerce – a 
statement as later repeated by Woodhouse – and that needed more time to complete his 
mission. The purpose of the message was indeed to ask Root to intercede with the 
Secretary of the Navy for an extension of the Admiral’s detail in the Ottoman Empire, 
which was granted a few days later.  
Moore gave no precise indication about the date of Chester’s arrival, but stated 
that the Admiral had attended both conferences in Europe, in early June and late July. 
DeNovo reported this aspect, but he also seemed to confirm one of Chester and 
Woodhouse’s claims, namely that the Admiral initiated the negotiation directly with the 
Sultan. He rather ambiguously wrote that the Admiral’s «original contacts were with 
Abdul Hamid», but that «after the revolution of 1908-1909, he had to negotiate with the 
Young Turks regime». It is therefore not immediately clear whether he was referring to 
the months before June 1908 (pre-revolution) or to the interval between August 1908 
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and April 1909 (when the Sultan was formally still in power but greatly weakened at the 
political level) as the period in which the “first contact“ between the Admiral and Abdul 
Hamid took place. Given the time frame of the events that he provided and the reference 
to Moore’s letter, it may make sense to think that he was simply referring to the latter. 
The exact month in which Chester brought up the issue with the Ottoman authorities is 
not just a matter of detail, as it changes the validity of the Americans’ claims. This is 
why Chester and Woodhouse after the War would have proposed, and stuck with, a 
different interpretation. In the early 1920s, when the international dispute over the 
ownership of Mesopotamian oilfields broke up, a reorganized Chester’s syndicate 
declared to be rightful possessor of the mining rights over the area by virtue of the fact 
that the Sultan Abdul Hamid had personally assigned the concession to the Admiral in 
1908. Woodhouse himself argued in the much-cited 1922 article that Chester had found 
an agreement with the Sultan before the outbreak of the Young Turk revolution on July 
of that year342. The Chester syndicate said that it was only because of Abdul Hamid’s 
ousting that the mining application had to be resubmitted and its formal (and final) 
approval got eventually delayed, thanks to the timely intervention and interference of 
other European competitors. In the 1930s, Woodhouse, acting as a managing director of 
the Chester’s syndicate after the death of the Admiral, was still writing letters to the 
directors of the Standard Oil, the Anglo-Persian, and the Dutch Shell, all involved in the 
development of new oilfields in the Persian Gulf, warning them against going forward 
without the consent and participation of the original owner of the concession. The entire 
region by that time was firmly in control of the oil majors and the chances of breaking 
their hold were basically non-existent. It is therefore possible that Woodhouse was just 
trying to extract some money as pecuniary compensation and was not really interested 
in entering the oil business. He went however as far as affirming the existence of 
specific historical records in the correspondence of the Admiral that proved the pre-
existing agreement between Chester and the Sultan. In his letter, he even reported the 
exact date in which the mining concession was supposedly assigned to Chester: June 
23rd, 1908343. The date is of course not a coincidence, since the revolution started just 
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few days later. Furthermore, in September, the Young Turks decided take the 
jurisdiction over the Mesopotamian mineral resources away from the Sultan’s 
prerogatives and transfer it to the Minister of Mines344. The move deprived Abdul 
Hamid of the authority to directly sell the concessions, which made useless any attempt 
to gain the concession (exclusively) from him. Having the sympathy of the Sultan (or 
simply paying him off) was not sufficient anymore; all the applicants now would have 
had to receive the public approval of the government.  
It is clear how admitting a “late” arrival of the Admiral in Constantinople would 
have forced the syndicate to tell a different story. The problem is that only way for 
Woodhouse’s version to hold somehow together was to imagine Chester as being able 
to be in Constantinople as some point between his two European conferences - i.e. to go 
from the United States to Russia and from Russia to Turkey in little more than three 
weeks, from the end of May to mid-June; successfully negotiate an agreement with the 
Sultan in a matter of days, while the political situation in the capital was already tense; 
leave Constantinople (just a few days before the country plunged into chaos), in order to 
go to Geneva to attend the second conference, which started at the end of July; then 
return once again in Turkey at the end of the summer of 1908 to continue the talks with 
the new government. 
Besides the letter that his Moore had sent to the Department, which saw Chester 
arriving in Constantinople only after July, and common sense (such an itinerary would 
have been a impressive tour de force for a sixty-five years old man at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, when commercial flights were not even an option), there is also at 
least another source that appears to disprove the Admiral’s (and Woodhouse’s) own 
version. In November 1908, a Washington Post’s special cable from Constantinople 
announced the recent arrival of the Admiral into the city. It stated that the Admiral and 
his wife were «now in Constantinople» and planned to spend the winter there. It did not 
mention any previous passage in Turkey and reported instead on Chester’s previous and 
current and activities. The newspaper wrote that the Admiral was working on a report 
for the Department of the Navy on «astronomical observatories». The Secretary of the 
Navy had indeed instructed Chester to obtain during his stay in Europe «certain 
information regarding matters of interest to the Navy Department», an information that 
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was passed to all the U.S. diplomatic officers in Europe in April 1908 in order to 
forewarn them and call upon them to render him all the necessary assistance345. No 
reference was made to any possible ongoing negotiation with the Ottoman government, 
which could well indicate that still in the fall of 1908 Chester had not yet taken up the 
issue with the Sublime Porte. What found instead large coverage in the report was the 
Admiral’s newfound interest in liquid and gaseous methods of propulsion. Indeed, the 
article was specifically meant to publicize Chester’s call for the introduction of gas 
engines on American battleships346. The Admiral admitted that he had been studying the 
latest developments in naval construction while in Europe, assessing the technical 
solutions already introduced by the other countries. He urged the United States to stop 
following Great Britain and take instead the lead in naval engineering. Most important 
was the change that he seemed to promote in naval construction and operations. As 
reported by the article, the Admiral explained that the only way to build better and more 
serviceable ship was by improving their propulsion system and not by trying to increase 
the displacement:  
«But we must realize that, in spite of the [steam] turbine, we 
have come to the point where steam power has reached practically its 
maximum of efficiency. As the consumption of fuel is augmented so 
greatly with increase of speed, we cannot extend the radius of action 
of our fleet, much more even if we do build larger ship. Thus it 
becomes evident that for any marked increase in the efficiency of the 
ship we must look to the engine. And in the face of what has been 
written and demonstrated by actual operation it cannot be gainsaid 
that the engine that will give the greatest efficiency is the explosive 
engine»347.  
 
After a summer in Europe, Chester seemed to have put aside his passion for 
airships and started focusing on naval fuel. It is clear that the Admiral left the United 
States in mid-1908 with various tasks to complete. Apart from the official 
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responsibilities that he had been assigned with by the Navy, he had received the 
mandate of a series of American commercial boards to explore possible commercial 
opportunities in the Middle East, as well as the authorization of the Department of State, 
which approved and supported the overall mission. Furthermore, Chester had his own 
business interests and those of his sons and his associates to take care of. Despite all the 
instances in which both the Admiral and Woodhouse repeated their version of the story, 
however, it is really difficult to believe that there was any contact with the Ottoman 
before – at least – the very last months of 1908.  
The historical sources are more precise about what happened next. Chester 
stayed in Constantinople over the winter of 1908 and entertained cordial relations with 
the new parliamentary regime, helped also by the good disposition of the American 
administration towards it. One of Chester’s two sons, the Commander Arthur Chester, 
who had retired from the Navy’s active duty even before the father (in 1905), joined 
him in the Ottoman capital to become the field representative and operative of their 
joint business venture. Again, contrary to what the Chester’s syndicate claimed after the 
War, it seems that the American investors counted on the Young Turks more than on 
the Sultan to open up the country to foreign investments. It is only after the deposition 
of Abdul Hamid, in April 1909, and the end of the unrests in the country that the 
American commercial interests began to really press their cases, probably thinking – or 
at least hoping – that the new regime would have finally made good of their promises of 
reform and modernization.  
In August, the New York Times reported that «an American industrial invasion 
of Turkey» seemed to be a «a near probability», explaining that the Department of 
States was registering the activities of various American groups trying to obtain 
concessions in the Ottoman Empire348. Among them there was also the Chester 
syndicate, which had already applied for a couple of smaller projects – the building of a 
railroad between Aleppo and Alexandretta, and the installation of a telephone system in 
the capital – and had finally decided to submit in formal terms to the Ottoman 
government the proposal for a much larger railway development program. The 
construction details would have changed several times in the following years, but the 
basic idea remained the same. It involved the laying down of more than a thousand 
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kilometers of train tracks all over the country and the acquisition of exclusive mining 
rights for all minerals – petroleum included – within a strip of land of twenty kilometers 
on each side of the line. Such an ambitious proposal was what the syndicate would have 
come to be associated with and known for. It was also the reason why European 
interests, especially those in Berlin, stood up and placed themselves firmly in the 
syndicate’s way.  
As reported by the American newspaper, however, European investors were not 
the only competitors that Chester had to guard from. His compatriots, too, were after the 
prize. Dr. Bruce Glasgow, a representative of the Anglo-American firm J. G. White and 
Company, had applied for a very similar concession just the month before. Even worse 
for the Admiral, was the fact the Glasgow had promptly communicated his move to the 
American embassy, and had duly received its administrative support, technically 
beating him to the punch. The situation led to a direct competition between the two 
groups and to the emergence of a certain level of uneasiness in the American legation. 
U.S. officials did not want to be forced to choose between the two, as throwing 
Washington’s diplomatic weight behind one of the two would have given it a decisive 
advantage, while American officials would have therefore preferred cooperation instead 
of opposition. The idea was not well received by Chester, who acted to solve the 
problem on his own terms. He moved to undercut his competitor by proposing to the 
Sublime Porte the construction of normal-gauge instead of narrow-gauge tracks, as 
proposed by Glasgow. The offer of course got the attention the Ottoman government, 
which refrained from assigning the concession to the first comer. The Department’s 
files suggest that the Admiral even paid a sort of compensation to Glasgow to avoid any 
counteroffer and to settle the matter once and for all. Either with or without money 
involved, the strategy worked and by the end of the summer the Chester’s group 
remained the only American applicant.  
The Admiral’s venture therefore moved forward, despite its rocky start and the 
apparent distaste of the new head of the American legation, Oscar Solomon Straus. As 
U.S. representative, Straus had acted twice as envoy extraordinary and minister 
plenipotentiary in Constantinople in the previous two decades (1887-1889 and 1898-
1899). In September 1909, however, he returned to assume the rank of Ambassador. In 
one of his first messages to Washington, Straus wrote that Arthur Chester had not 
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particularly impressed him as business representative – so much so as to propose the 
Department to set in place a sort of screening mechanism for Americans seeking the 
administration’s support in their dealing with foreign government, in order to diminish 
both the possibility of having multiple American applicants and the risk of having to 
spend resources on irresponsible and disorganized speculators. Undeterred and probably 
unaware of Straus’s full views about his son, the Admiral moved full steam ahead. In 
November 1909, he formally reorganized his business venture under the official name 
of Ottoman-American Development Corporation, with an initial capital of $100,000. 
Chester was able to put together a significant number of renowned investors and 
supporters for his syndicate. Besides the Chesters and Moore, among the list of people 
involved in the project there were heads of prominent American railway and steel firms, 
construction companies, and banks. A series of U.S. institutions like the U.S. Steel 
Corporation and J.P. Morgan and Company even sent direct letters of recommendation 
to the Ottoman authorities in behalf of the Chester’s group. James W. Colt, a successful 
American engineer who had oversaw the construction of parts of the most important 
railway lines in the United States, joined the Ottoman-American Development 
Corporation as technical expert349.  
As next move, the group asked the official backing of the American authorities, 
asking Washington to support its case before the Ottoman government. Possibly 
mindful of Straus original lukewarm endorsement of the enterprise, the Secretary of 
State remained sympathetic to the group’s claims but noncommittal, writing back to one 
of the company sponsors that the policy was to «seek and have the same opportunity 
and facilities for submitting proposals...afforded to reputable American concerns of 
their representatives, without espousing the claim of any particular individual or firm to 
the exclusion of others»350. He added that the Ambassador at Constantinople would 
have been pleased to get the representatives Ottoman-American Development 
Corporation in touch with the appropriate ottoman officials, but that «the scope of the 
policy would not permit him to request the granting of the concession to the company, 
which must rely upon its own efforts and merits to obtain this»351.  
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Chester and his associates continued to work fully to that effect in the following 
months. By the beginning of 1910, a preliminary understanding had been found with the 
Ottoman officials. The agreement gave the Ottoman-American Development 
Corporation sixteen months to complete a survey of the area involved in the project. To 
prove the bona fide of its application, the Chester group even made a deposit of 20,000 
Turkish pounds in an Ottoman bank. The sum was a sort of down payment, which 
would have been collected by the government in case the preliminary study had not 
been completed within the given time frame. The hopes for a quick approval of the 
official concession contract by the Ottoman government and parliament, however, 
vanished over the spring just as fast as they were created. There were two main reasons 
for the delay in the ratification process, which eventually became an indefinite 
suspension that de facto killed the application. The first was the Ottoman authorities’ 
intention to extract the greatest advantage from the agreement, which led them to raise 
the stakes in the negotiation not only with the Chester’s group but also with 
Washington; the other, and possibly decisive, was the German opposition.  
The Ottoman officials were well aware of the project’s magnitude and, betting 
on the Americans’ ambitions for its acquisition, advanced a series of requests directly to 
Washington in order to guarantee its authorization. The Sublime Porte was simply 
trying to leverage the Department of State into conceding the more favorable conditions 
on a series of outstanding issues between the two countries. Among the demands of the 
Yung Turk government, there was the increase in Turkish customs duties, the 
possibility to obtain a number of American warships to strengthen the Ottoman Navy 
and, above all, the renunciation of a series of capitulatory privileges. The Ottoman 
authorities were right about Washington’s interest in the concession. After the initial 
doubts about the solidity of the enterprise, Chester’s resoluteness and prominent 
sponsors seemed to have reassured the American officials, both in Constantinople and 
in Washington. Furthermore, as Taft’s presidency took shape, so did its policy regarding 
the advancement of the American interests abroad. The President’s dollar diplomacy 
would have targeted primarily Central and South America, but Chester’s operation fit 
perfectly into the picture. The attempt to obtain construction and mining projects in the 
Middle East was in line with the administration’s objectives of expanding U.S. 
investments abroad and promoting U.S. trade. As Knox himself explained to the 
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Ottoman representatives in March 1910, the administration attached «great importance 
to the granting of this concession», which had to be considered as a proof of the 
«growing commercial relations between the United States and the Ottoman Empire»352. 
Once realized that Chester was actually in the position of securing an agreement, the 
Department became not only interested in the negotiation, but also willing to get 
involved and ready to make offers at the national level in order to reach a favorable 
outcome. While agreeing on the on the increase of the custom duties, however, it still 
found it difficult to accept the dropping of capitulatory rights. Knox assured that the 
issue would have remained on the table for future talks, but, as he put it, the U.S. 
government was «not at the moment fully prepared to open negotiations for a modus 
vivendi waiving the right of forum claimed by the United States in the case of the arrest, 
imprisonment and trial of American charged with criminal offences in Turkey»353.  
This position does not diminish the extent of the Department’s support for the 
Chester’s project before the Ottoman authorities. American officials both in 
Washington, in the person of the Secretary of State and even more of the Assistant 
Secretary of State Huntington Wilson, and in Constantinople, with Straus, repeatedly 
signaled to the new Ottoman regime the administration’s interest and goodwill. The 
direct discussion between the two governments added a new level in the negotiations, 
bringing in additional elements that complicated the process, but it was not the reason 
why the application fell through. Indeed, the gap between the positions of the two sides 
would have been greatly reduced and almost closed in the following two years. What 
seemed to have instead greatly influenced the considerations at the Sublime Porte and 
eventually halted the ratification of the agreement was the German opposition to the 
project. Berlin’s influence in the Empire had rose quickly in the previous decades the 
Chester’s plan could had effectively opened the way to the American penetration in 
what Wilhelmine Germany clearly considered a part of its sphere of influence. 
Furthermore, German investors already held specific interests in the same construction 
sector. The Chester project, Berlin would have contended, interfered with the planned 
path of the German-sponsored Baghdad railway. Technically, the dispute focused on 
specific sections of the line proposed by the Americans that reportedly crossed areas 
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already assigned to the Germans. Berlin’s concerns, however, had little to do with the 
practical aspects of the concession. The resistance to the Chester’s group was more a 
matter of principle, based on (geo)political considerations. The nature of Germany’s 
opposition was revealed also by the techniques it used to pressure the Ottoman 
government into refusing the American application. The rumor that the Standard Oil 
was behind the Ottoman-American Development Corporation began suddenly to 
circulate in Constantinople in those months. Playing upon Standard’s reputation for 
being a predatory and soulless company, the story painted the entire operation – a 
developmental project of immense proportions – as a scheme to control the 
Mesopotamian oil fields devised by what, in 1910, was the most feared (and despised) 
oil corporation on the planet.  
Chester’s and his associates «took pains to assure the Department, the Turkish 
Embassy, and the Embassy in Constantinople that this was not the case»354. Being 
accused of colluding with Rockefeller, or actually being his pawn, was just one of the 
problems for the Admiral. Indeed, had he succeeded in convincing his interlocutors 
about the Standard’s non-involvement, probably would have not made any difference. 
The Grand Vizier, Hakki Pasha, had decided not to pass the preliminary agreement to 
the Council of Ministers for consideration, despite the fact that it had already received 
the approval of the Minister of Public Works. In his communications with the American 
officials, he explained that the decision was solely due to the presence of more 
important and pressing issues concerning the unstable situation in the Balkans provinces 
of the Empire, which the government should have had to address first355. Hakki Pasha’s 
close contacts with Berlin and his sympathies for Germany were however not a mystery 
to anyone356. In reporting these developments back to Washington, between May and 
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early June 1910, Straus explicitly pointed to the opposition of the European powers as 
the main obstacle to the approval of the concession357. While small progress were being 
made at the bureaucratic level, he said, the German Embassy was actively trying to sink 
the project.  
In Washington, the Department understood that the road to Constantinople 
passed through Berlin. The European chancelleries, however, were difficult places to 
navigate and the American officials would have soon got lost on the voyage. Knox 
instructed the U.S. Ambassador in Germany, David Hill, to make «very discreet but 
strong oral representations» to the host government, asking explanation on its 
opposition towards the Chester project358. In what, according to DeNovo, was a 
remarkable display of the Department’s «inadequate grasp of the power equation», 
Knox’s directive authorized the U.S. envoy to threaten retaliation in case Berlin refused 
to cooperate359. Hill should have made reference to the open door policy, asking for its 
respect and pointing to the other instances in which the two countries had developed a 
successful collaboration in China and Africa. Eventually, if German opposition were not 
removed, Hill had to warn the German government that the United States would have 
allied with other powers to deal with the situation.  
Berlin’s reply was, in the words of the Department of State, «characteristic in a 
certain indirection which was sometimes attributed to the Wilhelmstrasse in its imperial 
days» – that is to say the German Foreign Office simply denied any official opposition 
or intervention on the matter360. David Hill, the American ambassador in Berlin, 
reported however to have received also informal visit from Arthur Von Gwinner, the 
Director of the Deutsche Bank, who came to complain about the Chester’s venture. He 
said that it “invaded” a series of rights already possessed by the German group and 
repeated a major accusation against the American project: that it was «not a plan for 
bona fide railroad development but a scheme for controlling certain undeveloped oil 
fields in order to keep their product out of the market»361. The frustration and hostility 
of Von Gwinner is understandable. Over the last two years, the German group had 
struggled to keep its own railway project alive, trying to convince the new regime to 
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revive the old concession agreement and continue funding the construction works. In 
1908, the revolution and the fall of the Sultan had compromised the German position at 
the Sublime Porte. Berlin had lost a precious ally in Abdul Hamid and risked losing the 
previous commercial privileges, with the pact with the Baghdad Railway Company that 
could have ended up being scrapped altogether. Meanwhile, the competitors had 
multiplied. First appeared D’Arcy, who aimed directly for the acquisition of mining 
rights in Mesopotamia – a claim that, if successful, would have deprived the German 
group of the biggest prize associated with their original concession. Then arrived the 
Americans, who threatened to replace them in the railway business. Berlin would have 
eventually reacted, winning back the favor of the Ottoman authorities and finding a 
compromise with the other European powers to secure the construction of the remaining 
sections of the Baghdad railway and launch a joint effort for the exploration and 
development of the Mesopotamian oilfields (through the NBT and the TPC), but the 
post-revolutionary period was surely a complex period, in which the German 
representatives and investors were forced multiple times on the defensive.  
About the repeated accusations of cooperation with the Standard Oil, it does 
seem that many Europeans officials and capitalists were simply being paranoid, if not 
malicious. Many of them feared the American giant so much that they saw its shadow 
everywhere. Before Chester, even Bruce Glasgow, the head of the other American 
group that tried to apply for the same concession, was thought by the British at first to 
be a Standard’s representative362. London had even received a report stating that the 
American company had no plan to join the race for the development of the 
Mesopotamian resources at that point, being interested only in the sale of petroleum 
products in the country363. Apparently it was not enough. Actually, it probably ended up 
confirming some of the fears about Standard’s goals in the region. For D’Arcy himself, 
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the fact that the Chester project was so large and included a series of very convenient 
clauses for the Turkish government was in itself a proof that the plan was just a 
subterfuge to get a hold on the oil, with no real intention of building a railway. He even 
wrote to the English officials that Chester and his financial supporters had «openly 
stated that the object they have in view in this scheme is not the building of a railway, 
but the security of the mineral rights, and more particularly those for petroleum»364. 
The U.S. records, on the other hand, show nothing of sort. The participation of the 
Standard Oil was not even an issue and was never actually discussed. The only times it 
came up was when both the members of the syndicate and the American officials had to 
respond to foreign accusations. They did it so always in the same fashion: i.e. denying 
any direct or indirect involvement of the Standard Oil365.  
If European investors were overtly agitated about, and opposed to, the Chester’s 
application, the public face of the European diplomacy remained impassive. The 
German foreign minister even told Hill in Berlin that his government would have 
actively supported the American project once it was modified to respect what Germany 
considered its already acquired rights366. Berlin’s message however greatly contrasted 
with the information gathered by the Americans in Constantinople, which pointed to an 
escalation of Berlin (secret) diplomacy targeting not only the Ottoman government but 
also the other European powers, in an attempt to secure their support against the Chester 
project. The Department then tried to go around Berlin and bring up the issue directly 
with the countries that were supposedly involved – France, Italy, Great Britain, and 
Russia – but, even in this case, Americans were left empty-handed367. The U.S. 
representatives abroad all received similar replies: there had been no contact with the 
German authorities on the subject and nobody really opposed the American venture368. 
The Russian foreign minister went as far as saying that his country was actually in favor 
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of the American enterprise, as it would have balanced out the German influence in the 
Ottoman Empire369.  
The events in Constantinople continued to suggest a different scenario, one in 
which the European juggernauts were making the American diplomatic machine going 
around in circles with relative ease. Indeed, as sound as the Chester’s project could be, 
commercial considerations stopped where geopolitics began. The exchanges between 
the U.S. representatives and their European counterparts took place in mid-June, 1910. 
The agreement was supposed to reach the general assembly for final consideration by 
the end of the month. The Grand Vizier, however, never submitted it. As feared, on 
June 28, the Ottoman parliament went in recess without having discussed the matter. 
The Chester group had little doubt about who was responsible for the situation. As they 
explained to the Department, expressing their dismay, they felt «quite confident that 
had it not been for the intervention of the German Ambassador, the concession would 
have been granted several months ago»370.  
The defeat, while profoundly frustrating for Chester, seemed to have the 
opposite effect of the Department of State, which appeared even more motivated to 
secure the concession. To the disappointment of the Ottoman-American Development 
Corporation, the Taft administration answered indeed with resolve. The U.S. officials 
spent the rest of the summer trying to organize a strategy for the fall. The head of the 
Near East Division, Evan Young, asked the representatives of the Chester’s group to 
«call at the Department…for the purpose of conferring and mapping out a line of action 
in order that we may exert every pressure as soon as Parliament convenes»371. Great 
care was also taken in staffing up the American legation in Constantinople and 
preparing it for the diplomatic offensive. Strauss was indeed scheduled to return to the 
United States due to previous personal commitments. The Department however did not 
want to leave the post without a high rank representative, so it was decided to send no 
less than the Assistant Secretary of State, Huntington Wilson, to Constantinople in 
September on a special mission with the title of Ambassador Extraordinary. It was not 
enough. John Ridgely Carter, who was Minister at Bucharest at the time, was also 
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ordered to proceed to the Ottoman capital. He was asked to familiarize with the history 
of the negotiations and be ready to support the syndicate’s representative. The president, 
the Department explained, had a «keen interest» in the concession372. 
In the following weeks, indeed, Wilson would have handed the new Sultan, 
Mehmed V, a letter signed by Taft himself. Throughout the fall, U.S. representatives 
continued to confer with the Ottoman officials at multiple levels. In order to secure the 
concession, the administration went as far as to offer what seemed to be the most 
coveted prize for the Young Turk regime: the revision of the capitulatory privileges. 
The strategy apparently bore fruit. The U.S. envoys held the attention of their Ottoman 
counterparts and the negotiation moved forward despite the reportedly continuous 
interference of the German embassy. At least, this is what they thought. In November 9, 
1910, Wilson wrote back to Washington that «the railway concession seems to be 
matter of very widespread interest and what I hear makes me sanguine of its 
consummation»373. Few weeks later, it was the company itself to express its satisfaction 
and gratitude to the American government, praising Wilson’s action. Thanks to his 
mission, John R. MacArthur (one of the two MacArthur brothers and Chester’s 
associate) wrote to the Secretary of State that «the hope of our representatives is much 
strengthened that the concession we are seeing will in due time, without great delay, be 
granted»374.  
The talks continued incessantly into the first months of 1911 around the details 
of the concession. Company’s representatives, American officials, and members of the 
Ottoman government began negotiating anew the extent of the mining rights associated 
with it and the choice the Mediterranean terminus of the line, in the attempt to trace a 
route that would have not infringed upon what Germany perceived to be its own rights. 
Berlin’s preferences and position on the matter were indeed still the main concern of the 
Young Turks, which at this point clearly communicated to the American representatives 
that they could not risk irritating Germany and losing its friendship. In early February, 
after a series of changes to the original agreements, Carter was nonetheless reporting to 
Washington that the Chester project would have been «approved within a few days»375.  
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By April, nothing had happened yet and the company had grown increasingly 
exasperated. MacArthur communicated to the Secretary of State that they had 
information signaling – contrary to what the Department had assured them – that 
Russia, too, was opposing the concession and siding with Germany. He added that the 
group had come close to the decision to withdraw their application out of frustration. 
The negotiation rollercoaster brought the enthusiasm back up in early May, when Carter 
cabled from Constantinople that the Grand Vizier had finally signed and submitted the 
revised version of the agreement to the Parliament. Then, on June 1, everything fell 
through – again – when the news arrived that the assembly had voted to postpone the 
consideration of the project until the next fall, when the assembly would have 
reconvened after the summer adjournment. Carter was quick to blame the Grand Vizier 
and his «entire absence of good faith throughout all the negotiations» for this second 
defeat, which came after a year of intense talks between the parts376.  
The decision was a terrible blow for the American company. At that stage, 
somewhat ironically, the side more invested in securing the concession became the 
Department and not the original applicants. The first doubts about the ultimate success 
of the project had actually begun to creep in as early as the previous fall, when Colt 
completed the first field survey. The results were not as good as expected and indicated 
that completing the project would have been more expensive than originally predicted. 
At the time, one American official at the legation in Constantinople had warned 
Washington about the possibility that the company would have not been able to sustain 
the effort. Chester, however, personally had reassured the Secretary of State of the 
soundness and commitment of the enterprise and the diplomatic effort continued. Now, 
almost one year later, those he needed to convince to carry on were his own 
disillusioned sponsors. More than one investor appeared indeed to have had enough. 
After two years of trying, they came to believe that the external opposition to overcome 
was too strong and that keep running after the Ottoman authorities was useless, even 
more so now that Italy was about to occupy Tripoli. Technically, the finish line was not 
that far, since the only administrative passage left was the parliament’s approval. Yet 
few of those associated with the project thought that, with a war to wage, the Ottoman 
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assembly would have really taken up the issue for consideration – and even less that 
there was a real chance of success.  
At the end of September, the Admiral’s son communicated that the members of 
the syndicate had decided to withdraw the cautionary deposit made in 1909377. The 
exchange took place while Department was busy preparing a new diplomatic offensive 
and getting ready for the reopening of the parliamentary session. William Woodville 
Rockhill, an experienced diplomat who had served already in the Ottoman Empire, in 
China, and Russia, and happened to be the actual author of Knox’s original “Open 
Door” note, had been reassigned as new ambassador in Constantinople in mid-1911 – a 
clear sign of the administration’s determination. Chester Jr. denied that the move 
represented the end of the syndicate, but struggled to keep the bid alive while looking 
for possible alternative backers. He hoped that the decision to withdraw the money 
would have been interpreted as a sort of ultimatum by the Ottoman government, 
possibly (and paradoxically) accelerating the definitive approval of the concession. The 
actual outcome, of course, was just the opposite.  
The deposit was taken out of the bank five days before the parliament 
reconvened, on October 19. Chester’s application technically was still standing, but Colt 
communicated to the Department that they would have been forced to formally 
withdraw their proposal unless additional contractual benefits could be guaranteed to 
the syndicate. Indeed, without a strong financial backing, the company was not anymore 
in the position to be able to accept the same terms agreed on in the spring. Such a 
development de facto eliminated any residual chance of success. At that that stage, there 
was no margin to even think that it would have been possible to renegotiate the 
concession. The parliament did take up the contract previously agreed on for discussion, 
but its approval was never put to vote, since the signatory had announced its inability to 
respect its terms.  
The American officials, after almost three years of diplomatic battle and an 
incredible amount of political capital spent, were deeply irritated. As the company 
suddenly withdrew, the Department remained in the embarrassing situation of being the 
only side pushing for a concession that everybody, at that point, knew was impossible to 
achieve. Both in Constantinople and in Washington, the feeling was that the diplomatic 
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exposure on the project had compromised the American position in the Ottoman 
Empire, since the administration risked being associated with the resounding failure of 
the Chester syndicate. In the following months, the department tried to distance itself 
from the American group and go back to an official policy of neutrality and 
noninvolvement in the region, avoiding taking up the issue of the concession again, 
either with Chester or with other U.S. investors.   
The following year, in 1912, Chester and Colt claimed to have gathered again a 
sufficient number of financial backers and thus revitalized the syndicate to try once 
more to secure the railway contract. The Ottoman government was technically still 
interested in developing the project, which would have undoubtedly benefited the 
country as a whole. At the time the Baghdad Railway Company had gone back to laying 
down railroad tracks in the eastern part of the country, while the Deutsche Bank was 
still busy working out the details of its agreement with the NBT to launch the assault to 
the mining concession in Mesopotamia. The negotiation between the European powers, 
and the supreme distrust between the parties involved, continuously slowed down the 
process. With every country always wary of the other’s moves, willing to double check 
them and ready to stymie them if necessary, the result was that no other claimant had 
been able to secure a new construction agreement with the Sublime Porte after Chester’s 
withdrawal, thus leaving the Americans hopes alive. The concession remained however 
a politically loaded issue. Without the backing of the administration, the commercial 
ambitions of any private citizen were destined to collide with, and to be crashed by, the 
strategic interests of the European powers. The Department, although still sympathetic 
with Chester, made clear that this time declarations of intent would have not been 
enough to prove the seriousness of their commitment. The Company had to make «good 
on its own» before hoping to receive again the administration’s support378.  
Few months later, after the new Wilson administration had installed, the 
syndicate was further reshuffled. Some of the old investors definitely abandoned the 
project, others joined, and Colt became the president of a newly organized entity named 
Ottoman-American Exploration Company379. The new appellation hinted at a possible 
change in the mission of the enterprise, from a construction company to one interested 
in mining and surveying for minerals. The government’s position, however, remained 
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the same. In mid-1913, in an internal memorandum, the new administration produced a 
lucid analysis of the situation, saying that any attempt to secure the concession, 
although driven by purely commercial interests, carried a number of unavoidable – and 
unwanted – political implications. The administration realized that in trying to force 
American interests’ way into the Ottoman government, it would have had to engage 
with the European powers, with the clear risk of becoming embroiled in a series of 
disputes that that the country was not prepared to discuss and from which could have 
extracted little benefit. The ongoing Balkans Wars were a perfect example and 
reminder. The administration, following a long-standing diplomatic tradition, realized 
that was neither willing nor ready to be sucked into European politics and therefore 
decided to back away from a more direct and active support.  
 
In a matter of few months, the outbreak of the War would have canceled any 
hope of gaining a concession, with or without the administration’s support. The early 
story of the Chester project remained however as a perfect representation of the pre-
WWI trajectory of the United States in the region. Its origins and development 
paralleled the transformation, and actual evolution, of American interests and presence 
in the Middle East in the first part of the twentieth century. In a matter of about two 
decades, the situation changed significantly. On the eve of War, American activities in 
the Ottoman Empire were still first and foremost religious in character and connected to 
the missionary world, but were no more exclusively limited to it. The country had 
actually become a target for businessmen and investors, in a move that was extensively 
celebrated at home by American newspapers380. Likewise, Washington’s official 
presence on the territory, which was almost nonexistent at the end of the nineteenth 
century, grew in both quantitative and qualitative terms. An expanding network of 
missions, new and more experienced personnel, and a reorganized (and specialized) 
Department of State were now the means through which the Administration could 
operate in the region and implement its policy. The change in attitude was due the 
outward looking strategies and policies of Roosevelt and his successor, as much as to 
the practical steps taken by their three secretaries of states, John Hay, Elihu Root, and 
Philander Knox, to modernize the foreign service. The rationalization of the Department 
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and the definition of a clear policy for the expansion of the American trade abroad 
between 1908 and 1909 marked an important juncture, one that inaugurated a new 
season of foreign involvement in (and support to) American businessmen activities 
abroad.  
Just as it demonstrated the American advances in the region, however, the 
Chester project (and the Department’s management of the issue) showed also the limit 
of the U.S. foreign action and diplomacy in the area. The Americans’ inexperience in 
dealing with the Ottoman authorities and their dilatory tactics doomed their efforts and 
proved the American uneasiness in such a context where the European powers were 
actively engaged in their own maneuvers. The dispute over the development project was 
indeed the first time that Washington tried to assert its interests over those of the other 
powers out its geographical comfort zone. At the end of the nineteenth century, the 
Department had confidently asked for the respect of an “open door” policy in China. In 
that case, however, there was no real disagreement between the parties involved. The 
European countries basically consented to a commercial policy that benefitted all 
without depriving them of anything that was considered to be of real political interest. 
Furthermore, Washington did see Eastern Asia as an area of natural expansion for the 
American trade while being relatively marginal to the strategic ambitions of the other 
western powers. Hay’s move was a significant diplomatic success, but also a fairly 
effortless one. The Roosevelt and Taft’s administrations were equally confortable in 
dealing with the various squabbles that emerged during the rest of the decade between 
the American bankers and capitalists with their southern neighbors. Once it was clear 
the American continent was within the sphere of influence of the United States, 
Washington proceeded to resolve its controversies undisturbed, choosing and shaping 
policies to its own liking. In the Ottoman Empire the situation was different. The 
European countries had been discussing over the Eastern Question for two centuries, 
with the United States not really being a part of the picture. The Department’s attempt 
to replicate successful dynamics, continuously stepping up the level of their 
involvement, did not work. The problems of the Chester and his associates, which knew 
little of Ottoman politics, had limited connections in Constantinople and even less in 
Europe, and therefore had to rely heavily on the Department’s intervention, further 
burdened the negotiation.  The syndicate’s failure in maintaining and showing a solid 
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financial backing eventually finished off any chance of succeeding. By then, however, 
then the administration had already suffered multiple defeats.  
In Constantinople, the United States got into the shifting sands of European 
imperial politics and did not seem to grasp the nature and magnitude of the forces at 
play. It found itself lost in details and ended up missing the larger picture, unable to 
work out a more compelling and comprehensive strategy. The fact that neither Chester 
nor the American officials did realize what the other parties involved were specifically 
fighting about is significant in itself. Oil was not at all a central issue in the discussion 
about the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the century, but it did become one of the 
main reasons why a series of private and governmental European agents tried to secure 
construction and mining contracts from the Ottoman authorities by 1914. Yet the 
American representatives seemed to have missed this level of the discussion, so much 
so that the only instances in which the matter was (briefly) registered was when they 
had to defend the syndicate from the charge of being a proxy for the Standard Oil.  
While the Deutsche Bank hoped to control new sources of petroleum to oppose 
Standard’s overwhelming power in Europe, D’Arcy planned to expand his oil venture 
into Mesopotamia, and Great Britain dreamed of securing fuel of its Navy while 
blocking off any attempt to undercut its position the Gulf, the American administration 
remained apparently unaffected by similar concerns in the area. In Europe; petroleum 
had already entered the foreign policy discussion as an element of strategic interest; in 
Washington, the decision to support Chester was driven primarily by commercial 
considerations, not naval, military, or public ones surrounding the use of petroleum. 
Washington would have fully caught up with these changes soon thanks to the 
intervention in the political and public debate of those geologists and engineers who had 
already been trying to shape the conversation around petroleum within the nation in the 
previous decade and that took the opportunity provided by the War to push their 
analysis and claims even further.  
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4. Towards War and Beyond 
4.1 Oiling the War Machinery 
Woodrow Wilson was sworn in as the 28th president of the United States on 
March 4, 1913. The inaugural address was a perfect collection of those progressive 
themes and catchwords that first helped the Democrats to regain control of the Congress 
and then him to get elected. Wilson referred multiple times to the “Nation” as collective, 
organic entity and pointed his finger at those greedy individuals who, for the sake of 
their egoistic interests, had drained the country’s resources and had stepped on the 
rights of the other members of the society. The speech was imbued with religious 
overtones – a consequence of the President’s own strong spirituality, but also a natural 
aspect of a reformist message that expressed a righteous fury and quasi-messianic 
vision. This kind of language, and the moral Manichaeism that it conveyed and 
promoted, emerged clearly in a passage where Wilson, while discussing the evolution of 
the American system of government, touched one of the defining political issue of the 
era – the conservation of national resources – before explaining the undesired 
consequences of the American unregulated economic and industrial development:  
«Our life contains every great thing, and contains it in rich abundance. But the 
evil has come with the good, and much fine gold has been corroded. With riches has 
come inexcusable waste. We have squandered a great part of what we might have used, 
and have not stopped to conserve the exceeding bounty of nature, without which our 
genius for enterprise would have been worthless and impotent, scorning to be careful, 
shamefully prodigal as well as admirably efficient. We have been proud of our 
industrial achievements, but we have not hitherto stopped thoughtfully enough to count 
the human cost, the cost of lives snuffed out, of energies overtaxed and broken, the 
fearful physical and spiritual cost to the men and women and children upon whom the 
dead weight and burden of it all has fallen pitilessly the years through…With the great 
Government went many deep secret things that we too long delayed to look into and 
scrutinize with candid, fearless eyes. The great Government we loved has too often been 
made use of for private and selfish purposes, and those who used it had forgotten the 
people»381. 
 
The concern for the American declining natural endowment and the hostility 
towards monopolies were two traits that would have indeed deeply characterized the 
work of the Wilson’s administration. These ideas affected the actions of two crucial 
members of the executive, Franklin Knight Lane and Josephus Daniels, and the two 
departments they headed, the Interior and the Navy, whose policies are often reported 
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and analyzed without properly taking into consideration the importance of the common 
progressive cultural and political milieu that shaped them. Lane was Canadian by birth 
and, as Wilson, the son of a Presbyterian minister of Scotch-Irish descent. The family 
soon moved to California, where Lane began working as journalist while earning a law 
degree. After a period in New York as San Francisco Chronicle’s reporter and activist 
for the Democratic Party, he went back to the West Coast where he became more and 
more involved in politics. He helped his friend James Duval Phelan to secure the 
election as mayor of San Francisco in 1896 and became soon after (in 1898) himself a 
public servant, winning just enough votes to defeat the Republican incumbent in the 
race for city and county attorney382. Lane’s status within the Party’s ranks grew in the 
following years. The Democratic establishment first selected him as candidate first in 
the 1902 election for governorship in California then tried to make him mayor of San 
Francisco, in 1903. Both campaigns were unsuccessful, but Lane fared well in a state 
dominated by Republicans. Just as Lane’s activities within the Democratic Party grew, 
so did his adhesion to progressive ideas and principles – so much so that he gained a 
seat in one of the most important and representative regulative agencies in the hands the 
federal state in those years: the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). President 
Roosevelt named him as one of the members of the ICC at the end of 1905. The Senate 
confirmed the nomination on June 1906; on the same day it passed the Hepburn Act, 
which greatly expanded the powers of the agency. Lane maintained the same role until 
after Wilson’s election, when he was offered a position in the new executive383. The two 
men had never met before – and would have not met until the very day of the 
inauguration – but his upstanding profile and professional experience as railroad 
regulator convinced Wilson’s advisor, the Colonel Edward M. House, that he was the 
right man for the job384.  
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Daniels, born in North Carolina, represented a different kind of Democrat and 
progressive. His ideas were deeply rooted in Southern politics and tradition. Advocate 
of white supremacy, pro-silver, in favor of both the introduction of the income tax, 
abolitionist, and radically anti-bug business, David M. Kennedy rightly defined him a 
«Bryanite schooled in Populist principles»385. Daniels acquired indeed recognition 
within the Democratic Party for the help and support that he, as editor of one of the 
main North Carolinian newspapers (the News & Observer), gave to Bryan during the 
presidential campaign of 1896. He was then named as Democratic national 
committeeman for his state, a position he maintained until 1912, while continuing to 
advance the Party’s cause from the pages of his newspaper. His selection as member of 
the cabinet after Wilson’s victory was not happenstance. Daniels was an ardent reformer 
and during the first decade of the century he had come to know, and appreciate, the 
vision of the future Democratic president. Despite the initial differences between Bryan 
and Wilson, he fully threw his support behind the latter. In fact, he skillfully worked 
behind the scene to smooth any possible intra-party, becoming instrumental first in 
bridging the divide between them and then in securing Wilson the nomination in 1912. 
It was Daniel’s activity in those years that elevated him into the inner circle of the 
presidential candidate, who duly rewarded him for his work after the election386.  
The relationship between the two was based on mutual appreciation and 
remained solid throughout the years, as Daniels became one of the (only) four cabinet 
members to serve during both Wilson’s terms. His nomination as Secretary of the Navy 
was however not without controversy. Daniels knew nothing about naval operations or 
the department he was about to lead. Similarly to what happened in the selection of the 
other departments’ heads, loyalty turned out to be more important than expertise. 
Daniels would have nonetheless succeeded in his position, steering the Navy through 
turbulent times – and a world war from which the U.S. naval forces emerged 
undoubtedly stronger than they had ever been. Daniels indeed made up in effort and 
determination what he lacked in experience. His activism and drive for reform became 
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clear since the very beginning of his tenure. Like Wilson, Daniels officially took office 
on March 5, 1913. The day after arrived also Lane’s formal confirmation as Secretary of 
Interior387. On March 7, just two days after the installation of the administration, the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Beekman Winthrop wrote to the Secretary of Interior, 
asking Lane to provide his Department’s «unreserved opinions» on a series of technical 
issues connected to one of the most pressing, and important, matters for the Navy: the 
conversion of the American fleet from coal to oil388.  
Winthrop explained that, in order to «act intelligently and safely upon the policy 
of building oil-burning battleships and destroyers», the Navy was requesting 
information on «the future of fuel oil» in the United States. The advantages of the use of 
petroleum in military and naval operations were so evident, Winthrop continued, that 
the Department would have loathed throwing them away – especially considering that 
the United States, as «extensive oil-producer», seemed to be in an unique position to 
make use of it. By mid-1913, the Navy had already begun equipping its smaller ships 
with oil-burning engines, so the question was not whether to initiate the transition to 
fuel oil but whether to embrace, accelerating the conversion as to finally include capital 
ships. In fact, the Department had already requested and obtained the authorization from 
Congress to build its first oil-fuelled battleships (the USS Nevada and the USS 
Oklahoma) in 1912. Their construction, which had started late that year, was however 
far from being completed when the new administration took office and, as Daniels 
himself reported in his memoires, the Navy technical bureaus were still discussing 
whether or not actually install a propulsion system that relied primarily on oil389. What 
caused the Department to have second thoughts were the expenses associated with the 
use of liquid fuel. The price of petroleum was rising quickly and steadily (especially on 
the Atlantic seaboard) due to the burgeoning demand and, as Winthrop wrote to Lane, 
the Navy would have found itself in an «awkward and dangerous position» if the 
country’s oil reserves were suddenly to fail once the conversion of the whole fleet had 
been approved. The new Secretary wanted therefore to make sure that there was enough 
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oil available to supply the new battleships during their entire lifespan, which was 
considered to be of about twenty years, before confirming the policy of fleet conversion.   
The request for information addressed to Lane was particularly indicative of the 
position of the Navy as regards to fuel oil and, more in general, the country’s level of 
awareness about petroleum’s uses, supply, and military potential. The letter 
demonstrated the Department’s (and Daniel’s) serious interest for the matter – one that 
would have remained central throughout the decade –, but also the relative 
unpreparedness of the Navy on some of the basic issues surrounding it. Winthrop asked 
Lane what would have been the «probable fuel-oil situation» in twenty years, on how 
many years notice could have been expected in case U.S. oil resources were to fail, and 
how reliable would have been the Navy Petroleum Reserves in California as source of 
supply for the following two decades in case the Navy had to depend on them, taking 
into consideration their current status and the constant drainage by wildcatters. The 
decision to ask for Lane’s opinion was warranted, given the expertise of the Interior’s 
bureaus on the matter. Less justifiable, and more problematic, was the extent to which 
the Navy’s policy of conversion seemed to hinge on the technical judgment of another 
federal agency. The letter indeed indicated, still in 1913, Daniels’ department lacked 
any in-house bureau or committee able to make similar estimates and had to base the 
future of a program as important as that of adopting oil-fuelled battleships on 
assessments made by an external entity, as it was not in the position to autonomously 
determine the proper course of action. This aspect is even more worrying when one 
considers that the decision to adopt oil as primary fuel for the new class of capital ships 
had, in fact, already been made in 1912. In the final months of the Taft’s administration 
the Navy’s adoption of oil did seem a fait accompli, so much so that the geologist and 
oil expert Day himself wrote that the Navy had «definitely abandoned the use of coal in 
future fighting-ship design. All new destroyers, submarines and battleships are designed 
for oil burning», adding that the Navy was «extending its oil facilities rapidly»390. By 
declaring itself surprised by the rising prices and ready to reconsider its choices 
depending on the Interior’s estimates, the Navy proved that not only it still lacked its 
own supply strategy but also it had failed in acquiring the necessary capabilities to plan 
for one.  
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The figures in Daniels’ possession seemed to be at best partial and at worst 
inadequate not only as regards to the general oil situation of the country, but also as to 
the status of the Navy own reserves in California, which had been established as early 
as 1910. The fact that Day, in those very months, published exactly these information in 
his own annual report, offering an estimate of the capacity of the Elk Hills and Buena 
Vista fields together with the volume of oil stored in all the others naval stations, from 
Norfolk to Pearl Harbor, from Boston to Guantanamo, was the apparent confirmation 
that the Geological Survey knew more than the Navy itself – or, at least, just as much391.  
The way in which the Navy reported on its fleet’s oil requirements to Lane, too, 
raises questions about the Department actual effort, if not ability, to plan for future 
supply. Despite the rapid growth of oil consumption in the first decade of the century 
and the experience of the war of 1898, which caused the amount (and the cost) of fuel – 
coal, at the time – necessary for U.S. naval operations to skyrocket, the Navy had asked 
the Department of Interior to assess the reliability of Californian oil reserves by 
providing a fixed and constant figure as annual naval consumption for the following 
twenty years, with no indication or apparent provision for increased use in case of war. 
The comparison with the British strategizing could only serve to emphasize the delay 
and superficiality of the American side, since by 1913 the Royal Navy had already set 
up a specific naval commission on oil after years of internal discussion about the 
adoption of fuel oil and planning for its recovery from various overseas sources.  
The Department of Interior, on its side, took more than three weeks to respond to 
the request of information. When Lane’s reply arrived, on March 31, a young Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt had already replaced Winthrop as Daniel’s Assistant Secretary. The 
information conveyed was itself an indirect (and involuntary) proof of the volatility 
(and inaccuracy) of U.S. oil estimate at the time. Lane reassured the Navy about the 
availability of petroleum in California. In explaining the state’s oil situation, the 
Secretary of Interior made reference not to the aggregate Day’s 1908 report, but to more 
recent and specific estimates that focused on the petroleum reserves of the West Coast. 
Based on these reports, Lane predicted that Californian oil would have lasted way more 
than twenty years392. What is remarkable is how he (and the engineer he cited) came out 
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with such a figure. The number of years of oil supply left in California was indeed 
calculated by diving the estimated amount of total reserves of the state by the 1911 rate 
of production. Petroleum estimates, therefore, continued to fail to properly anticipate, 
measure, and include the continuous growth in production and consumption, creating 
fixed models that were as linear and stationary as inaccurate.  
To be fair, Lane did stress that it would have been impossible to provide 
accurate answers to the Navy’s questions, since they depended on a «a variety of 
unknown factors» – a series of variables that could have greatly affected the 
«commercial and industrial development in the country during the next generation». 
This realization however did not stop Lane to write Daniels that he believed the 
Department of the Navy would have been able «rel[ied] upon the reserves already 
existing for a supply of fuel oil for a period greater than the life of any battleship to be 
constructed within the next decade»393. Lane, of course, got the right answer, although 
his numbers and model were incorrect. His assurance was enough to convince Daniels 
to go forward with the conversion: the first two American battleships relying primarily 
on oil would have been launched in mid-1914 and finally commissioned in 1916.  
Daniels also asked if the Navy could expect “some relief” from the high prices 
that it was forced to pay on the Atlantic coast in order to get oil. Lane replied that fuel 
would have only become more and more expensive and, as the only way to avoid such 
expenses, suggested that the Navy autonomously extract its own oil. Despite lacking 
any technical expertise on oil drilling and extraction, the possibility of directly 
producing oil and therefore “cutting out the middleman” resulted incredibly appealing 
for Daniels. In the following weeks, after having received equally positive feedbacks 
about the idea by the Navy General Board and the Bureau of Steam Engineering, which 
expressly suggested asking appropriation and authorization from Congress, the 
Secretary decided to move forward. He used the Navy annual report, presented in 
December 1913, to press the matter before the administration and the U.S. lawmakers. 
His words offered a forceful representation of the situation, emphasizing the need to act 
promptly to secure oil for the Navy and avoid remaining at the mercy of the oil 
companies. He recommended to Congress «the immediate consideration of providing 
fuel oil for the Navy at reasonable rates, and the passage of legislation that will enable 
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the department to refine its own oil from its own oil wells and thus relieve itself of the 
necessity of purchasing what seems fair to become the principal fuel of the Navy in the 
future, at exorbitant and ever-increasing prices, from the private companies that now 
completely control the supply»394. In order to emphasize the urgency of the matter, he 
explained that «the superiority of oil over coal» was at that time a settled issue and «no 
longer a matter of experiment»395. He doubled down on this point by bringing up the 
example of the Royal Navy. Churchill’s attempts to make the Navy self-sufficient as 
regards to oil through the development of an independent network of supply and a series 
of direct partnerships with the national oil companies proved that the British 
Government, Daniels stated, had «clearly foreseen» that the future was «in the control 
of oil wells, and the refining of its own». Daniels rhetorically asked what the United 
States, a country with «bounteous flowing petroleum wells», was waiting for to develop 
its own fields if even was even an oilless nation as England – which he called 
«geographically handicapped» – had realized that taking charge of the supply at the 
government level was the best policy396.  
It is worth noting that, in pressing for a Navy able to produce and refine its own 
oil, the Secretary was driven more by economic considerations than by strategic ones. 
Daniels was worried about the price of oil and, given its newfound indispensability of 
liquid fuel, wanted to find a cheaper way to secure it. In this respect, to influence 
Daniels’ reasoning and shape its position (and that of the Department) there was his 
deep-rooted distrust for “big business”. As many other progressives of the time, 
especially those within the Wilson administration, the Secretary favored governmental 
control over the industry and despised the monopolies. He was therefore soon to 
identify the oil companies, whose behavior was the first cause and target of the 
widespread suspicion and hostility against the large business in the United States, as a 
possible obstacle, if not danger, to the national service offered by the Navy. In his report 
Daniels indirectly accused them of profiteering (and charge that would have been levied 
on them multiple times during the War), famously saying that the current system, in 
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which the Navy had to purchase oil from the market, only «fattened the pockets of a few 
oil companies» at the expenses of the American people397.  
In the anti-trust crusading climate of those years, it is not difficult to understand 
why Daniels’ proposal seemed reasonable and even to some extent appealing. Roughly 
a month after the publication of Daniels’ report, in January 1914, Congressman Thomas 
Pryor Gore introduced a resolution in the Senate that authorized and directed the 
«Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Interior to investigate and report as to 
the feasibility, expense, and desirability of Government constructing maintaining, and 
operating» its own pipe line to move oil from the mid-continent to the Gulf, as well as 
of acquiring additional oil lands or lessees and «producing or purchasing oil with a 
view to provide and conserving at all times an adequate and available supply of oil for 
the Navy»398. Not surprisingly, also the proponent of the resolution was a progressive 
Democrat coached in populist principles. Born in Mississippi, Gore became a prominent 
member and supporter of the Populist Party in the early 1890s, before deciding to 
campaign for Bryan in 1896. He formally joined the Democratic Party in 1900 and was 
elected as a Senator from Oklahoma for the same Party in 1907. His background is a 
sign of the importance of the southern-populist tradition in the definition of the 
Democratic brand of progressivism during the early Wilson presidency. In 1914, the 
Senate did indeed approve his resolution and, for the following two years a 
representative of the Department of the Interior, together with a colleague from the 
Navy, conducted hearings to assess the feasibility of the new proposed policy.  
The oil industry was not pleased at all with the idea. Small operators had, in fact, 
reasons to appreciate the plan, since the entrance of the federal government into the 
petroleum business would have helped them – in theory – to break Standard’s close 
hold over the industry. Rockefeller’s various companies and subsidiaries, even after the 
court’s order of 1911, maintained a de facto monopoly of the American oil 
transportation network. A federal-owned and managed pipeline would have therefore 
brought some relief (and a possibly fair alternative) to independent companies otherwise 
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forced to accept any price requested by the “octopus” to handle their oil399. Despite the 
possible benefits, however, such a move by the administration would have represented 
an outright intrusion into the private sector. The government would have become a 
major player within the industry, turning into an actual competitor – one that would 
have been even harder than Standard to work against – and no oilman could take the 
prospect lightheartedly. The possibility of a federal authority with creeping regulatory 
powers and a direct participation in oil operations was a risk more than anything else, as 
the sanctity of free enterprise, and the definition of its limit, remained exactly the major 
point of contention in the political and cultural struggle between the private capital and 
the public administration that characterized the Progressive Era400. The fact that the 
government believed that it could known and do better than the oilmen themselves in 
fuel production and distribution was not therefore only a worrying news but also an 
irritating development for those entrepreneurs who had helped to make the American 
petroleum industry great worldwide401.  
The results of the Senate investigation, which were ready by January 1915, 
could do nothing but uphold the position of the business interests, pouring cold water on 
the aspirations of the Secretary of the Navy and all those who believed that the federal 
government had the political capital and the practical skills to substitute itself to private 
companies. The final report considered the project feasible from a purely engineering 
standpoint, but stated that none of the departments or agencies existent at the time 
would have been able to undertake it. It was not just a matter of technical knowledge. 
The reality of the oil business made its day-to-day operations too complex to be 
managed through government bureaucracy.    
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«We consider the operation of producing oil no simple matter and the operation 
of pipe line, refineries and the marketing so complicated in their ramifications, that 
short of an organization which is as efficient as some of our largest oil companies, it is 
impossible to satisfactorily conduct this business»402   
 
The only possibility was to create a sort of «permanent service department» to 
be filled with oilmen co-opted from the private sector and therefore already «thoroughly 
trained in these matters». Even in that case, however, the nature of the public 
administration would have frustrated their work and chances of success. In an passage 
that seemed to perfectly incorporate the industry’s critique, the study explained even if 
«men of this class were obtained, they would not be able to work at their full efficiency 
on account of restrictions, limitations and delays that would be imposed upon them as 
employees of the government. Their chief value in any private corporation would be 
their ability to take prompt action in matters that frequently involve large expenditures 
on properties or production, and these opportunities could not be taken advantage of if 
they were obliged to be put through as requisitions or requests through the usual 
Government channels»403.  
The report still considered «highly desirable, even imperative, that the 
Government should place itself in a position to control a reserve supply of oil that will 
give it use of liquid fuel at a minimum cost for a long period of years», but asked it to 
refrain from any direct involvement in refining and marketing of oil404. All it had to do 
to secure the oil was to lease its lands to private companies and subject them to the 
Government’s right to claim production as required, or reserve those territories and 
avoid excessive depletion. Alternatively, it could just find an arrangement with the oil 
companies operating there as to maintain the possibility to obtain fuel oil – the only 
item the Navy was actually worried about spending too much money on – at production 
cost and allow them to sell the other petroleum products for profit.  
The report included the statements of the Navy Commander David F. Boyd, who 
had been specifically asked to collaborate in the study and who had been even more 
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straightforward in his assessment. He wrote that the U.S. stood «supreme in production 
and reliability of supply». While foreign fleets may had «perplexing oil problems to 
face», the American Navy had «only that of expense to meet and surmount». Since the 
problem, in Boyd’s opinion, was just about the price of oil and not its availability, the 
solution was simple: it would have been enough for the government to reserved for 
itself the privilege of first purchaser of the oil produced from the lands it owned and 
secure «preferential contracts from any of the large pipe line companies now 
operating»405. There was no need to enter the oil business; the government could have 
just taken care of organizing its own transportation system to connect its storage tanks 
to its bases along the American coasts. 
The results of the study greatly dampened the enthusiasm and interest in 
Congress around Daniels’ plan. The changing reality of the petroleum industry had 
meanwhile contributed to undercut the position of the Secretary. At the time of the 
submission, the U.S. oil outlook appeared much better than it was when the Navy first 
wrote Lane – a perspective change in that was emerged also from the overall very 
optimistic tone of the report. Between 1913 and 1915, U.S. oil production had indeed 
growth by around thirteen percent, while the price had dropped by more than thirty 
percent406. What was regarded as the Navy’s main problem as regards to oil had, 
therefore, almost disappeared by itself and the U.S. Congress, as a consequence, became 
less concerned about the issue. Despite the insistence of the Secretary, who as late as a 
month before the report was presented reiterated his desire to see the Navy «own its oil 
lands and ultimately produce, transport, refine, and store its own oil»407, the plan to 
transform his Department (and therefore the government) into a oil producer was 
shelved. Another reason for the decision was the fact that, while the hearings were 
ongoing, the Supreme Court had struck another blow to Standard’s control, ruling that 
the companies operating the American oil pipelines were in fact “common carriers” 
engaged in interstate commerce, and therefore subject to the Interstate Commerce 
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Commission408. The sentence had expanded the powers to regulate of the federal 
government the movements of petroleum products under the Hepburn Act of 1906, thus 
already addressing some of the concerns raised by Daniels about the absolute power of 
the private companies in imposing high prices.  
Despite the rejection of Daniels’ requests, the debate on the issue remained 
however as the first instance in which the direct intervention of the government in the 
oil business as an actual participant was proposed. Proposals to organize through and on 
behalf of the federal government business entities directly involved in oil production, 
refining, and marketing would have appeared again both after WWI and WWII. In all 
these cases, the authority and capacity of the national oil companies was questioned 
and, in the name of a greater national good, Washington's authority and resources were 
summoned. In every instance, the American oil companies managed to rebuff the 
attempts to restrict their space of maneuver and encroach on their commercial 
independence while holding high the banner of free enterprise.  
The extreme confidence expressed in the report about the overall availability of 
American oil – just a few years after the foreboding estimates completed at the end of 
the Roosevelt administration – indicated the difficulties that some U.S. officials still had 
in understanding the nature and dynamics governing the industry and therefore predict 
its trajectory. The Navy, in particular, seemed to be easily swayed by the volatile 
movements of the market. Unable to grasp the forces at play and therefore anticipate 
them, the Department was forced to closely follow and react to the ups and downs of 
the petroleum business. This also meant, however, that the only way the Navy could 
make long term planning was by using short time-frame analysis. What they use to do 
was basically take the only thing available to them – a snapshot of the current market 
situation – and project them into a longer temporal perspective in a linear manner. Just 
like if they were to develop a flight plan only by looking outside a cabin window, the 
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American officials found themselves scrambling to readjust their path (and policy) after 
any variation in the external conditions. Unable to gather all the information and 
incorporate them in a single, broader, and more stable model, they risked not only to 
miss the bigger picture, but also to over- (or under-) react to any change along the way.  
The ability to grasp the basic elements of the ongoing process that the Navy 
itself called «the passing of coal and the advent of oil» would have indeed been crucial 
in any attempt to correctly assess and adjust to it409. The adoption of liquid fuel on a 
global scale would have had enormous consequences. Yet a still overlooked aspect 
seemed to be the soon-to-arrive increase in demand that the implementation of a similar 
naval policy in all the other countries would have caused. Like the United States and 
following the example of Great Britain, other powers would have tried to secure oil for 
naval uses too and, if the line of action proposed by Churchill and Daniels, involving 
the government’s direct participation into the oil business, were to become the norm, 
then access to oil would have stopped to be simply a commercial objective and become 
a bone of strong political contention between nations. The Petroleum Gazette, a 
Pennsylvanian independent oil and gas journal, had anticipated this scenario as early as 
1913 while discussing Daniels’ proposal:  
 
«There are other considerations than cost that enter into the question and not 
the least of these are volume and permanence in supplies made available…If the 
world’s navies are to use oil for fuel the same arguments will be advanced and acted 
upon by every other nation that would not be placed at a disadvantage in naval 
efficiency. The governments with home or territorial oil fields will endeavor to provide 
for the greater part of their supplies in the same manner as proposed above by Mr. 
Churchill in Great Britain and Mr. Daniels in the United States, while the countries 
with little or no oil production, but with navies using fuel oil, must make provision for 
storage reserves. Indeed, even the governments best situated as to current supplies and 
producing territory, actual or prospective, will require substantial reserves of this 
character, for oil fields will decline and dry spots will be in evidence for governments 
as well as individuals. Thus to the rivalry for oil on the part of individuals and 
companies there is the prospect, in the present outlook, there is to be added the rivalry 
of nations»410. 
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A world’s race for oil driven by a change in naval policies would have put under 
great stress the existing production sites, redesigning trade patterns and eventually 
upsetting the linear, “static” representation that American officials had of the oil 
business. At the time, the industry already operated on a global scale, dominated by 
international corporations with large interests abroad and over which national 
governments had little or no control. In 1914, U.S. oil companies’ investments in 
Europe accounted for about one fourth of all the American foreign direct investments 
towards the region411. Even when taking into consideration the entire world, the share of 
American FDI in the petroleum sector (exploration, production, refining, and 
distribution) remained well above ten percent of the total412. These numbers are 
impressive if one considers that the pre-WWI period represented a still early stage of 
development for several oil-intensive industries (including mechanized agriculture, air-
transportation, chemicals and plastics). Still in 1914, American companies (and above 
all the Standard Oil group) provided alone for almost one third of all the crude oil and 
derivate products demanded by the other countries413. In this context, it is clear that oil 
was not meant to, and would have not, stopped at the border. Petroleum would have 
flown instead where it was most needed (purchased), following the law of supply and 
demand – or, more realistically, according to the market share allocations decided by 
the companies among themselves. 
The industry had evolved tumultuously through cycles of rapid expansion 
fuelled by major oil discoveries around the world. Especially in the United States, 
where the structure of the property rights rewarded the quick exploitation of the fields 
over their conservation, periods of overproduction were part of the (if not natural, at 
least) usual pattern of development of the oil business. Due to the high availability of 
petroleum, the commerce of crude oil and derivatives had remained a buyer’s market for 
most of the previous decades. Yet price hikes due to rapid increases in demand or 
sudden drop in production, especially at regional level, were also common. Oil booms 
and phases of relative contractions therefore alternated in what was an overall positive 
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trend of growth for the petroleum sector. These fluctuations however continued to 
puzzle and concern those who were looking closely at the industry, trying to understand 
it and interpret its future course. 
 Indeed, the optimism of the years immediately before the War quickly dissipated 
as the fundamentals of the market began to change again. In his 1915 annual report, 
Daniels repeated his worries about the oil situation before the Congress. Oil price was 
on the rise once again and he explained that the supply was «a problem of great 
importance» now that the Navy had fully committed to liquid fuel414. Forced to abandon 
the idea of having the Department produce its own oil, he did not relent and indeed 
double down on the request of for protection of the naval reserves. Oil was a 
«necessity» for the Secretary, who regarded the oil lands in Wyoming and California as 
the actual lifeline of the Navy415. Wary of the market oscillations and even warier of 
private interests, he announced that he had met with the Attorney General and the 
Secretary of Interior in order to figure out the best strategies to protect the rights of the 
Navy and asked the government to “persecute” and “remove” without delay any driller 
who was «illegally occupying» any tract of those territories to operate thereon. Daniels 
stated that the «only feasible method of providing an adequate, dependable supply» was 
to set aside, under government control, large oil-bearing areas and keep private 
companies out of them. Those reserves were to be used only when a decrease in 
production and high prices would have shut off all other sources of supply416. In 
Daniels’ opinion, such a time would have come, for sure: it was just a matter of “when”, 
not “if”. It was therefore «vital» for federal government to retain control of those 
lands417. The obsession with the naval oil-lands was indeed so great that at one point he 
actually requested the deployment of armed group of Marines on them – and therefore 
on U.S. soil – to physically protect the areas from wildcatters418.  
 After what seemed a short period of diversion, principle of conservation came 
back as strong as than ever as guide for government’s action and as fundament of the 
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public debate around American resources, especially mineral ones. In fact, 
conservationism had never left. It had simply fell on the background for a very brief 
time as oil production grew and the country gained new confidence about its role and its 
means, thanks also to a blossoming industrial sector, a revamped Navy, an expanding 
commerce, and the continuous growth of Washington’s diplomatic reach. Furthermore, 
to dampen the conservationist furor had arrived Lane himself, who had a more moderate 
and pragmatic view on how to manage the country natural resources. Differently from 
those who held pure preservationist positions, the new Secretary was open to a 
controlled and regulated – functional – use of American natural endowment. As his 
reply to Daniels demonstrated, he saw the country’s naval reserves as an asset to exploit 
– not as an untouchable property. This attitude was, in theory, similar to that displayed a 
few years earlier by Pinchot, the father of America’s forestry. In fact, the two were more 
distant than what they had wanted to see. Pinchot, who had even welcomed Lane’s 
appointment, would have turned sour quickly, as the Secretary began to drift farther and 
farther away from his initial naturalistic benevolence and towards a pro-business vision 
and management of American lands and natural resources, oil included419.  
Lane’s growing distance from the traditional positions of the American 
conservationists was however due more to the intransigency of the latter than to the 
treachery of the former.  To any of Lane’s openness towards the American business 
interests interested to operate on government lands, Daniels responded with stiffness, 
progressively hardening its position as to claim the absolute inviolability of the oil-
bearing lands under federal jurisdiction by 1915. The crusade of the Secretary of the 
Navy signaled that at no point before the War the conservationist cause was lost. The 
proof that the progressive conservationism, as defined by its traditional anti-business 
ethos, was still a powerful ideological force was in the kind of reasoning expressed by 
Daniels and by those who, like him, always operated on the premises that resources 
were scarce and that, in order to make better use of them on behalf of the “nation”, 
federal government had to step in and private interests had to be kept in check. This 
socially and economically characterized conservationism scored indeed some important 
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points in those years. On April 30, 1915, Wilson decided to create a third Naval Reverse 
at Teapot Dome, in Wyoming. The decision, which followed Daniels’ request and came 
in the middle of the discussion about the legal status of the first two, left little doubt as 
to where the president stood.  
In such a climate, Wilson’s administrative move was indeed particularly 
significant. Yet it was neither the only action nor the most visible one taken at the time 
with the problem of the American future oil supply in mind. In 1914, the president had 
authorized the occupation of Veracruz, in Mexico, after the diplomatic crisis following 
the Tampico Affairs. The deployment of U.S. forces was formally meant to restore the 
American prestige and admonish the southern neighbor. In fact, it was a way to punish 
and damage the authority of Victoriano Huerta, who was despised by Wilson. In the 
context of the intervention, the take of Veracruz did not come by chance. American oil 
companies had indeed invested heavily in the area in the previous years, attracted by 
richness of the oil lands and the closeness to the American border, and the 
administration realized it would have been important to safeguard them.    
The decision to intervene arrived in late April 1914. Just a couple of weeks 
before, the Secretary of State Bryan had explained Wilson that Mexico was destined to 
become an «inevitable source» from which the American oil supply would have been 
drawn in the near future. Bryan’s reasoning added a new passage to the usual 
conservationist logic – one that pointed at foreign oil as the natural substitute for what 
many thought would have soon become difficult to find at home. In a matter of a couple 
of years, those concerns would have grown exponentially thanks to the war in Europe, 
marking a new phase in American conservationist thinking.  
 
The First World War would have indeed soon confirmed petroleum’s crucial 
role as fuel and lubricant also in the military realm, producing a new awareness about 
its role, availability, and supply. As soon as the conflict spread through Europe, oil 
became a prized resource in a conflict that saw the introduction of tanks, trucks, and 
planes, and a widespread use of submarines and battleships. The steady rise of 
petroleum consumption, however, was worrying news for those federal experts who had 
already questioned the abundance of national oil resources before the outbreak of the 
war. As early as February 1916, with the war already ravaging Europe, Mark Lawrence 
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Requa, a consulting engineer at the Bureau of Mines, prepared a report on «The 
Exhaustion of the Petroleum Resources of the United States», and submitted it to the 
U.S. Senate through his friend and California Senator James D. Phelan. The Bureau of 
Mines, headed by Van H. Manning, and the U.S. Geological Survey, whose director 
was George Otis Smith, were both agencies of the Department of Interior. Formally 
they had different technical responsibilities, but the status of American oil reserves was 
clearly an area of common interest. In his article, Requa painted a very grim picture of 
the country’s future, explaining that American oil resources could last – under the best 
of circumstances – about thirty or forty years. He specifically called for the intervention 
of the federal government to avoid what was described as an impending national 
catastrophe. The only solution, according to the federal official, was in the acquisition 
of foreign resources (first of all the ones in Mexico, then those overseas). There was not 
only the country’s commercial and economic independence at stake, but also its 
freedom.  
 
«Viewed from any angle, the situation is highly unsatisfactory and demands 
immediate consideration in an attempt not only to husband what we have but to add to 
our reserves by securing foreign sources of supply… 
In the exhaustion of its oil lands and with no assured source of domestic supply 
in sight, the United States is confronted with a national crisis of the first 
magnitude…We must either plan for the future or we must pass into a condition of 
commercial vassalage, in time of peace relaying on some foreign country for the 
petroleum wherewith to lubricate the high-ways of commerce, in time of war at the 
mercy of the enemy who may either control the source of supply or the means of 
transportation; in either event our railways and factories will cease operation our 
battleships will swing helplessly at anchor, and our country will resound with the 
martial tread of a triumphant foe»420.  
 
Requa was a true “mining man”, whose father made a fortune with gold and 
silver mines in Nevada. He instead turned first to copper and then to petroleum, joining 
the oil rush in California at the beginning of the century. As member of the industry, 
Requa had already become a relatively well-known figure within the Western oil 
circles. In Washington, however, in 1916 he was still a simple technical advisor and his 
earnest concerns for the status of the national oil reserves may have seemed far-fetched. 
                                                
420 Mark Requa, Article on the Exhaustion of the Petroleum Resources of the United States, United States 
Senate, 64th Congress, 1st Session, March 9, 1916. A copy is enclosed in the Department’s file 
867.6363/5, RG 59, NARA II. 
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The gravity of the situation, as expressed by his article, largely surpassed any previous 
assessment about the role of foreign petroleum. At the time, the American companies 
were already present in the Mexican oil fields and the federal government was aware of 
their importance. It was however an evaluation based on their commercial value, not on 
their strategic significance. Requa’s message carried instead a different and 
unprecedented sense of urgency421.  
These considerations ceased to be simply those of a particularly concerned 
engineer only one year later, when United States’ entrance into the war transformed 
Requa’s role within the administration and gave him national visibility422. Personal 
connections helped his cause: soon after the country joined WWI, Requa’s close friend 
Herbert Hoover called him to serve as his personal assistant in the U.S. Food 
Administration. After few months of service, he was appointed Head of the Oil Division 
in the U.S. Fuel Administration, a position that gave him large wartime regulatory 
powers and the opportunity to establish close ties with companies’ executives. In that 
function, indeed, he gained the appellation of «oil czar» and worked side by side with 
the National Petroleum War Service Committee (NPWSC), a group of prominent 
industry representatives including the heads of the major national oil companies, to 
coordinate petroleum shipments to the Allies and organize national fuel distribution. 
The Committee had been designed specifically to encourage the collaboration between 
oilmen and federal agencies and succeeded in bridging their relationship. The joint-
wartime planning was considered a success on both sides of the Ocean. The U.S. was 
able to supply about eighty percent of the Allied petroleum needs during the war and the 
combined work of the country’s companies and federal departments received 
widespread acknowledgment on the press423.  
The war effort, however, also forced the United States to accept oil rationing and 
gasless Sundays, which were imposed by Requa himself in the last months of conflict. 
The domestic controlled shortages were simply the result of the industry difficulties in 
                                                
421 About the concept of scarcity and the resulting “ideology”, see: Roger J. Stern, «Oil Scarcity Ideology 
in US Foreign Policy, 1908–97», Security Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 214-257. 
422 Requa’s name began not only to appear on oil industry-related journals and magazines, but also on the 
national newspapers. During wartime, New York Times itself reported multiple times on his work and 
decisions as Head of the Oil Division. 
423 See, for example: «Floated to Victory on a Wave of Oil, Earl Curzon Tells How Allied Ingenuity 
Overcame Petroleum Crisis of 1916», New York Times, November 23, 1918; «Wave of Oil that Swept 
Allies to Victory Was American Oil», National Petroleum News; December 16, 1918. 
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restocking and transporting oil after having stretched its logistical resources for years 
because of the war, but they ended up inevitably confirming the fears about the future of 
the national supply previously publicized by federal experts, bringing down an already 
weakening confidence in the abundance American oil reserves. Requa’s narrative began 
to gain recognition and support during the final moments of the WWI, as he incessantly 
continued to press his arguments in Washington. Hoover’s endorsement of his 
recommendations, and overall vision, for example, arrived already in October 1918. The 
then still head of the U.S. Food Administration wrote him denouncing the restrictions 
put by foreign countries upon U.S. companies attempting to acquire ownership of oil 
producing territories abroad, and expressing his agreement on two specific points:  
 
1. The United States oil concerns must secure foreign oil territory if we are to 
have continued supplies  
2. The effort to secure this supplement must be organized by the 
Government424. 
 
Requa was incredibly consistent during his career in advancing a strongly competitive, 
antagonistic vision about the issue of oil supply, based on a classical and exclusivist – in 
a world: imperialistic – notion of possession and control that applied to the natural 
resources just as well as it applied to territories. He reiterated this approach in his final 
report as general director of the Oil Division U.S. Fuel Administration, produced soon 
after the end of the war. In the official document, dated December 20, 1918, and to be 
transmitted to the head of the U.S. Fuel Administration, H. A. Garfield, Requa 
explained that it was not even a matter of knowing precisely how much oil was still 
stored below the American ground anymore. The decision to acquire foreign fields was 
not connected to the years of supply left; it was not a relative necessity, but an absolute 
one. This is why, regardless of how much time the country had left before seeing the 
exhaustion of its national resources, the government had to act now: 
 
«Whether estimates of the Geological survey are correct or grossly in error, the 
fundamental fact remains unaltered; we are increasing our consumption of petroleum 
products at a tremendously rapid rate, domestic production no longer suffices to meet 
the demand, and in the light of future needs we should, as a Nation, encourage in every 
                                                
424 Hoover to Requa, October 12, 1918, Food Administration Records, Box 66, Hoover Institution, 
Stanford (CA), USA. 
	 213 
way possible our nationals in the acquisition of petroleum-bearing lands thought the 
world… 
Mechanical power is the dominant note in the determination to future industrial 
supremacy; the products of petroleum are essential in the development of this power… 
We must see to it, therefore, in behalf of national welfare, that our reserve supplies are 
increased at every opportunity through the acquisition by our nationals of reserves in 
foreign lands». 
 
In order to push the government into action, Requa made reference to the very 
popular and powerful idea of national welfare that emerged in the progressive era – that 
of a superior public good (as opposed to the private one) that the state had to serve and 
protect through its action. He would have eventually redefined and expanded its 
meaning – and the extent the federal authority had to go to safeguard it – by redefining 
it in such a way as to include the very safety of the country, therefore marking a 
transition from the idea of a communal, shared, domestic well-being to that a national 
interest (as opposed to other “national” interests in the international arena): Requa was 
not asking the government to break monopolies for the sake of the collectivity (i.e. to 
rebalance the various private interests within the community and avoid profiteering), 
but to protect the country from external and “vital” threats that could endanger its very 
existence by destroying the fabric of its society, the structure of its economy, and even 
infringing upon the integrity of its territory. 
 
4.2 America Needs to Refuel 
The months following the end of WWI proved to be critical in ending 
Washington’s apathy about the issue of foreign supply and transforming the public 
debate about it. A more assertive foreign policy toward the acquisition of external 
petroleum reserves, especially in the Middle East, developed through the combined 
efforts of a limited but determined group of people, who established a powerful 
connection between oil reserves and the nation’s growth and security. This shift in the 
national discourse on oil began to materialize in early 1919, when the widespread 
pessimism regarding the status of the national resources coupled with American oil 
companies’ post-War business considerations. The wartime collaboration between the 
industry and Washington proved that the two could effectively work together, for the 
gain of both. Once the war was over, this relationship turned in a relatively short span of 
time into an even closer, yet informal, partnership, based on a stronger convergence of 
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interests. The federal experts, concerned about the country’s dwindling oil reserves, and 
the companies’ executives, looking into commercial opportunities abroad, found 
common ground (and cause) in building a greater awareness about the strategic value of 
foreign petroleum supply and in guiding policy-makers towards the formulation of a 
new and more forceful approach to the matter – i.e. for the government to extend 
assistance and support to the national oil companies seeking concession abroad425. 
From a purely commercial perspective, the extraordinary surge in the 
consumption of petroleum products sounded more like an opportunity than a 
misfortune, as it bore serious expectations of a formidable post-War world market 
expansion. The rapidly shifting business environment compelled even the largest of 
American companies to rethink their business plans and operations. The impressive 
production’s capacity of the American domestic fields had guaranteed to U.S. 
companies decades of dominance in the world oil market. Now the prospects of 
exhaustion forced them to plan ahead and enter the race for overseas exploration, in 
which American operators lagged well behind their international competitors. In fact, 
scarcity per se was not what troubled American oilmen the most. Oil industry’s leaders 
were skeptics about federal geologists’ claims and, even if they actually were to believe 
them, it would have made little difference. Companies’ directors and Washington’s 
officials operated with different time frames. The government had (still has) to assume a 
long-term perspective in the definition of its policy; businesses thrive on the realization 
of short-run objectives (and gains). A thirty or forty years’ outlook was definitely too 
long for any oil company firm worried about surviving the next five in immediate 
aftermath of a world war. What companies really worried about was to find oil as not to 
be wiped out by the increasing domestic and international competition, a threat way 
more imminent than that posed by the depletion of the national reserves. Coincidentally, 
there was a way to defuse both: secure foreign resources. The actual possession of the 
wells was indeed considered crucial in a business sector that, according to both industry 
and government’s assessments, was to be dominated by production. As another engineer 
of the Bureau of Mines wrote exactly in early 1919, «oil companies – and their 
                                                
425 The works of historians such has John DeNovo, Gerald D. Nash, Randall J. Stephen, have all 
highlighted, with various degree intensity, this complementarity of interests and the role of those who 
tried to make them relevant in US foreign oil policy. 
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countries – controlling oil production will control the petroleum trade of the world in 
the future».  
The leading American company, Standard Oil of New Jersey (SONJ), had the 
same concerns, as was affected by the same problem. After the 1911 sentence, which 
had divided and compartmentalized the original Standard, the SONJ had maintained a 
strong marketing structure, but had lost much of its upstream operations (exploration 
and production). As a consequence, the company became soon “short on crude”, i.e. it 
lacked the production capacity to satisfy its distribution objectives. By the end of the 
war, indeed, the quantity of oil extracted directly by the SONJ accounted for only about 
the fifteen percent of its refineries’ needs426. The overwhelming majority of the 
petroleum’s products marketed by the company derived therefore from oil bought from 
other producers – a situation that basically forced the SONJ to rely on its competitors 
(and accept their posted price) if it wanted to continue selling, let alone expand in new 
markets. The Wall Street Journal reported on the company’s outlook few days after the 
armistice, explaining that it lacked any control of the supply outside of United States427. 
The SONJ had focused for years on distribution and marketing activities, thinking it 
«could control the markets of the world through the markets of America», just to find 
itself at a serious disadvantage when the demand boomed and new and more productive 
oilfields were discovered abroad and acquired by its competitors.  
In the following weeks, the future of U.S. foreign oil supply repeatedly entered 
the public debate428. While great attention was reserved to the oil situation in Mexico, 
where U.S. private interests had entered a long legal battle with the national government 
for the redefinition of royalties and ownership rights, both federal oil experts and 
Standard’s executives began to look at the Middle East. The region, stretching from 
Egypt to Persia, was enormous but at the time only few areas arose real interest. 
Geologists knew that oil was present in Persia, suspected that it could be extracted in 
commercial quantities from Egypt and Palestine, and were pretty sure about the 
existence of large reservoirs below the territory once referred as Mesopotamia, between 
                                                
426 D. Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power. NY: Sino & Schuster, 1993; pag. 199. 
427 «Standard Oil Strongest at Home, Not Abroad», Wall Street Journal, November 24, 1918. 
428 See, for example, «Edward L. Doheny Talks About Petroleum’s Future», Wall Street Journal, 
December 12, 1918; «Walter Teagle Discusses the Future of Oil», Wall Street Journal January 21, 1919; 
«World’s Future Run on Oil», Tusla Daily World, March 15, 1919; «Looking Toward the Future», The 
Waverly Oilman, May 1919. 
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the modern Iraq and the southeast of Turkey429. The information about the area was 
limited but compelling enough to convince U.S. group of geologists, oil experts, and 
oilmen of the opportunity and, in fact, necessity to compete for its control. To 
successfully do so, however, it was necessary to gain government’s attention to the 
Middle Eastern cause, and to try to offset British advantages in the area430.  
 
4.3 Minding the Gap 
The way federal oil experts and Standard’s directors brought pressure to bear on 
the administration, and specifically on the State Department, for a shift of policy 
towards access to Middle Eastern resources mirrored the tangled web of personal and 
working relationships existent among them, which had mostly grown out of the war 
experience. Their efforts, which would have showed a remarkable degree of 
coordination, started from afar and precisely in Europe.  
The fate of the Mesopotamian territories, which were officially part of the 
defeated Ottoman Empire, would have indeed been decided during the peace 
negotiations. When they started in Paris, on January 18, 1919, the partition of the 
Empire was among the many issues on the table. The goal, for the federal oil experts, 
was to avoid any transfer of authority to European powers that would have 
compromised the chances of the American government and companies to acquire the 
area’s oilfields. In order to get the attention of the U.S. delegates in Europe, on February 
4th, Requa instructed E. W. Perdew, a chemical engineer of the Bureau of Mines 
stationed in London, to forward to his friend Bernard Baruch, one of the highest 
American representatives in Europe, a message on the «Protection of the Petroleum 
Industry of the United States». Baruch was sympathetic to the industry’s needs. Besides 
                                                
429 The Arab Peninsula and the Persian Gulf were still basically unexplored. Outside the national borders, 
US interests extracted crude only in Romania and Mexico, whose large oilfields had raised great 
expectations. Among the other oil-bearing regions, the most important were the Russian territory around 
Baku, the Dutch East Indies – where the Royal Dutch Shell, Standard’s competitor, operated –, and 
Venezuela (where commercial production had just began). Middle Eastern oil reserves, however, would 
quickly gain major consideration. 
430 English merchants, explorers, and officials had been roaming the region for decades, and the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company was already active in Persia. On the other hand, US presence in the early twentieth 
century went little further that of missionaries and occasional merchants. The State Department, which 
had only a handful of diplomatic posts in the region, waited until 1909 to inaugurate a division of Near 
Eastern Affairs and, once established, it failed to signal the emergence of a specific interest in the region - 
lest of all an oil-related one: the jurisdiction of the new bureau extended to an enormous area that 
included Russia, Germany, Italy, and the Balkans, together with Turkey, Persia, Egypt, and Abyssinia. 
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being one of the best-know American financiers, during the conflict he had served as 
director of the War Industry Board and had the role of supervising the work of the 
National Petroleum War Service Committee – a task that of course brought him to have 
a direct relationship with the Committee’s head: A. C. Bedford, the SONJ’s chairman.  
Perdew’s letter to Baruch was meant to inform the latter and, as a consequence, 
President Wilson himself, about the precarious situation of the American oil industry. It 
included a series of considerations emerged during previous conversation between 
Requa, Van H. Manning, who was still the director of the Bureau of Mines, and Perdew 
himself. Requa had worked as consulting engineer in Manning’s Bureau for years 
before WWI, prior to becoming head of the Oil Division. After the conflict, they 
restarted, or better continued their collaboration, showing perfect alignment in their 
positions on the issue of foreign supply. Perdew’s long message to Baruch conveyed 
their common concerns about the future of American oil, beginning by reiterating the 
impending danger for the country’s economy: 
 
«…I wish to state most emphatically that Mr. Requa has not in anyway over-
estimated the impending danger and disaster to the petroleum industry of the United 
States - and what affects the petroleum industry affects directly and indirectly every 
industry in the United States...Lessons of the war have shown only too clearly that 
petroleum products are now essential to life and industries as are iron and coal».  
 
He then went to describe the situation of the American oil industry:  
 
«Unfortunately in the past [had] confined themselves almost entirely to territory 
within the United States…[building] up large and efficient distributing and marketing 
organizations abroad, depending upon American production» (emphasis in the 
original). 
We are now confronted with the fact that US Production of crude oil is not 
keeping up with the consumption of US refineries, which, alone, should cause the US 
government to encourage and induce American oil interests to seek production in other 
part of the world, and thus help supply American foreign trade with American produced 
oil from foreign fields431. 
 
Given Baruch’s background and expertise, it is not difficult to understand why Requa, 
Manning, and Perdew decided to draw attention to the situation of the American oil 
                                                
431 Perdew (American Shipping Mission – Petroleum Section; London) to Baruch, February 4, 1919. 
Josephus Daniels Papers, Box 518, Reel 36; Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, Washington 
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business and the country’s shrinking commercial opportunities to get his support. The 
letter stated that there was also an «even stronger reason» behind their call to action. 
Perdew wrote that, after few months in London, he had come to the conclusion that H. 
M. Government was «adopting a strong, vigorous and continuous policy with regard to 
controlling as much as possible of the present and future world’s production of 
petroleum». According to him and his colleagues, it was clear that Great Britain (and 
France, too) were practicing unfair competition, discriminating against U.S. citizens and 
capitals in those territories under the European influence. The message described 
London nationalistic practices as a matter of fact and asked for immediate Washington’s 
involvement. Perdew called the British policy «aggressive» and warned that, if allowed 
to continued, it would have, «to say at least, place[d] all American oil interests at a 
serious disadvantage in the future, unless the Government of the United States also 
speedily adopt[ed] a strong “oil policy” or [took] some other means to protect 
American interests and to secure for them an equal break with British companies». 
The proposed recommendations were equally clear. The three federal experts 
specifically referred to the Middle East, communicating its undeniable importance. 
«The so-called Neutral Zone in Persia», Perdew wrote, «has without the shadow of 
doubt tremendous oil resources […] There is every reason to believe that this immense 
oil field extends into Turkey (Mesopotamia)». This information, he added, should have 
been taken into serious consideration «in the settlement of the world’s new boundary 
lines and especially in the disposition of enemy territory and colony»432.  
A few days later, Perdew made even clearer what they expected from the government, 
specifying to Baruch that: «Mesopotamia stands to become one of the world’s greatest 
oil fields. It is therefore very important that Mesopotamia does not come within either 
British or French areas of influence»433. 
  
Industry’s executives soon joined the mission of this small group of oil “experts” 
(they were all non-elected officials with technical knowledge), which had fully 
mobilized in the attempt to promote a very definite vision about the management and 
control of the country’s oil resources. Walter Teagle, who was SONJ’s president and 
                                                
432 ibid. 
433 Memorandum, Perdew to Baruch; February 12, 1919. Josephus Daniels Papers, Box 518, Reel 36; 
Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, Washington DC, USA. 
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used to sit, together with SONJ’s chairman Bedford, in the NPWSC, soon demonstrated 
to possess, and work on, the same information about the profitability of the 
Mesopotamian oilfields circulating within the Department of Interior434. It was not, by 
any means, surprising. The numerous (positive) assessments about the oil prospects in 
the area were indeed nor new or secret. Furthermore, Teagle, too, was a personal friend 
of Requa, with whom he literally shared an office while working in Washington during 
the war435. Just a few days after Perdew sent his message to Baruch, Teagle wrote to the 
Standard’s directors, bringing to their attention the great perspective value of the 
«promising» Middle Eastern oilfields436. Given Standard’s thirst for crude oil, the 
possibility of controlling them must have sounded like a unique business opportunity. 
Teagle made clear that gaining access to those sources of supply had already become a 
company’s objective, expressly stating that he was «already wondering if there was any 
way we could get into the oil producing end of the game in Mesopotamia». In the 
following weeks, Bedford left for Paris to talk directly with the U.S. delegates 
dispatched there and take part in person to the ongoing negotiations.  
 
4.4 Forging the Oil-National Security Nexus 
The efforts to convince the administration not to let Mesopotamia slide into the 
British area of influence continued incessantly during the spring of 1919. While SONJ’s 
executives were in Europe, the geologists and petroleum engineers at the Department of 
Interior applied further pressure on Washington officials. On February 28, Requa, 
Manning, and the Director of the U.S. Geological Survey George Otis Smith, sent a 
common statement to H. A. Garfield, head of the U.S. Fuel Administration, saying they 
were «impressed with the seriousness of the efforts being made by the British and Dutch 
interests to dominate the petroleum supply of the world». They letter explained that, 
since «40% of the available oil of the United States has already been exhausted», it was 
«absolutely necessary…that American interests be encouraged by sympathetic 
                                                
434 Bedford too had a seat in the NPWSC – a situation that made the SONJ the only company to have two 
of its men sitting the Committee. 
435 G. Knowlton & S. Gibb, History of Standard Oil Company: Resurgent Years 1911-1927, NY, Harper 
and Brothers, 1974, pag. 120. 
436 Teagle wrote almost the exact same words used by Perdew: «there is every reason to believe that these 
Persian fields are large in extend and they extend over into Mesopotamia…». Ibid, pagg. 274-275. 
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Government cooperation», so that «the interests of the public can best be 
safeguarded»437.  
The day after, on March 1, 1919, J. H. Rossiter, the Director of Operations of the 
US Shipping Board, doubled down on these claims sending his own personal message 
to Garfield. He added a new perspective on the importance of securing foreign supply, 
explaining that oil was essential to keep the U.S. merchant marine running and thus to 
maintain any hope for an all-American commerce. Rossiter put on record his full 
support for the positions and recommendations advanced by the American oil experts 
and said that he had received the report from Requa himself.  
 
«Through the courtesy of Mr. Mark L. Requa I have had the opportunity of 
perusing statement on PETROLEUM addressed to you by Mr. George Otis Smith, 
Director Geological Survey, Mr. Van Manning, Director Bureau of Mines, and Mr. 
Mark L. Requa, General Director Oil Division, Fuel Administration…  
I desire to further impress the importance, nay-absolute necessity, of assuring sufficient 
oil fuel for our merchant marine… 
OIL vs. COAL is to be briefly summarized as SUCCESS vs. FAILURE. Unless 
we have oil fuel for our ships we must relinquish our aspirations for an overseas 
commerce under the American flag… 
The question of a dependable oil supply for our ships is one that gives me 
constant concern and I cannot too strongly urge the importance of acting promptly 
along the lines suggested in the statement of Messrs. Smith, Manning and Requa» 
 
Garfield was the perfect person to convey the message to the President. Besides 
being the head of Fuel Administration, Garfield was also Wilson’s friend438. He 
forwarded the letter to him just two days later, «urging that the question of fuel oil 
supply receive early and careful consideration». «In weighting the value» of the 
experts’ assessment, Garfield specifically suggested «calling upon Mr. Baruch», who 
had evidently already been exposed to Requa’s ideas – and possibly to those of Bedford, 
too439.  
                                                
437 Requa, Manning, Otis to Garfield, February 28, 1919. Josephus Daniels Papers, Box 518, Reel 36; 
Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, Washington DC, USA. 
438 Both university professors, Wilson had offered Garfield a chair in politics at Princeton in 1903, when 
he became president of the prestigious institution. A few years later, Wilson recommended Garfield as 
president of the Williams College in Massachusetts, before asking him to serve as Fuel Administrator 
during the World War I. 
439 Memorandum for the President of the United States From H. A. Garfield Concerning the Oil Situation, 
March 5, 1919. Josephus Daniels Papers, Box 518, Reel 36; Manuscript Division of the Library of 
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The head the Oil Division lobbying activity was relentless and unending during 
those months. At the beginning of March, he sent a letter sent to the Sub-committee on 
Mineral Raw Materials of the newly established Economic Liaison Committee – an 
interdepartmental body formed few months earlier to study the new economic situation 
and coordinate policies among those agencies that were usually dealing with foreign 
trade, namely the Department of State and the Department of Commerce. Dismayed by 
the lack of progress on the issue, Requa tried to send another forceful message, urging 
«that in the national interest [emphasis on the original] American petroleum companies 
be encouraged by the Government to acquire foreign sources of oil supply, wherever 
they can be obtained»440. In the attempt to prevent any accusation of favoritism towards 
the industry – i.e. of trying to enlist the government’s support just to allow American 
private companies to profit off the acquisition of foreign oilfields  –, he appealed again 
to the notion of public good, explaining that the action he was proposing «was solely 
and wholly in behalf of the people of the United States», and restating that this was «not 
a plea in behalf of the Standard Oil Company or any other company; it is a plea in 
behalf of the United States, in behalf of the people of this nation». The bigger, 
international implications of the petroleum issue were of course not lost. Requa hinted 
in the text at the fact that the United States risked (another) war if it were to disregard 
his recommendations and refuse to take action.  
These very same concerns were presented to the Secretary of the Interior 
Franklin Lane almost at the same time. In mid-May, Manning presented to his superior 
a voluminous report on the International Policies Affecting the World’s Petroleum 
Industry. In fact, the study was prepared as a reply to a formal questionnaire submitted 
to Manning a week before by a member of Congress – no one else than the Californian 
Senator Phelan, Requa’s friend and the man who first formally introduced his original 
report in Congress in 1916. «On account of the national importance of this 
information», Manning presented it to Secretary Lane in the form of an one hundred-
page memorandum, which included an fairly elaborate presentation of all the arguments 
advanced in the previous months about the importance of securing foreign supply and a 
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series of specific policy proposals. Manning’s report began by repeating the claim that 
there was no other option in respect to future supplies of essential raw materials for the 
United States, and in respect to the country’s future trade in general, that was at the 
present time so important and so critical as the petroleum situation. He added:  
 
«No greater and more lasting and far-reaching service can be rendered to this 
country at the present time, than making possible and effecting the securing by or for 
American Citizens their rightful participation in the development of all of the world’s 
reserves of petroleum»441. 
 
As to the Middle East, he asked the administration to intervene in the peace 
negotiation as to force the European power to maintain an “open door” policy as regards 
to petroleum: 
 
«[P]ositive stipulation should be made that, in any protectorate or mandatory 
sphere resulting from the pending peace negotiations, the protecting or mandatory 
power, its citizens and its nationals shall not enjoy any special privileges or preferences 
in respect to the oil industry»442.  
 
The participation of American companies was however not a matter of profit, or 
economic growth, as of national supply. The difference is crucial to fully understand 
their logic. According to Manning, Requa, and Otis Smith, the ownership of the 
concession equaled with the control of the production – an assumption based on a very 
rigid vision of the oil industry and market, in which oil followed, and would have 
always followed, the flag. They feared the possibility of foreign nationals controlling 
foreign oilfields because they thought that, once the major sources of production were 
placed in British or French or Dutch hands, the American industry, military, and navy 
would have been cut off from supply, or easily forced to pay any price (not only in the 
monetary sense) imposed upon them. The strictly nationalistic policy that they proposed 
followed exactly from these premises. To address the problem of scarcity, what they 
argued for was «an American petroleum company financed with American capital, 
guided by American engineering, and supervised in its international relations by the 
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United States Government» to pump oil out of foreign ground. Indeed, it was either 
“American” oil or the risk of not getting oil at all. This is how the connection between 
the acquisition of foreign sources of supply and the security of the state emerged, 
through the application of a close neo-mercantilist reasoning that valued control and 
saw no space for compromise.  
In the report, Manning actually explained what control meant in the context of 
the oil industry – or at least what the federal oil experts thought it to be – and why it 
was important. He accused foreign countries, and especially Great Britain and France, 
of developing «nationalistic and national policy leading to the direct of indirect 
governmental control of oil production and distribution in the respective countries» 
before discussing the incentive behind it. He wrote that oil controlling policies had «a 
number of objects»:  
 
1) To insure an unhampered and certain supply of petroleum products in war as 
well as in peace;  
2) To benefit the public treasury. 
3) To secure for their own citizens all profits accruing from the petroleum 
business within the borders or zones of influence of these countries.  
4) To dominate indirectly shipping and commerce by controlling oil bunkering 
stations and sources of supply of petroleum. Petroleum products may be bartered for 
other raw materials or commodities».  
 
His analysis demonstrates that U.S. oil experts had already a clear understanding 
of the strategic implications of the issue of oil supply and deliberately choose to adopt 
this framework, which placed the American oil needs in a broader geopolitical context, 
to discuss it. Petroleum fields’ control was rather characterized as an element of state 
power and therefore as a valid reason to compete for.  
 
These explicit political considerations, which seemed to go well beyond the 
technical opinions usually requested from geologists and engineers, all came from a 
small group of specialized federal officials within the Department of Interior. They were 
the same civil servants who had been studying the American oil industry and its 
resources in the previous ten years and whose careers actually depended on natural 
resources’ preservation. WWI enhanced their visibility and their role, giving them the 
opportunity to build a successful working relationship with the petroleum industry. The 
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result could be seen in the growing emphasis they put in promoting foreign acquisition 
through government’s support to private business, and not direct state’s intervention or, 
worse, takeover, as in the British case. It is worth noticing that twice between 1919 and 
1920 the creation of an all-American oil company, in which the government would have 
had a direct participation, was proposed, and twice it was rejected in Congress. Among 
those opposing to the project, there were not only the industry’s executives who 
strongly argued against such a possibility, but also the oil experts themselves.  
This is just one of the issues over which the interests of both groups converged 
after the war. Indeed, federal geologists and engineers in those months found 
themselves suddenly much closer to the oil companies that they had been working with 
during the conflict. It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine if proximity to 
corporate interests had an influence over their sense of mission. What it is sure however 
is that between early 1919 and 1920, besides pushing for a course of action compatible 
with that desired by companies’ executives – i.e. government assistance to (not exert 
control over) private enterprise abroad –, some of them were becoming oil company 
representatives.  
In spring 1919, after the dissolution of the NPWSC, the industry’s need for a proper 
representative body led to the establishment of the American Petroleum Institute. 
Requa, who actually fostered its creation, had left his work within the administration 
and quickly became member of what could be called the first national trade petroleum 
association, serving as one of its directors. Manning followed soon after, assuming the 
role of Head of Research. Thomas O’Donnell, Requa’s director of production in the 
Fuel Administration, did the same, becoming API president.  
API’s creation both structured and expanded the network of government-
industry relations, which, from then on, would only become stronger. In mid-1919, 
Requa went to work as Vice-President of Sinclair Oil Company, while Secretary Lane 
and his personal assistant Joseph J. Cotter, accepted an offer of the Pan American Oil 
Company in 1920. Both companies had their presidents among the members of the 
NPWSC and, later, became API affiliates. Moreover, until 1920, Requa also served as 
vice-president in another trade association, the American Institute of Mining Engineers, 
together with his friend and soon to be Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover – who 
became president of the organization.  
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From mid-1919 on, Requa acted as a connecting link between Washington and 
the industry. His great familiarity with both the administration became extremely useful 
for the industry in trying to secure government’s assistance in the Middle East. On May 
1919, he communicated directly to the Department of State that «American oil interests 
are seriously considering examination of Mesopotamia and Palestine with view of 
acquiring oil territory». Before proceeding, he needed assurance that «such activities 
met [the] approval [of the] American Government» and that the «conditions of peace 
treaty [were] such as to permit American companies to enter that region under terms of 
equality as compared with foreign companies...»443. U.S. companies, too, turned 
directly to the Department of State for attention, as they began reporting the race against 
English companies more and more as an international dispute, rather than a commercial 
confrontation among competing firms. In the same days, Standard Oil of New York 
(Socony) complained to the State Department, which continued to be officially silent on 
the issue, that the British authorities’ forced a company representative in Jerusalem to 
open his office for inspection. The incident dated back to mid-1918, but it was not a 
coincidence that Standard decided to denounce it only months later, defining it a «very 
grave offense»444  
During the first half of 1919, this aggressive representation of British intentions 
was repeatedly brought to the US public, with articles on industry-related journals and 
newspapers about possible British oil «monopoly»445. British activities in the Middle 
East (together with commercial advances in Mexico) were seen as part of London’s 
deliberate attempt to lay hands on the world’s oil reserves, shutting the United States off 
from its much-needed supply. The issue also reached the floor of the US Senate, where 
Phelan disclosed Manning’s memo at the end of June446. Later on, the chamber 
published extracts from the Secretary Lane’s Annual Report to the President, in which 
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he called for «a policy prompt, determined, and looking many years ahead» in regards 
to petroleum supply447. 
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4.5 Shifting Gears Up 
After months of pressing concerns, the Department of State was eventually 
brought to recognize the importance of foreign oil supply. On August 16th, the Secretary 
of State Alvey A. Adee wrote to US consular posts: «The vital importance of securing 
adequate supplies of mineral oil both for present and future needs of the United States 
has been forcibly brought to the attention of the Department». It was the first time Adee 
was specifically addressing the problem, and asked for the «most complete and recent 
information regarding such activities either by United States citizens or by others 
countries»448.  
With the involvement of the State Department, the race for Middle Eastern oil 
against European oil companies formally acquired the status of a political and 
diplomatic issue, although it took almost another year, and further British moves in the 
region, before the administration aligned completely with the oil industry and experts’ 
requests. American companies continued to organize themselves for foreign ventures in 
the following months, while maintaining the pressure on Washington policy-makers for 
the establishment of a clear and secure policy of assistance in Middle East. Socony, one 
of the most active companies of Standard group in the region, renewed its grievances 
over British obstructionism during the summer449. When the State Department 
eventually questioned Great Britain’s intentions, London’s (weak) defensive argument 
explained that as long as those territories remained under its military occupation, it felt 
«bound to prohibit the activities of any explorer, commercial agents or 
concessionaires», in order to avoid confusion while waiting for the establishment of a 
new, formal authority450.  
The decision on the future status of those territories was indeed still officially 
pending in Paris. It seemed clearer, however, that both areas would fell under London 
jurisdiction thanks to the newly instituted mandate system of the League of Nations451. 
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This prospect was not reassuring for U.S. companies, which were particularly irritated 
by London discriminatory practices. The American Petroleum Institute formed its 
Foreign Relations Committee in order to help U.S. firms to take part in the exploration 
of new oil regions. Its chairmanship was assigned, unsurprisingly, to Standard’s 
president W. Teagle. On September 30, API’s president O’ Donnell communicated to 
the Secretary of State Robert Lansing the resolution adopted by the Board of Directors, 
based on the work of Teagle’s Committee. It urged the government to take «effective 
steps through diplomatic channels» in order to assure «American companies or citizens 
operating, or desiring to operate, in foreign countries the same privileges enjoyed in the 
United States by companies or citizens of such foreign countries»452. 
In the first months of 1920, as the negotiations continued to stall, the efforts to 
pressure the U.S. government were renewed. During the February meeting of the 
American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers in New York, Manning 
identified the «access to the sources of supply» as «the key to the future» and exhorted 
the other members «to educate the people of this country and their representatives as to 
the situation, and to urge such wise and necessary steps as would best relieve it»453. 
After him, Otis Smith lambasted the government for its inactivity, making specific 
reference to the much-needed support from Washington for an «Open Door» policy454. 
In commenting Otis’ speech, Requa was even harsher, holding US officials accountable 
for not having listened to their early warnings: 
 
«We face a lack of preparedness and appreciation of the gravity of the 
situation…that would be grotesque were it not for the tragedy involved. […] Our 
Government officials have before them a very unpleasant experience when they have to 
explain the lack of foresight as regards petroleum»455. 
 
AIMME offensive culminated few days later, when Requa prepared a petition 
entitled Imperative Need of Aggressive Foreign Policy as Regards the Oil Industry. The 
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document, which bore the signature of AIMME president Hoover for approval, was 
presented to both the White House and the Congress456. 
In those months, Requa brought his fight directly before the American people, 
writing a series of long articles that were published on the Saturday Evening Post, 
which at the time was one of the most influential and widely circulated magazines in the 
country. One of them – titled The Petroleum Problem of the World – described a post-
WWI world where competition was real and the risk of war still present. Looking back 
at the situation of Germany during the conflict, he warned the government and its 
people against not taking the issue of petroleum supply seriously. Washington ought to 
have a solid and coherent plan to safeguard the country and avoid its collapse.  
 
«Germany is an example of a country cut off from petroleum in time of war, 
attempting the use of all kinds of substitutes, and failing success in the end in part 
because of the lack of those very petroleum supplies. With such an example before us it 
is scarcely conceivable that the United States will permit itself ever to reach such a 
position; and yet, notwithstanding the war and its lessons, we have done absolutely 
nothing to anticipate such a contingency… 
National necessity, having to do mainly with industrial problems, was the 
underlying cause of the Great War; and again in the future commercial conditions will 
play a similar role unless wise statesmanship forestalls the crisis and provides adequate 
means whereby the situation will be not only anticipated but controlled… 
The industrial life of every nation depends today upon the products of petroleum… The 
collapse of industry spells national collapse, and it therefore follows that the nation 
must guard against such contingency»457  
 
Requa presented the access to foreign oil neither as an industrial, practical issue 
nor just as a commercial opportunity for few. Securing oil supply was a critical step in 
guaranteeing national growth and security. Petroleum came to be characterized as a 
fundamental factor in state power and, therefore, as a commodity worth competing for. 
Companies’ stakes in the control of the Middle Eastern petroleum resources were thus 
merged with what was considered a more general and inescapable national need – 
access to more oil: 
 
 «Due to the tremendous increase in consumption of raw materials, the struggle 
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for possession of the world’s reserves has assumed of late years a more and more acute 
phase. Farseeing statesmen have long since realized the necessity for providing - as far 
as possible - unlimited reserves to meet national requirements, not of today or 
tomorrow, but for centuries - the longer the better»458. 
 
The category of control is essential to understand Requa’s views about the 
structure and functioning of the oil industry, as well as the perceived threat to the 
security of the nation that the failure to acquire foreign sources would have caused.  
 
«In the world contest for raw materials the struggle for petroleum will be most 
intense. The uses to which it is put are fundamental and vital; the demand has grown 
and will continue to grow at a rate exceeding that of any other of the great mineral 
products. New sources of petroleum supply must be sought in the underdeveloped 
countries. Efforts to the national of each leading nation to control these supplies will 
involve friction so intense and severe that war may be the ultimate outcome of the 
struggle unless some plan is adopted by which the several conflicting national interests 
may be harmonized… 
Control of some of the most important foreign sources of petroleum supply is 
now in the hands of American companies. This control must be solidified, the companies 
strengthened and a plan perfected whereby America can deliver fuel oil not only to her 
own ships but to the ships of the world at any port at which they may call. 
No matter what our international arrangements may be, how liberal or fair the 
proposed action, we shall be unable to reap our share of the benefits or fulfill our tasks 
unless we are able to perform it as efficiently as other nations»459 
 
Requa continued to refuse to frame the acquisition of foreign oilfields simply in 
terms of commercial competition. It was the international standing of the United States, 
which the war had elevated to the rank of world power, which called for different, 
global, and more forceful approach to oil.   
 
«The United States cannot sit idly by a witness the passing of the world’s 
petroleum reserves into foreign lands. With the world’s raw materials under control of 
England the League of Nations would be but hollow mockery so far as industrial 
freedom is concerned. It is true we might avoid war, but at the price of industrial 
vassalage… 
Such procedure [England’s attempt to control all world oil] would be 
shortsighted in the extreme, as it would at once raise the question of a world monopoly 
of which England would alone be the beneficiary – a procedure so charged with danger 
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that its adoption seems hardly possible when once the United States invites attention to 
our mounting needs and our dominating position»460. 
 
Requa barely mentioned the oil companies themselves. He demanded action 
from the state, because at risk there was the safety of the nation. In this perspective, 
private oil firms, and their successful activities in the Middle East and elsewhere, 
became simply a means to reach what was seen as a broader national interest. The 
prosperity of the American industry was not an end in itself, but instrumental in 
achieving a national control over the world petroleum’s supply – a way to reassert the 
American position on the international arena and maintain a hold on friends and foes.  
The notion that “oil is power” was repeatedly presented to the American public 
in those years. As Rossiter put it already in early 1920 referring to the international 
struggle for possession and its strategic aspects, especially referring to the mobility of 
the Navy, «oil is a very big stick»461.  
These lobbying efforts made a breakthrough in the first half of 1920. 
Representatives in the US Congress, who were naturally more receptive to this kind of 
by then widely public concerns, acknowledged part of the oil experts’ requests adopting 
a new Mineral Leasing Act, which, among others things, basically denied access to U.S. 
oil lands to private interests of any country excluding U.S. companies from accessing 
oil fields under its control. The State Department too came to assume the oil industry’s 
viewpoint against Great Britain during the following months, when a series of 
unanticipated events convinced Washington policy-makers to reconsider the country’s 
international position. Back in October, the Secretary of State had duly warned London 
that, even if Great Britain had obtained the jurisdiction over Mesopotamia, it should 
have abided by the rules it had agreed to, i.e. «to secure to citizens of all nationalities 
members of the League of Nations, equal protections and the same rights as the 
acquisition of property…and that concessions will be granted…without distinction on 
the ground of nationality»462. This claim, however, ironically crumbled when the United 
States itself renounced to enter the League in March 1920, after Senate’s refusal to 
ratify the treaty. Short of this legalistic argument, the administration had to hold onto 
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the more general principle of the Open Door, as repeatedly advocated by the industry 
since the end of the War, in claiming what was by then considered the vital – and 
indisputable – U.S. need for Mesopotamian oil.  
This strategy became even more inevitable a month later, when the State 
Department learned about the April 1920 San Remo agreement between Great Britain 
and France, which divided among them the territories of the old Ottoman Empire, 
including its oil-bearing lands, and confirmed their influence over the whole area of the 
British mandate in Palestine and Mesopotamia. The pact stirred controversy in the 
United States. The State Department stepped up its diplomatic activity over the summer, 
initiating a tough exchange with London over oil access rights.  
At the beginning of 1921, when the new Republican administration of President 
Harding took office, a more assertive foreign policy toward foreign oil acquisition in the 
Middle East was virtually set: the relationship with Great Britain began where it had 
been left off, as the new administration completely embraced oil experts’ claims for 
foreign petroleum supply, building closer and closer ties with the oil industry to 
facilitate both the passage of information and the assistance to specific companies 
involved in foreign exploration. The State Department of Secretary Hughes, together 
with the Commerce Department of Secretary Hoover, became the staunchest supporters 
of the U.S. oil companies in the long struggle with London in Middle East, which ended 
– temporarily – only in 1927 when Great Britain eventually agreed to Washington’s 
pressures for participation in the development of the rich Mesopotamian oil fields.  
The main actors in the negotiations, of course, were the American and British 
companies themselves. By the time they found an agreement, the issue of oil supply was 
not as central in the American public and political debate as it was at the beginning of 
the decade. The main reason was that new large discoveries in Oklahoma, Texas, and 
California had flooded the country with oil. In a matter of few years, the scenario had 
shifted from possible exhaustion to certain overproduction, undermining the original 
argument for the acquisition of foreign sources of supply. Fears of scarcity were swiped 
off by a flush of oil that still raised concerns, but this time for the continuous drop in oil 
prices due to oversupply.  
What did not change was the underlying reasoning that connected the possession 
of oil resources with national security – the idea that oil was an instrument of state 
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power and that therefore the control over its supply, or the lack of it, what a vital matter 
for the state. The belief that a country could achieve this supposed control through the 
ownership of the oilfields by fellow nationals remained alive, too. In a true mercantilist 
fashion, U.S. oil experts were convinced that the physical possession of the sources of 
production by American companies could have assured a direct flow of oil from those 
distant territories to the homeland and its bunkering stations around the world, both in 
peacetime and in war, while accruing the national wealth. In other words, the presence 
of national companies in foreign producing countries was a necessary and actually 
sufficient condition to have a corresponding degree of control over the market and 
securing supply. 
The assumption that sees national oil companies as a powerful and effective 
instrument of national interest was (and has been) however exactly that: an assumption, 
something taken for granted and accepted as true without prior verification. Oil majors 
have instead never acted as governmental tool, nor have based their commercial 
strategies on what the idea of common good. Private companies operated according to a 
different set of rules, those of the market, and objectives, those of their investors. 
Already in the 1920s, instead of serving the country by delivering to its people (as well 
as its government, its military, and its navy) petroleum’s products at the lowest price, oil 
companies tried to negotiate lucrative supply contracts with their national governments 
and raise costs by restricting the production. Even the Anglo-Persian, usually pointed at 
the quintessential example of government-directed company, engaged in similar 
practices. The story of the oil industry is, indeed, one of attempted cartelization and 
evasion of regulation. In the United States more than anywhere else the central authority 
had never had any direct and formal means to participate in the definition of the 
companies’ commercial policies. Differently from what happened in Great Britain and 
elsewhere, the state had never held oil companies’ shares, therefore government 
officials, in that function, have never seated on board meetings.   
Furthermore, even if American oil companies could have ‘taken instructions’ 
directly from Washington regarding foreign acquisitions, they could have done very 
little to really secure supply – especially when it would have mattered most, i.e. in 
wartime. From a strategic perspective, distant oilfields were indeed not a reliable asset 
in time of war, since they were (and still are) extremely difficult to defend and equally 
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easy to destroy, or simply to damage up to the point of halting the production. What 
defined (or should have defined) the importance of oil reserves from a national security 
perspective was not the nationality of their owners, but their ability to defend them. 
Unless a country was powerful enough to maintain active and safe supply lines that 
could stretch for thousands of miles, as in the case of the Middle Eastern oil fields, and 
still have a physical military presence on site to avoid any possible disruption, foreign 
wells, whether they were in the hands of nationals or allies, were not sources of supply a 
state could safely rely on. As two commentators of the Anglo-American oil dispute 
wrote in the early 1920s, the «government’s policy of owning or controlling the sources 
of its oil supplies is entirely unnecessary»463. The idea that command of oil production 
is essential for the command of the seas is a «fallacy», which actually turns the reality 
upside down. On the contrary, «the axiom on which they might have proceeded is that 
command of the seas is essential for command of the oil production». This is because 
«in time of war, control of the sea routes makes every oilfield in the world a potential 
source of supply».  
Yet despite the continuously increasing levels of domestic production, the 
formal and factual separation in place between the federal government and private 
business (and thus between public policy and corporate interest), and a strategic reality 
that greatly downplayed the importance of the formal ownership of the fields vis-à-vis 
sovereignty and military power, the original oil-security nexus, which connected the 
possession of the oilfield with the possibility of actually ‘controlling’ its production and 
therefore with the energy security of the country, has never left the American political 
and public debate. The historian M. J. Hogan noted that, after the heated exchanges of 
the early 1920s between Washington and London, the oil companies were able to find 
an agreement and neutralize the conflict, acting as a buffer between the states and de-
politicizing the issue of supply. In fact, the process of oil securitization was never 
reversed. At the end of the 1920s, American and British companies eliminated a reason 
for a possible international confrontation, but did not change the discourse about oil. 
Petroleum continued to be considered a strategic commodity and, as soon as fears about 
its immediate and future availability arose again, as in the 1940s, the very same 
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arguments about the importance of securing access to the Middle Eastern oilfields and 
controlling the production through “national presence”, reentered the policy-making 
process as well as the public debate. The securitarian rhetoric used to frame, present, 
and justified Washington’s interest for the region actually benefited the oil companies 
themselves, which were once again recognized as interpreters of the country’s security 
needs.  
The notion of “national security” acquired a specific connotation after WWII. 
Yet the very same expression was repeatedly used already after the WWI when 
discussing oil-related matters. A 1923 Report of the Federal Trade Commission on 
Foreign Ownership in the Petroleum Industry, for example, clearly summarized the 
reasoning behind the U.S. approach towards oil making direct reference to the fact that: 
 
«....Among the other result of the war it may be noted that a spirit of nationalism 
was awakened in all of the important countries of the world, which involved the ideas of 
self-determination, self-preservation, and national security. The latter idea immediately 
suggested the importance of conserving the natural resources and raw materials of any 
given country and of extending holdings by acquisitions abroad. These considerations 
led to the adoption of governmental programs of exclusion or discrimination against 
foreigners, together with the development o their own natural resources by their own 
citizens. Due to the demonstrate vital importance of large supplies of petroleum in the 
World War for oil-burning navies, for the merchant marine, for airplanes, and for the 
transportation of Army supplies and equipment, there was a widespread realization that 
a nation possessing ample petroleum reserves had a tremendous advantage over any 
nation not possessing adequate supplies of petroleum products...  
It appears self-evident that a country having widely distributed sources of supply 
storage, and distributing facilities is in a much stronger competitive position than one 
with concentrated sources of supply»464.  
 
This notion of energy security strictly connected with the idea of ‘control’ of 
“crystalized” in the minds of both American officials’ and citizens, as the same rhetoric 
continued to be used even once the fear of oil scarcity was long gone. Throughout the 
interwar period, foreign acquisition and internal conservation remained the two faces of 
the same coin for those who saw oil as a vital asset for the U.S. In December 1924, 
President Coolidge established the Federal Oil Conservation Board. Although the 
country was not, by any means, suffering from underproduction at the time, the 
president’s decree read:   
                                                
464 Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Foreign Ownership in the Petroleum Industry, February 
1923 (Washington DC, Government Printing Office, 1923), p. 33. 
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«Developing aircrafts indicate that our national defense must be supplemented, 
if not dominated, by aviation. It is even probable that the supremacy of nations may be 
determined by the possession of available petroleum and its products…  
Oil, of which our resources are limited, is largely talking the place of coal, the supply of 
which seems to be unlimited, but coal can not take the place of oil in most of its higher 
uses, on land or sea or in the air...  
For the purpose of giving this responsibility of government in all of its aspects 
the consideration it demands, I have constituted a Federal Oil Conservation Board 
consisting of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, and Commerce, to study the 
Government’s responsibilities and to enlist the full cooperation of representatives of the 
oil industry in the investigation… 
Last March I appointed a commission to advise me on the special subject of the 
best policy to insure the future supply of fuel oil for the Navy. That commission will 
continue to function in its limited field and might to advantage sit with the Conservation 
Board in the conferences I expect will be between these four Secretaries directly 
concerned and the outstanding producers of petroleum. Similarly, the members of the 
Conservation Board will call upon their technical adviser in the bureaus to contribute 
to the full discussion of ways and means of safeguarding the national security through 
conservation of our oil»465. 
 
In «Oil», a series of booklets prepared and published by the American Petroleum 
Institute in 1930, the narrative revolving around the concept of national security was 
expressed in even equally clear terms. A section, titled The World Goes Round on Oil, 
read: 
 
«The world was brought to a full realization of the importance of petroleum in 
every-day life, in industry, and in safeguarding national security by the World War. The 
use of fuel oil in factories and for ship propulsion, and the demand for specialized fuels 
and lubricants made by air transportation, had their inception during the war. 
 
Before the war probably less than 4 percent of the word’s vessel tonnage burned 
oil; today 34 percent is oil burning. This includes the Dieselized ship, the automobile of 
the sea…Half the ships being built in the world today are Diesel ships»466. 
 
The same security considerations became officially engrained in U.S. oil policy 
during WWII, when Washington’s assessments on the strategic value of the Middle 
Eastern oilfields – repeating those very assumptions about oil, the structuring of the 
                                                
465 Letter of appointment of the Federal Oil Conservation Board, dated December 19, 1924; the letter is 
present in the introduction of the First Report of the Federal Oil Conservation Board (Washington DC, 
Government Printing Office, 1926), Reports of the Federal Conservation Boards, Hoover Presidential 
Archive, West Branch (IA), USA 
466 Oil (New York: American Petroleum Institute, 1930), p. 45 
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industry, and the notion of energy security – unmistakably argued for their importance 
for the country’s national security.  
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